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Abstract
Previous studies on depression have suggested that depression is accompanied by
memory disturbances such as memory deficits (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993). The thesis aims to explore depressive
memory deficits in terms of long-term and short-term memory, employing precision of
elaboration and memory span tasks respectively.
The long-term memory deficits focused on elaboration deficits using a subjectgenerated elaboration method (Stein, & Bransford, 1979). Regarding elaboration deficits in

depression, several studies suggested that memory deficits in recall occur in tasks requir
elaborative processing such as in semantic processing within the depth of processing
paradigm, and processing of elaborated sentences (Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello,
& Gerdt, 1981, study 1; Ellis, Thomas, & Rodrigez, 1984, study 1). Recall deficits due to
these elaboration deficits were attributed to inadequate allocation of cognitive effort
expended on the current task. In addition Hasher and Zacks (1988) and Abramson, Alloy,
and Rosoff (1981) suggested that depression interferes with elaborative processing. These
elaborative processing deficits were inferred from reduced performance in overall recall.

However, the purpose of the first three experiments was to examine directly this elaborati
processing deficit through precision of elaboration, as well as recall, using a subject-

generated elaboration method. The results showed that both recall and the extent of precis

elaboration depends upon the task instructions. Consistent with this hypothesis, dysphoric

students generated less precise elaboration in a more controlled task instruction, and gre
depression is associated with less precise elaboration (experiment IC), while in a less

controlled task instruction (experiment 1A), such a difference in the precision of elabora
disappears. Reduced recall performance was found in experiment 1A, but not in experiment
IC. These results were discussed in terms of a cognitive effort account of depressive
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memory deficits and the reduced initiative hypothesis. It seems that these results put a
constraint on a general elaborative processing deficit.
The following chapter shifted the focus to the mood induction procedure from

naturally occurring depression with aiming to develop a better mood induction procedure in
terms of duration and intensity. The most popularly used mood induction procedure, the
Velten Mood Induction Procedure is flawed by its short-lived induced mood, particularly
when cognitive and behavioural measurement proceeds (Clark, 1983). To overcome this
problem, this study examined the effects of three mood induction procedures (the Velten
procedure, music mood induction, and the combined Velten-plus-music procedure) on the
strength and duration of induced depression while undertaking a sentence completion task.
Mood state was measured prior to, immediately after, and at 3 six-minute intervals after
mood induction. The results showed that the Velten-plus-music and Velten procedures
induced a large immediate increase in depression scores as measured by the Depression
Adjective Check List (DACL) and a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). Mood induced by the
Velten-plus-music and music procedure was relatively stable through the post-induction
period, but mood induced by the Velten procedure dissipated quickly over time. Anxiety

level was increased by all three induction procedures, relative to a neutral music control

condition. The results show that the transient mood change induced by the Velten procedure
can be prolonged by playing depressing music.
The subsequent four experiments examined verbal short-term memory. The effect of
dysphoric mood states on immediate serial recall was investigated from a working memory
perspective. Experiments 3A and 3B found no differences between dysphorics and

nondysphoric controls with respect to either serial recall of 6 or 7 digits, or speech rat

measures. Self-report questionnaires indicated that the dysphorics had a higher incidence
negative automatic thoughts and task-irrelevant thoughts while performing the memory
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tasks. However, this did not influence serial recall performance. Experiment 3C investigate

serial recall for long and short words, and found similar levels of recall performance, wo

length effects and speech rates in natural dysphorics and three groups of nondysphorics wh

were subjected to either neutral, elated or dysphoric mood induction. The natural dysphori
reported more negative automatic thoughts than any of the mood-induced groups, but no
differences in report rates for task-irrelevant thoughts were found. In experiment 3D, a

running memory span task was used, in which subjects were required to recall the final six

items of a list in which list length was 6, 8, 10, or 12 items. In this task, dysphorics s
memory deficits only when list length exceeded 6 items, and updating of the rehearsal set
was required. The results of Experiments 3A - 3C show that the articulatory loop is
functioning normally in dysphorics, but experiment 3D suggests that dysphorics have

difficulty in adapting their rehearsal strategies, suggesting a deficit in central executi

function. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between automatic vs. effo
processing, and in terms of the distinction of maintenance vs. elaborative rehearsal.
The next two experiment address similar issues to verbal short-term memory in the
visual recognition memory of matrix patterns with varying retention intervals (1, 8, 15
seconds). Experiment 4A using a 4 x 4 matrix pattern showed that recognition performance
of dysphorics did not deteriorate more rapidly over retention intervals, compared to
nondysphorics, nor did overall performance vary between both groups. The subsequent
experiment, 4B, used a 5 x 5 matrix pattern with longer retention intervals (1, 15, 30
seconds). There was a significant interaction between group and retention intervals.
However, this interaction effect was due to poor performance of dysphoric subjects in the
immediate recognition test rather than in a longer retention interval, compared to

nondysphorics. These results suggest encoding difficulties rather than difficulties in the
maintenance rehearsal of stimuli. In terms of the working memory model, these results are

VI

similar to those in verbal short-term memory, suggesting that dysphoric students have some

difficulties with central executive functioning rather than with the visuo-spatial scratch pad
responsible for the maintenance rehearsal of visual stimuli,
In sum, the results reported appear to fit better with the initiative deficit hypothesis
rather than the reduced attentional capacity or cognitive effort accounts of depressive
memory deficits because performance of depressives was sensitive to task instruction and
cognitive strategy rather than task difficulty.
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CHAPTER 1
Theoretical Frameworks of Memory Disturbances in Depression

1.1 Phenomenology of Depression
Depression has been used to describe a brief negative mood which ordinary
people experience in their daily life and whose duration lasts a few minutes or a day,

having little disruptive effect on their life; for example, interest in their usual ple

activities, cognitive functioning, and interpersonal relationships. Most people from ti

to time experience depressed affect as a transitory reaction to life events, such as mi

failures and disappointment. In general, they make an effort to exit from such distress
and most find that depressed periods pass quickly. However, some people experience a
more lasting negative affect, developing more severe depressed affect with
accompanying symptoms; eg., negative thoughts and feelings about themselves. They

become more self-occupied, recalling unpleasant experiences more frequently, find fault
with themselves, which consequently leads to a negative self-concept, pessimism about
the future and the current situation (Beck, 1967).
To identify general features of depression is important because any theoretical
framework should take account of these features. Major symptoms of depression can be
categorized into cognitive, somatic, and motivational aspects. According to the DSMIII-R (1987) and Akiskal and McKinney (1975), besides dysphoric mood, various
symptoms accompany depression; negative cognitions of the self (eg., self-devaluation
and low self-concept), thoughts disturbances (eg., poor concentration, mixed-up
thoughts, and slow thinking ), intrusive thoughts of death or suicide, motivational

deficits (eg., lethargic responding and decreased interest in usual activities), and so

changes (weight loss or gain, sleep disturbances, and appetite disturbance). Each of the
symptoms has received attention from many researchers by examining the difference
between depressed and nondepresed persons. For example, in relation to negative

2

cognitions of the self, Beck, Steer, Epstein, & B r o w n (1990) using the Beck SelfConcept Test, showed that depressed patients (unipolar and bipolar depressives) have
low and negative self-concept relative to anxiety patients and psychiatric controls.
Regarding decreased interests in activities, Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978) found
that people whose depressed mood was induced by having them lose at a computer war
game are less likely to attend to another acitivity, compared with people in an elated
mood through winning. These results suggest that depression reduces interest in
activities.
As an example of poor concentration, Watts and Sharrock (1985) found that
depressed patients experience concentration problems in reading and watching the
television. In relation to psychomotor retardation, clinically depressed people slowed

down their speech rate as measured by the total time taken to count from 1 to 10 in their
own time (e.g., Szabadi, Bradshaw, & Besson, 1976; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).
Concerning weight fluctuation, Frost, Goolkasian, Ely, and Blanchard (1982) studied
current eating behaviour among high- and low-restraint people while they were
undergoing the Velten mood induction procedure (VMTP, 1968; elation, depression, and

neutral). Depressed high-restraint people took in significantly more food than neutral or
elated high-restraint people and depressed low-restraint people. These results suggest

that depression can have effects on an actual eating behaviour as a function of one's le

of eating history (high vs. low restraint). Two studies on suicidal intent (Hill, Gallagh
Thompson, & Ishida, 1988; Ranieri, Steer, Lavrence, Rissmiller, Piper, & Beck, 1987)
reported that depression is positively correlated with suicidal intent.
Despite such diverse differences between nondepressed and depressed people,
there are some controversial issues. Firstly, whether such depression-related symptoms
are unique to depressed people or are part of a non-specific negative symptomatology of
general psychopathology (cf. Gotlib, 1984; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995).
Secondly, depression co-occurs commonly with anxiety disorders, eating disorder,
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alcohol, and drug abuse (Gotlib, & H a m m e n , 1992). Particularly, to select a purely
depressed sample from a student population seems difficult (Ingram, Kendall, Smith,
Donnell, & Ronan, 1987). Finally, another issue is whether mild/moderate depression
classified by dint of psychometric measures (e.g., BDI), not by clinical diagnosis, is
qualitatively the same as clinical depression (Depue & Monroe, 1978). In other words,

this is the issue of whether depression can be placed on the continuum ranging from mild

to severe depression. The last issue is particularly relevant here because the following
experiments in this thesis rely on dysphoric students except for two experiments. The
following section will address this issue in detail.

1.2 Generalisability of Findings from Analogue Studies to Clinical Depression
Depression-related studies have relied on different depressed subject populations;

e.g., mildly/moderately depressed students, elderly depressed people, clinically depress
patients (e.g., Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985; Gibson, 1981; Weingartner et
al., 1981). In addition, researchers have used a mood induction procedure to induce

depression (e.g., Ellis et al., 1984). One controversial issue is whether findings from t
analogue studies using either mood induction procedures or a mildly/moderately
depressed student population can be generalised to the clinical population.
Many of the studies have relied on the student population. Depressed students
were screened out from the student population by using various psychometric
measurements (e.g., BDI: Beck Depression Inventory, Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock,
& Erbaugh, 1961). The typical procedure in the selection of depressed students is to
administer the BDI and to classify them into depressed and nondepressed group

according to their scores on the BDI. However, the concerns of generality and validity o
analogue studies using the student population to clinical depression were addressed due
to following reasons (Depue & Monroe, 1978; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). One of the

central concerns is with the severity of depression; depressed patients are more severel
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depressed than college students. In addition, in other demographic factors such as age,

marital status, IQ, and education, college students and clinical patients may be different
Secondly, depression in college students is confounded with other general psychological
distress such as anxiety, hostility, and maladaptive beliefs (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983).
Relative to college students, depressed patients show more dramatic impairment in
behavioural, anxiety, and other somatic components. Finally, depression experienced by
college students is ephemeral and unstable, relative to clinical depression. However, in
their recent review on analogue studies using college students, Vredenburg, Flett, and
Krames (1993) concluded that these claims are not well founded, and that the existing
empirical findings suggested that the general findings from analogue studies using

dysphoric student populations are similar to those from clinical depression. Another type
of analogue studies employing a mood induction procedure will be discussed in another
chapter.

1.3 Theoretical Frameworks of "Depression and Memory"
Many researchers on depression are interested in what factors make people
depression-prone, contribute to the maintenance of depression, and what kinds of
qualitative and quantative changes in cognitive and interpersonal areas depressed people
experience. Particularly in the area of "depression and memory", diverse theoretical
frameworks have been proposed to explain negative memory bias and memory deficits in
depressed people (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1988; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Ellis &
Ashbrook, 1988, Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Memory function in
depressed people has been investigated quite extensively using the application of the
information processing approach to "depression and memory". A number of depressionrelated studies employing experimental paradigms at all levels of cognition have been
conducted; for example, verbal and visual short-term memory (e.g., Colby & Gotlib,
1988; Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1989), depth of processing (eg.,
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D e n y & Kuiper, 1981; Davis, 1979a; Kuiper & D e n y , 1982), cognitive effort (eg., Ellis
et al., 1984), implicit vs. explicit memory (Roediger & McDermont, 1992; Elliott &
Greene, 1992; Denny & Hunt, 1992; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992),
and attentional bias (e.g., MaCabe & Gotlib, 1993; Ingram, Bernet, & McLaughlin,
1994). The advantage of employing these experimental paradigms is that more specified
cognitive processes can be investigated; which memorial processes are impaired and
which remain intact in depression.
Three main frameworks of effects of depression on memory will be considered:
the first predicts a negative memory bias of depressives towards negative information
(e.g., Beck, 1967, 1979; Bower, 1981), the second is related to depressive memory

deficits (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), and the third is associat
with depressive self-focused attention as a mediating variable of depressive memory
deficits and memory bias (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Each framework is
different in their emphases on different aspects of altered cognitive functioning. The
negative memory bias is predicated on schematic/network processing, depressive
memory deficits are based on the assumption of limited attentional capacity, and the
explanation of negative memory bias and performance deficits relies on the selfregulatory process and self-focused attention.
Secondly, in regard to emotional contents of stimuli used, the three major
frameworks are different. The schema/network and self-focused attentional models
mainly have been interested in the interaction between emotional contents and
depression, whereas the attentional capacity model is more concerned with neutral ones

in that the content of stimuli is neither positively nor negatively valenced. Even tho
depressive memory deficits are of a primary interest to the current study, the three
approaches are discussed because of their complementary function in understanding
depressive memory deficits.
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1.3.1 Attentional Capacity-related Frameworks and Depression
Several reviews on cognitive functioning in depression demonstrated that

depression impairs cognitive functioning including memory (McAllister, 1981; Williams
et al., 1988; Miller, 1975; Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993; Ellis &

Ashbrook, 1989; Burt et al., 1995). The following frameworks in this category dealt w
such questions as the nature and extent of the memory impairment and the etiology of
such deficits in depression. The common assumption among frameworks is that
depressive memory deficits arise from a limited attentional capacity which can be
allocated to various mental activities including depressive thoughts (cf. Kahneman,

1973). According to the general capacity theory (cf. Kahneman, 1973), different menta

activities impose different demands on the limited capacity and these activities req
attention compete for the limited amount of resources. In general the allocation of

attentional resources is affected by four factors; i) a dispositional tendency refle

involuntary attention (e.g., allocate attention to a novel smell; to one's name in th

unattended ear; ii) momentary intentions, iii) the evaluation of demands, and iv) the
levels of arousal (Norman, 1976). From this general notion of the capacity theory,
several variants have developed, which will be described in the following sections.

1.3.1.1 Reduced Attentional Capacity Model
With the assumption of the limited attentional capacity, Hasher and Zacks (1979)

proposed a theory to account for the effects of aging, arousal, stress, and depressio
memory. The theory comprises two basic assumptions. The first one is that cognitive
operation on most tasks requires some attentional resources; at the one end of the
continuum are automatic processes, at the other end, effortful processes. Automatic

processes are considered as requiring minimal attentional resources from the limitedcapacity attentional mechanism. They can occur without intention, and without

interfering with other processing and they do not benefit from practice. In contrast,
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effortful processes require considerable attentional capacity, and so tend to interfere with

other cognitive activities also requiring capacity (cf. Hartlage et al., 1993). In reg
attributes of automatic vs. effortful processes, they claimed that automatic processes
encode the fundamental aspects of the flow of information, i.e., spatial, temporal
information, and frequency of occurence (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1984; cf. Ellis, 1990,
1991). On the other hand, effortful processes are involved in learning and memory
including imagery, rehearsal, organization, and mnemonic techniques. The second

assumption is that attentional capacity varies both within and between individuals. The

available attentional capacity at any moment is affected by such variables as depressio
age, and stress.
With these two assumptions, they contended that reduced available capacity
could occur because of a reduction in total attentional capacity in depression. As a

result, the reduced attentional capacity impairs those cognitive processes particularly
requiring attentional capacity (i.e., effortful processes) but has no effect on those

processes not requiring attentional capacity (i.e., automatic processes). In regard to

relationship between the severity of depression and available capacity, their subsequ
studies suggested that the degree of reduction in attentional capacity is proportional
the severity of depression (Hasher et al., 1985; Hasher, Zacks, Rose, & Doren, 1985).
The impairing effects of depression on the effortful tasks were tested in a forced
choice recognition test and recall of prose among mildly/moderately depressed people
(Hasher & Zacks, 1979, study 4; Hasher et al., 1985). The findings of some earlier

studies were not supportive of their prediction; overall performance deficits in depr
were not found in either test. The null findings in the prose recall were interpreted
the prose task might not be so demanding as to disrupt performance and/or the level of
depression was not severe. However, a recent review on depressive memory deficits in
terms of the continuum of automatic vs. effortful processing supported the assumption
that depression interferes with effortful processing but not with automatic processing
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(Hartlage et al., 1993). M o r e apparent memory deficits were found in clinical depression
than mild/moderate depression such as in a student population. On the other hand, as
they claimed, the processing of frequency was not disrupted by depression (Hasher &
Zacks, 1979, study 3). However, there is some controversy over whether processing of
spatial information by nondepressed people is automatic (cf. Naveh-Benjamin, 1987,
1988; Ellis, 1990, 1991). Furthermore whether the spatial processing of information in
depression remains intact is not clear.
One of the drawbacks with this framework (Hasher & Zacks, 1979) is that the
model is not clear about the mechanism of how depression reduces the available
capacity. The revised capacity model (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) addressed this problem. In
response to criticisms of the general capacity view, Hasher and Zacks (1988) proposed
the revised capacity model which was originally designed to predict the relationship
among age, memory, and discourse comprehension. However, Hasher and Zacks (1988)
claimed that the model could be applied to the studies of depression (pp. 194). In
contrast with the old reduced capacity model, the revised framework proposed an

inhibition mechanism to explain cognitive deficits in depressive mood states. The norma

function of the inhibition mechanism is to prevent task-irrelevant ideas (called off-go
path thoughts) from entering into working memory, helping people concentrate on the
current criteria of the task. In depressed mood states, the inhibition mechanism is
malfunctioning or becomes inefficient, and as a result, more off-goal-path thoughts are
allowed to enter working memory. Once they enter working memory space, it allows the

irrelevant information to receive sustained activation. Three categories of off-goal-p
thoughts were illustrated: irrelevant environmental details, personalistic memories or

concerns, and off-goal-path interpretations. The hypothesis of a malfunctioning inhibit
mechansim in depression suggests that depressive memory deficits can occur due to offgoal-path thoughts which could occupy or compete for the limited working memory
capacity with goal-path thoughts. In addition, they put forward more specific

9

assumptions. M o r e specifically, this malfunctioning inhibition mechanism can cause

lowered self-initiated activity in elaborative processing, resulting in poor elaboration a
attentional deficits by reducing the ability to switch their attention from one task to
another. In sum, the possible cause of depressive memory deficits lies in the malfunction
of an inhibition mechanism and the intrusion of off-goal-path thoughts into working
memory capacity (thought contents).
The concept of off-goal-path thoughts appears parallel to such various terms as
task-irrelevant and extra task-irrelevant thoughts (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), and negative
automatic thoughts (Beck, 1967; Hollen & Kendall, 1980). In a similar vein, the concept
of a degenerated cognitive structure (inefficient inhibition mechanism) was proposed by
Kuhl and Helle (1986) to explain depressive memory deficits. According to the
degenerated cognitive structure hypothesis, memory deficits occur because an inefficient
inhibition mechanism allows degenerated intentions to intrude into working memory
capacity. The concept of a degenerated intention can be compared to off-goal path
thoughts (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Kuhl and Helle (1986) defined intentional states as the
most self-committing and motivational states and claimed that depression involves
excessive perseveration of intentional states related to unfulfilled goals arising from
events such as object loss or loss of control. The degenerated intention means that

depressed people tend to encode unrealistic intentions into realistic ones. This hypothesi
was examined in a study which compared depressed patients with nondepressed patient
controls on short-term memory span by inducing degenerated-intention. As predicted,

depressed patients found it difficult to discard unrealistic intentions. On the memory spa
task, depressed patients in the degenerated condition showed a poor performance,
compared to nondepressed patient controls. They concluded that depressive STM
deficits occur due to the interference of unfulfillable intentions within working memory.
Compared to the revised reduced-capacity framework (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), the
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degenerated intention hypothesis placed more

emphasis on

the motivational

(intentional/volitional) aspect of depression to explain depressive memory deficits.

1.3.1.2 Resource Allocation Model
From a similar perspective to Hasher and Zacks (1979, 1988), Ellis and
Ashbrook (1988, 1989) proposed a resource allocation model to explain the disruptive
effects of emotional mood states on memory tasks. Their model makes three principal
assumptions to explain the mainly disruptive effects of depressed mood states on
cognitive performance. First, emotional states such as depression regulate the allocation
of attentional resources, such that the total available capacity in depression is reduced.
Second, in most cases, the encoding of information usually requires some allocation of
capacity, which is the same as the assumption by Hasher and Zacks (1979). Third,
memory performance is frequently correlated with the amount of capacity allocated to
the cognitive task (e.g., Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979). As additional elements,
"irrelevant-task processing" and "extra-task processing" were proposed to explain
memory deficits in depressed mood states.
Irrelevant-task processing means that attentional processing of subjects is
directed to all those features of a task which are unnecessary for optimal performance of
the criteria task, while extra-task processing means any allocation of their attentional
capacity to a whole range of potential cognitive activities directed toward any events
other than the criterion task (eg., thinking about sad feeling). With these assumptions,
they predict that depressive memory deficits occur on effortful tasks when some portion

of total capacity is diverted to irrelevant-task and/or extra-task processing. In addition,
their review illustrated some variables affecting depressive memory deficits; structural
and organisational characteristics of the task, its personal relevance, task demands, and
the degree of knowledge or expertise of subjects. Concerning these variables, it was
claimed that the processing of highly organized, highly personally relevant, familiar
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materials would require fewer cognitive resources (less effortful processing) and thus
should be relatively impervious to any disruptive mood effects.
In sum, depression reduces the total available capacity but depressive memory

deficits are determined by both the extent of cognitive effort required by a task and/or

irrelevant/extra-task processing. That is, despite this reduced capacity, they can perf
as well as nondepressives at relatively easy task.
In comparison to the reduced capacity model (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1988), the
resource allocation model has many common features to explain memory deficits in
depressed mood states. First of all, both frameworks assume a limited attentional
resource and depressive mood states reduce the attentional capacity available to the
current task. Secondly, these task-irrelevant thoughts (irrelevant-task processing and
extra-task processing) and off-goal path thoughts respectively can compete for the
reduced capacity with task-relevant thoughts. Thirdly, depressive memory deficits are
most likely to occur in conditions when the task requires effortful processing. This
account of depressive memory deficits was called the "cognitive effort account" by
Hertel and Rude (1991a).
This argument was supported through depressive memory deficits found across

three studies (Ellis et al., 1984). In three studies employing an incidental recall para
experimentally depressed people showed an overall recall decrement in elaborative

processing of sentences, in semantic processing of words, and in more difficult sentence
frame to fit a target word in. These overall deficits were interpreted as being due to
poor allocation of attentional resources to the more effortful task condition. So
processing of elaborated sentences, semantic processing of words, and sentences
accompanying more difficult decision, are assumed to be more effortful than
nonelaborated, structural processing, and sentences with a less difficult decision

respectively. However, in effect, no measurements of either cognitive effort expended or

i nnno rm 55789 1
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depressive thoughts (irrelevant/extra-task processing) as possible causes of deficits were
undertaken.
There are some criticisms of the resource allocation model, which are applicable
to the reduced capacity model (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Kihlstrom (1989) noted that the
resource allocation model is ambiguous about the effects of positive mood states on
memory. Particularly he raised the question of whether positive as well as negative

thoughts can induce task-irrelevant processing, thus impairing performance. Secondly,
pointed out that the model can not predict other memory phenomena such as moodcongruence and mood state-dependent learning and retrieval (e.g., Bower, 1981).

Riskind (1989) noted that the motivational factor was ignored in the model. Motivation
deficits were proposed as an explanatory framework for depressive memory deficits

(Miller, 1975; McAllister, 1981). As an alternative view to the resource allocation mo

he suggested that due to low motivation of depressives, depression may also diminish t

person's expectation that attending or allocating resources to tasks would produce any

benefit. The hypothesis of motivational deficits is contrast with the reduced capacity
model and the resource allocation model in that the motivational hypothesis does not

necessarily assume a reduced attentional capacity. Also it can predict that the depr

memory deficits can be removed if attention or interest could be stimulated by suitabl

incentives or more specific instructions to encourage depressed people. Another probl

with both models is that there is rarely any independent measure of attentional capaci

allocation (Mitchell & Hunt, 1989). Furthermore it is not clear what makes the task mo
or less demanding.

1.3.1.3 Reduced Cognitive Initiative vs. Resource Allocation Models
Recently the reduced capacity and the resource allocation models have been
challenged. In contrast with those capacity-based frameworks (Hasher & Zacks, 1979;

Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), Hertel and Hardin (1990) explained depressive memory deficits
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in terms of reduced initiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990) or reduced cognitive self-control
(Hertel, 1994). They assumed that if depressed subjects can allocate resources and
perform as well as nondepressed subjects on effortful tasks, the origin of the deficit lies
in the stage of initiating such effortful processing rather than a lack of ability due to
reduced capacity. According to this model, depression inhibits cognitive initiative, so that
depressed people do not spontaneously use strategies or engage in the types of
elaborative thinking that produces good performance, hence causing depressive m e m o r y
deficits particularly in the uncontrolled task. However, they are able to do so w h e n they
are given a specific instruction to muster their attention to the current task. So an
emphasis shifts away from reduced capacity to the initiation of cognitive strategy for
memorial processes for optimal performance particularly in an uncontrolled task
condition.
A similar argument to the reduced initiative model was mentioned in the previous
studies (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Abramson, Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981). According to
Hasher and Zacks (1988), depression reduces self-initiated activities, whose role is to
create distinctive m e m o r y traces through elaboration. A s a result, depressives are likely
to show their m e m o r y deficits w h e n the task requires self-initiated activities from
subjects. The difference to the reduced initiative model is that the reduction in selfinitiated activities results from the reduced processing resources. Abramson et al. (1981)
examined the hypothesis testing strategy of depressed students in the response-outcome
paradigm of the learned-helplessness model. Depressed students show poor performance
in the self-generated hypothesis condition, but not in the experimenter-provided
hypothesis condition. They suggested that in general, depressives do not seem to actively
engage in cognitive strategies; for example, attention focusing, m e m o r y search and
rehearsal. Performance deficits in depressives are closely associated with failure of
depressives to initiate helpful cognitive strategies for the solution of the problems. A
similar conclusion can be drawn from a study examining problem solving strategy
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(Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983). In the "Levene task" (Levene, 1966) examining
hypothesis-testing behaviour, depressed patients are to narrow down possible solutions
until they reach the final solution. Depressed subjects show poor performance due to
poor focusing (inability to narrow down a set of hypotheses) and perseveration on
disconfirmed hypotheses. These results can be interpreted in terms of the reduced

initiative hypothesis; as self-initiated activities for problem solving can be seen as

controlled situation relative to an experimenter-provided condition, depressed subjec
could show performance deficits.
Furthermore, several studies have tested the reduced initiative model (Hertel,
1994; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991a, 1991b; Channon, Baker, &
Robertson, 1993a; Slife & Weaver, 1992). Hertel and Hardin (1990) tested these

predictions using implicit and explicit memory tests (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982). It i

generally accepted that an implicit memory test is not affected by cognitive strategi

subjects, but an explicit memory test is. So if depressed subjects do not elect any st

spontaneously for their performance, which is not specified by the experimenter, in tha
situation the lack of initiative should be reflected on the explicit memory test. This
assumption was confirmed in study 1 using biasing of homophone spelling and
recognition of homophones as implicit and explicit memory tests respectively.
Experimentally induced depressed subjects showed depressive memory deficits in the

explicit memory test, recognition, but not in the implicit memory test. This dissociati
between implicit and explicit tests suggest that nondepressed subjects could use any
cognitive strategy which is not set up by the task characteristics. When the study 2
supplied subjects with a possible strategy, memory deficits found in the recognition
disappeared. These results imply that depressed subjects did not generate helpful

strategies for the recognition test, while nondepressed subjects did. Depression reduc

self-initiated cognitive strategy in the retrieval phase. In sum, the locus of the dep
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m e m o r y deficit lies in the initiation of strategy, not of effortful processing in the
recognition task.
Other supportive results were obtained with experiments using the sentence
completion task in which subjects were to fit a sensible word in the sentence frame
(Hertel & Rude, 1991b). The variation of initiation by subjects can be induced by
encoding instruction, in contrast with the study (Hertel & Hardin, 1990), in which an

initiative strategy can be set up at retrieval stage. Two task instructions were employ

In the focused instruction condition, subjects were required to rehearse the target wor

while in the nonfocused instruction condition, the choice of rehearsal of the target wo

was dependent upon the subjects. As predicted by the model, in the incidental recall of
target words, depressive memory deficits occurred in the unfocused instruction
condition.
Another recent study (Hertel, 1994) supported the reduced initiative model. This

time, the variation of initiative takes place during the rating of words that is, durin
encoding. Two rating tasks for sets of positive, negative, and neutral words were

employed; one was for emotional value and the other was for their physical curvature. I

the rating process of the physical curvature, subjects are assumed to be able to integr
the level of letters into words even if the task instruction does not require this. So

depressive memory deficits should be reflected on the subsequent word identification t
in which subjects were asked to read aloud the word presented briefly. Consistent with

the prediction from the reduced initiative model depressed subjects identified less wo

previously rated for their physical curvature, compared to nondepressed people, but thi

difference did not occur on the words rated for their emotional value. These depressive

memory deficits found in the automatic task of word identification are contradictory to
the prediction from the resource allocation.
Channon et al. (1993 a) contrasted the reduced initiative view with the resource

allocation theory (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988) in the effects of the extent of structure of
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word lists on recall among depressed patients. In line with the reduced initiative model,
they predicted that depressive memory deficits should obtain in the condition which
allowed for the most spontaneous use of cognitive operation when a varying level of
structure of word lists (highly, mediumly, unstructured) exists. That is, depressive
deficits are expected in the medium structure of materials in which there is the most

opportunity to benefit from the use of a strategy to improve performance, In contrast,

the resource allocation theory can predict that as unstructured materials require more
attentional resources, depressive memory deficits should occur in the unstructured
condition. Three types of word lists were used; randomly selected words among which
no close relationship exist, and the other two comprised categorised words with two
presentation methods (random and clustered). Depressive memory deficits were found

only in the medium structure condition, i.e., when the categorised words were presente

in a random order. These results support the reduced initiative model and suggest that
simply more demanding task (unstructured word lists) does not always accompany
memory impairment with depressives.
However, the recent study by Baker and Channon (1995) failed to show any

differential effects between depressed and nondepressed groups when a helpful strategy

in the Levene reasoning task was provided to focus their attention on the task. Overal

depressive deficits occurred regardless of provision of the helpful strategy. The help

strategy was to ask subjects to report all possible alternative hypotheses to solution

contrast, in a similar condition, Silbermann et al. (1983) found a facilitative effect

helpful strategies in depressed patients, but still their overall performance deficits

The results in both studies suggest an actual reduction in total available capacity wi

without the reduced initiation of cognitive strategy. These results in the reasoning t
area are contrasted with those in memory tasks employed by Hertel and her colleagues

showing no overall deficits. The role of initiation in the reasoning task requires a m
research in this area.
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In sum, the cognitive effort account of depressive m e m o r y deficits did not
consider the varying extent to which effortful processing is self-initiated vs. demanded
task characteristics (Hertel, 1994), Those studies aforementioned proved that memory
deficits can be obtained according to the variation of the self-initiated activities

independent of attributes of effortful operation. Furthermore such memory deficits can be
reversed by reducing the role of self-initiative activities in task performance through
more controlled task instruction or provision of a helpful strategy for performance,
However, depressive memory deficits caused by this lowered self-initiative seem to be
explained by irrelevant task and/or extra task-processing without necessarily assuming
reduced initiative (Ellis, 1991; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In other words, those task
instructions used for reversal of memory deficits appear to increase subjects' attention
the current task, thus facilitating task-relevant processing. Furthermore, from a
theoretical perspective, the reduced initiative model is not clear about whether the
reduced initiative arises from motivational or cognitive deficits (Hetel & Hardin, 1990).
Despite some drawbacks in the reduced initiative hypothesis, supporting evidence
for this claim comes from the findings in self-focused attention studies that depressed
people were found to have heightened self-focused attention to internal matters (e.g.,
Smith & Greenberg, 1981; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985) and
that depressives suffer from concentration difficulties (Watts & Sharrock, 1985). A clear
distinction between the reduced-capacity hypothesis and narrowing attention to /taskirrelevant thoughts was made by Hartlage et al. 's (1993) review, which will be discussed
in the following section.

1.3.1.4 Comparison of Capacity - Reduced vs. the Narrowing of
Attentional Focus Models
Hartlage et al. (1993) distinguished between a reduced attentional capacity and
narrowing of attentional focus on depression-relevant thoughts, in explaining depressive
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m e m o r y deficits. A narrowing attentional focus is not incompatible with the reduced
capacity model, but it does not assume a difference in total available capacity across
depressed and nondepressed groups. According to this hypothesis, memory deficits in
effortful processing operations are associated with a primary allocation of available
capacity to the depression-related materials and/or thoughts, thus reducing capacity
available to the current task performance. The source of depressive memory deficits lies

in inadequate allocation of available capacity rather than the absolute reduction of tota
capacity. A third explainatory framework can be made by combining the reduced
capacity model and narrowing attentional focus hypothesis. According to this combined
version, during depression, both reduced capacity and inadequate allocation occur (Ellis
& Ashbrook, 1988). The contrast of the reduced capacity with narrowing attentional
focus was substantiated by investigating the previous literature employing a secondary
task. Hasher and Zacks (1988) recommended the secondary task procedure as the best
available method of measuring available capacity. The main assumption underlying this

comparasion is that if depressives direct their attention to depression-relevant thoughts
without reducing the available attentional capacity (narrowing attentional focus), the
total latencies across probe signals (neutral, positive, and negative) should be equal in
depressives and nondepressives. This is because depressives are expected to respond
faster to negative words than neutral or positive words, whereas nondepressives are
reported to respond faster to positive words than neutral or depressive words.
Otherwise, if a longer total response time is found for depressives relative to
nondepressives, this supports the reduced capacity hypothesis. According to the reduced
capacity model, this is because depression reduces total available capacity and hence the
remaining available capacity for the probe task is smaller than that of nondepressives.
The findings from relevant studies are in favour of narrowing attentional focus view
(e.g., MaCabe & Gotlib, 1993; Bargh & Tota, 1988; Ingram, 1984).
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M a C a b e and Gotlib (1993) examined attentional bias in a dichotic listening task
with a concurrent light-probe reaction time task, The distracting words varied from
positive, neutral, to negative words and were presented through the unattended channel.
Both groups (depressed patients and normal controls) did not differ in their total
latencies to the probe signal even though depressed patients showed a longer response
time to the probe when negative distractors were presented in the unattended channel

than when positive or neutral materials were presented. In an experiment using the depth
of processing paradigm with a concurrent digit task as a secondary task, Bargh and Tota
(1988) showed that the total latencies as a function of memory load were not different
between depressed and nondepressed subjects, even though depressed subjects were
faster to respond in a self-referent judgement of negative content words than that of
positive and neutral content words. If depression reduced the available capacity, the
increase in memory load would have produced longer latencies in depressives. Ingram
(1984) examined recall of unfavourable and favourable feedback with a tone-detection

task as a concurrent task. The results are consistent with previous studies; total resp

latency to the probe signal was the same for failure-experienced subjects as for succes

or neutral- experienced subjects. Negative mood subjects still were slower to respond to
the tone and recall more unfavourable feedbacks than positive or neutral mood subjects
when they were presented with unfavourable feedback. Furthermore there was no recall
difference among the three mood-induced groups.
Another line of supportive findings for a narrowing of attentional focus comes
from the initiative model. The previous review on the initiative model found that
depressive memory deficits are more likely to occur in an uncontrolled experimental

instruction condition. It can mean that depressives do not pay full attention to the cu

criteria! task. Poor performance may be due to diversion of their attention to their own

problems or other task-irrelevant thoughts. Furthermore, depressive memory deficits can

be reversed by providing subjects with focused instruction, suggesting that their avail
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total capacity is equal. This line of reasoning seems to be consistent with the narrowing
attentional focus hypothesis. The narrowing attentional focus hypothesis and the reduced
initiative proposal have a c o m m o n assumption of no difference in total available capacity,
but differ in their emphasis; the former focuses on diverted attention, and the latter on
reduced initiative/motivation.
Another line of studies (distracting effects) seems to be related with testing the
reduced capacity vs. narrowing attention hypothesis. Here the distracting effects mean
that distracting tasks enhance performance of depressives, and argue that such facilitating
effects take place because self-preoccupied thoughts of depressives are removed
temporarily by the task (e.g., Foulds, 1952). This interpretation is consistent with the
narrowing attentional hypothesis. The distracting effects in depression will be discussed
in a later section. In sum, the current available studies appear to offer more support to a
narrowing attention view than to the reduced capacity hypothesis.
Theoretical frameworks aforementioned mainly addressed impairing effects of
depression on task performance. However, phenomena accompanying depression are
more diverse, including mood-dependent/mood-congruent learning and retrieval. Thus a
more comphrehensive framework is required to accommodate such phenomena as well
as depressive m e m o r y deficits. Williams et al. (1988, chap. 10) address both areas in their
model of "Affective decision and resource allocation",

1.3.1.5 Affective Decision and Resource Allocation
In contrast with the attempt of the above frameworks to explain depressive
m e m o r y deficits, Williams et al. (1988) proposed a more comphrehensive framework
with the aim of explaining both m e m o r y deficits and selective m e m o r y bias in depression,
as well as an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in anxiety. They noted that
both network and schema theories did not consider in detail whether different emotional
states m a y have different effects on different aspects of cognitive processing. Anxiety
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mainly accompanies an attentional bias, while depression affects m e m o r y bias (Dalgleish
& Watts, 1990). To take account of such a different tendency of emotional states, two
assumptions were included into their theory. First, both encoding and retrieval stages
involve a passive, automatic aspect (similar to automatic processing), and an active,

strategic aspect (similar to effortful processing ). Second, a bias in one aspect need no

entail a bias in the other. The model claims that anxiety preferentially affects the pass

automatic aspects of encoding and retrieval, whereas depression preferentially affects th
active, effortful aspects of encoding and retrieval. Another assumption is that all
stimulus inputs go through an affective decision mechanism and depending upon both the

extent of the affective valence (threat vs. nonthreat in the case of anxiety; depressed v
nondepressed in depression) of stimulus and emotional states (anxiety and depression),
more or less resources are allocated. In the case of mood-congruent-encoding and

retrieval, depression may affect active, strategic elaboration rather than a pre-attentiv
(automatic) stage, and mood-congruent materials will be given greater elaboration, thus

will be more retrievable. A final assumption is related to the severity of depression; th

predisposition to allocate processing resources towards negative materials at elaborative
stages becomes more evident as depression become more severe. According to this
framework, depressive memory deficits in neutral materials can be explained as a result
of poor elaboration, because neutral materials will not be given priority in the
elaboration stage. This assumption of the differential effects of depression and anxiety
an attentional and memory bias was supported by the review by Dalgleish and Watts
(1990). That is, attentional bias towards threatening stimuli in anxious states is more
prominent than memory bias, whereas in depressed mood, memory bias is more apparent
than attentional bias towards negative materials. Thus anxiety seems to affect an
attentional process (automatic), while depression seems to affect a memorial process
(strategic).
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1.3.1.6 Towards a Unifying F r a m e w o r k

In regard to depressive memory deficits, various theoretical frameworks were discusse

and compared with mainly their own supportive evidence. Models differ in their accoun
of cognitive mechanism in explaining depressive memory deficits; reduced capacity,

malfunctioned inhibition, reduced initiative, and narrowing attention. Secondly, they

differ in the degree to which reduced cognitive resources are invariant or flexible a

responsive to environmental cues (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988 Hartlage et al., 1993; Hashe

& Zacks, 1979, 1988; Hertel, 1994; Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Thirdly, each model is not
good enough to accomodate all the currently available findings. These models make

slightly different predictions, but each implies that depressed subjects will be impa
tasks that require effortful rather than automatic processes, and on complex tasks
requiring cognitive strategy.
The question of how to integrate models into a more testable theoretical
framework remains. In terms of descriptive level, three approaches to memory deficits

depression are feasible (Hartlage et al., 1993). The first approach is that there is a

reduction in total available capacity associated with depression. The second approach

that total capacity still remain intact, but due to narrowing of attention a proportio
cognitive resources is taken up by task-irrelevant and depressive thoughts. The third
is that both reduced capacity and narrowing attention occur at the same time. This
summary appears to be nicely accommodated into two concepts of the working memory
model; that is, the reduced storage capacity of working memory and malfunctioning

resource allocation. Therefore, memory deficits in depression can be related to centra

executive functioning of working memory, which is thought to deal with the processing

and manipulation of information as well as resource allocation.. In effect, this assum

has been supported by the findings that depression is associated with impairment in t
central executive component of working memory (e.g., Channon & Baker, 1994;
Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Channon & Baker, 1993),
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1.3.2 Schema/Network-related M o d e l and Depression
In general, people's reports of their environment, events, and facts are frequently

incomplete, or even highly distorted and inaccurately elaborated (cf. Bartlett, 1932). In

relation to depression, clinical observation suggests that emotional content information
processed in an idiosyncratic or biased fashion (Beck, 1967, 1976). Compared to nondepressed controls, depressed subjects are negative in their recall of performance
feedback, evaluate themselves more negatively, and blame themselves for failure (Coyne
& Gotlib, 1983; Segal & Shaw, 1986; Blaney, 1986). Thus it may be said that depression
is associated with selectve attention, knowledge acquisition and better recall of moodcongruent information. Schematic/network models were proposed to explain such
phenomena and address the existence of schema/network and its effects on selective
memory bias in emotional mood states. The critical question is whether these
characteristic biases in cognitive content and processes in depression result from the
operation of schemata.

1.3.2.1 Beck' negative self-schemata model
Beck (1967, 1976) proposed the existence of negative schema and put an
emphasis on negative cognitions for the initiation, maintenance, and intensification of
depressed mood states. Beck postulated that a negative self-schema has been formulated
since childhood and represents stable, underlying beliefs and assumptions about the
nature of the world and self, which affects the selection, encoding, and interpretation
environmental stimuli. Depressive schemata contain the cognitive triad; a negative view
of self, world, and future. Once the negative schema is activated by matching
environmental events, it has two main effects. First, latent negative automatic thoughts
(e.g., I am a failure) come into their mind either consciously or unconsciously. The
second function of the depressive schema is to facilitate faulty information processing
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evaluating situations. The systematic thinking errors are as follows; they m a k e arbitrary

inferences on the basis of inadequate evidence, selectively abstract information consiste
with their schema rather than considering the more plausible alternatives, and
overgeneralize from fragmented or unrepresentative incidents. Among these hypotheses,
a negative self-schema in depression in particular has been extensively studied by many

researchers to explain the increased probability of recall for negative information about
self.
More recently, regarding the activation of negative schemata, it was claimed that
the activation of schemata is determined by the interaction of personality modes and
types of stressors (Beck, 1983; Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983). He assumed two types
of personality mode; sociotropy and autonomy. Sociotropic people put more value on
interpersonal relationships such as acceptance, intimacy, and support. Threat or loss in
those areas make sociotropic people depressed and experience automatic thoughts (e.g.,
nobody likes me). On the other hand, autonomous people put more value on
independence, achievement, and goal-setting. Stressors congruent with those schemata
(e.g., thwart of goal-directed activity) are likely to cause automatic thoughts (e.g., I
failure). This prediction was confirmed in the 6 month follow-up study of patients with
unipolar depression (Hammen, Ellicott, Gitlin, & Jamison, 1985; Hammen, Marks,
Mayol, & deMayo, 1985). Depressed patients who experienced more objective stress

congruent with their personality type reported significantly greater levels of depressive
symptoms.
A recent review by Haaga, Dyck, and Ernst (1991) of Beck' s cognitive theory
of depression enumerated some testable hypotheses derived from it and examined each

hyothesis in relation to the previous literature. Firstly, in relation to the preponderan
negative automatic cognitions, the hypothesis that there is a higher proportion of
negative cognitions in depressives, relative to nondepressives was substantiated by
studies using questionnaires measuring the frequency of negative thoughts (Hollon,
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Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Crandell & Chambless, 1986).

Secondly, regarding positive automatic thoughts, they drived the exclusivity hypothesis
positive thoughts are totally excluded in a depressed episode. Contrarily, previous

studies showed that positive thoughts are reported less frequently compared to negative
thoughts (Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989; study 2; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). It seems
that the accessibility of positive thoughts is reduced in a depressed mood (Ingram,
Smith, & Brehm, 1983; Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin, 1981). Thirdly, regarding the
negative cognitive triad, Haaga et al. (1991) concluded that the negative view of

depressives of the self, the world, and the future received enough empirical support fr
the previous literature. They claimed that as the three parts of the triad have a high
correlation (Lewinsohn, Larson, & Munoz, 1982), the cognitive triad reduces to a single

dimension, that is, a negative view of the self. Finally, the hypothesis of the automatic
processing of negative thoughts was also supported (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988).
In summary, a negative self-schema is a stable, general, underlying structure
developed from childhood experience (e.g., loss of important persons), and latent
negative self-schemata become activated by matching environmental events e.g., loss of
job. Once negative self-schemata are activated, negative automatic thoughts such as '1

am a failure" and systematic logical errors lead to the negative cognitive triad, and i
this helps foster the depressed mood. Thus, Beck's cognitive theory of depression put an
emphasis on negative cognition in the etiology and maintenance of depression. However,
recently Teasdale and Barnard (1993) raised problems with Beck's cognitive model of
depression. One important problem is the possibility that negative cognitions as a
mediating variable to depression can be a consequence of depression rather than an
antecedent to the depressed feeling. This argument is based on the findings that

regardless of types of treatment of depression (e.g., antidepressant drugs and behaviou
therapy), negative thoughts recover towards normal levels when depressed episode is
remitted.
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1.3.2.2 Bower's Associative Network Model.
Bower (1981) has proposed that the effects of mood on cognitive processes can

be incorporated within a general associative network theory of memory (e. g., Collins &
Loftus, 1975). The general idea of an associative network model is that contextual or
personal vairables including emotional mood states can be represented as episodic
memory traces, which subsequently can aid remembering the events as acting as
contextual cues. According to the associative network model, distinct emotions such as
joy, fear, and depression, have their own node in memory. Each emotion node is
connected to nodes with many other aspects of the emotion such as autonomic patterns,

expressive behaviours, verbal labels for the emotion, and typical situations likely to
the emotion. Those different instances of the concept are connected by associative
connections of varying strength depending on the individual's personal experience.
Emotion nodes can be activated by any of these related events or phenomena, and if the
activation exceeds some threshold, they transmit exicitation to units that produce the
corresponding patterns of autonomic arousal, facial expression, etc.
With these assumptions, two distinct phenomena were predicted; state/contextdependent learning, and mood-congruent encoding and retrieval. State/dependent

learning states that material would be retrieved best when the situation in encoding a
retrieval stages matches. This has been demonstated in drug-induced states such as
alcohol intoxication (Eich, 1977), and environmental context (Godden, & Baddeley,
1975). Some experimentally induced mood states produced it successfully (Bower,
Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978, study 3; Schare, Lisman, & Spear, 1984, study 3). State
dependent memory was also found in naturally occurring mood shift in manic-depressive
patients, (Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977). However, several studies failed to
replicate it (Bower & Mayer, 1985; Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981 study 3; Schare

27

et al., 1984, study 1 and 2) and a review by Blaney (1986) showed that on the whole
state-dependent learning effects have been hard to obtain.
On the other hand, mood-congruent encoding and retrieval depends upon a
similarity between the mood and the affective valence of the material that is being

learned or remembered and recall is superior when there is a match between the affective
valence of the material and the mood in which the material is recalled. Blaney (1986)
concluded that state-dependent memory effects have been weak and unreliable, while
mood-congruent memory effects are relatively robust and consistent.
To explain the mixed findings in state-dependent memory, Isen (1984) suggested
that mood works as a contextual cue aiding remembering, whose effects are most
apparent when the meaning of cues are obscure such as in the interference learning
paradigm. In the interference paradigm, subjects are exposed to two different mood
states within a session and learned two different lists - one while happy and the other

while sad. Subjects are asked to recall the lists either in concordant or in disconcord
mood (Bower et al., 1978). Kihlstrom (1989) claimed that the reason why mood states

as contextual cues are weak is because the cues are fairly implicit. That is, mood stat

context variables are not so expressively presented as the lists. Only if mood states ar

actively encoded, i.e. they are relevant to the task at hand, can they serve as effectiv

retrieval cues. That is why state-dependent effects have been frequently observed in fre

recall but rarely in recognition and cued recall (Eich, 1980). More cues are available i

cued recall and recognition tests so subjects do not necessarily draw their attention t
mood state cues,
In relation to the mood-congruent effect, several reserchers found asymmetrical
effects, which is contradictory to the prediction of the network model (Bower, 1981).

The aymmetry of positive and negative mood states is related to the findings that paral
effects of affect on memory were not always obtained (Breslow et al., 1981; Clark &
Waddell, 1983; Isen et al., 1978; Nasby & Yando, 1982, study 1; Williams and
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Broadbent, 1986). The network model assumes that similar underlying processes are
operative in happy and in sad mood states. However, there are suggestions in the

experimental literature that this is not actually the case, and that subjects are more li
to perform in accord with the predcitions of network theory when in happy moods than

in sad moods. Happy moods typically facilitate the learning and the recall of affectively

positive material while inhibiting the learning and recall of affectively negative materi
Sad mood has often been found to reduce the learning and recall of affectively positive
material without enhancing the learning and recall of negative materials (Natale &
Hantus, 1982; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). For example, Williams and Broadbent
(1986) investigated the autobiographical memories produced to cue words by people
who had recently attempted suicide by overdose. The results showed that suicide
attempters had more difficulty in retrieving memories to positive cue words, and took

longer to do so, wheresas there were no group differences in the retrieval of memories to
negative cue words.
In comparison to Beck's cognitive model of depression, the associative network
model put a reciprocal relationship between depressed mood and negative thoughts

(interpretations) in explaining the maintenance of depression, while Beck's theory assign
a causal role to negative thoughts (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), According to the
associative network model, a self-perpetuating vicious cycle is formed in depressed
mood states. Depressed mood states activate corresponding nodes related to the
emotion, leading to selectively increased accessibility of negative cognitions and
subsequently exacerbating the severity of depression.
What implications for depressive memory deficits can be drawn from these
schemata/network-related models? From Beck's cognitive theory of depression,
depressive memory deficits can be predicted from the idea that negative automatic
thoughts can intrude into depressed people's minds either consciously or unconsciously,

thus interfering with ongoing mental activities. Similarly, modeled after the associative
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network theory, the information processing theory of depression by Ingram (1984a)
implies that depressive memory deficits occur due to increased activation of depressionrelated cognitions once a depression-linked node is activated, which occupies available
processing capacity.

1.3.3 Depressive Self-Focused Attention
On the basis of the self-focused attention and self-regulation model (Carver &
Scheir, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972), and from many similarities between depression
and states of self-focused attention, Pyzczynski and Greenberg (1987) proposed the selfregulatory perseveration model of reactive depression. The main thrust of Pyzczynski
and Greenberg's (1987) self-regulatory model is that depression occurs where no
response to reduce the discrepancy between actual and desired states is available after
the loss of an important source of self-worth. In this situation, the person can not exit

self-regulatory cycle, facing virtually constant self-focus, resulting in intensified nega
affect, self-derogation, and future negative outcome. And finally a depressive selffocusing style is developed from this process, in which an individual self-focuses a great

deal after negative outcomes but very little after positive outcomes. Thus, this depressiv
self-focusing attention maintains and exacerbates depression. It is suggested that a
depressive self-focusing style is accompanied by the following symptoms; depressed

affect, internal attribution for failure, self-criticism, low self-esteem, and performance
deficits.
Carver and Scheier's (1981) cybernetic model of self-regulation conceptualized
self-focus as part of a self-regulatory negative feedback cycle that keeps a person "on
track" in pursuit of important goals. Self-focus is considered as the test segment of a
test-operate-test-exit sequence in which a comparison is made between current state and
a standard. If the person meets or exceeds the standard, he or she exits the cycle, and

self-focus is terminated. On the other hand, if the person falls short of the standard, he
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she goes into the operate phase, in which attempts are made to bring the current state

into line with the standard. Subsequent tests will detect whether or not the operate ph

has been successful in eliminating the discrepancy. If the discrepancy is eliminated, t

person exits the cycle. Otherwise, the test-operate-test phases continue. From this cycl

depressed people can not exit, thus remain in a constant state of self-focus on awarenes
of the irreducible negative discrepancy.
Many studies have explored how depression is associated with self-focused
attention (Smith & Greenberg, 1981; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Smith, Ingram, & Roth,
1985; Ingram, Lumry, Cruet, & Sieber, 1987). Some of these studies found a significant
correlation between self-focused attention and depression (Smith & Greenberg, 1981;
Ingram & Smith, 1984; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, 1985). The more depressed subjects get,

the more self-conscious they are in the private self-conscious scale (Fenigstein, Schei
& Buss, 1975). Secondly, depressed people are associated with more negative selffocused attention compared to nondepressed people (Ingram & Smith, 1984), along with
negative self-evaluation and negative affect. Other studies manipulated self-focused
attention by the presence and absence of a mirror after depressed and nondepressed
subjects were exposed to success and failure experiences (Pyszczynski & Greenberg,
1985; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1986). The results from those studies are consistent
with the predicition from a depressive self-focusing style; depressed people tend to be
more self-focused after failure compared to nondepressives. Greenberg and Pyszczynski

(1986) showed that depressives persist in spontaneous self-focused attention after fail
longer than nondepressed subjects. They investigated how self-focused attention
interacts with depression.
Other studies were concerned with whether induced depression creates selffocused attention by using the mood induction procedure (Wood, Saltzberg, &
Goldsamt, 1990; Salovey, 1992; Sedikides, 1992) and have been successful in showing
that an induced sad mood creates self-focused attention.
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In sum, many studies showed consistent findings that depressed m o o d is

associated with self-focused attention toward internal feeling and thoughts, particularly

focused on the negative aspects. Unlike the assumed specificity of self-focused attention

to depression, a recent review (Ingram, 1990) claimed that self-focused attention is not
specific disposition of depressive mood states, but a nonspecific process in
psychopathology. Ingram (1990) claimed that evidence of self-focused attention has been
found in various psychopathogical disorders such alcohol abuse, schizophrenia,
psychopathy, and anxiety.
In relation to depressive memory deficits, Ingram and Smith (1984) suggested

that depressive self-focusing style can contribute to cognitive impairment in depression
Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1987) also proposed that a self-focusing style on the part of
depressed individuals may contribute to difficulty concentrating on current tasks. The
construct of a self-focusing tendency in depressed mood states can be seen as a
mediating factor of task-irrelevant thoughts and poor concentration on the current task.

1.4 Summary and Discussion
Various theoretical models of effects of depression on memory were discussed
from three major categories; reduced capacity, schema/network, and self-focused
attention in relation to depressive memory deficits and selective memory bias. The
cognitive effort account of memory deficits, drawn from the reduced-capacity model,
provides a useful framework for explaining memory deficits, but the lack of independent
measurement of allocation of resources flawed the model. To overcome this drawback,

Hartlage et al., (1993) defined several criteria to classify tasks in terms of automatic
effortful processes and using those criteria, support the assumption that depression
interferes with effortful processing. On the other hand, Hertel and her colleagues put
constraint on such an argument, proposing a reduced initiative model. They claimed that
effortful processing is not always impaired by depression, rather it is impaired when the
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task requires self-initiation of effortful processing. Furthermore, contradictory to the
cognitive effort account, depressive memory deficits can be shown in a condition
requiring relatively automatic processing such as in word identification (Hertel, 1994).
Other supportive evidence comes from a study (Channon et al., 1993a) in which task
difficulty and initiative were directly compared in the varying structure of word lists.
Depressed subjects showed memory deficits in the condition requiring self-initiative

rather than in the most difficult task condition. Compared to the cognitive effort accoun
the reduced initiative model appears more testable by showing depressive memory

deficits in the condition requiring subject-initiation in the first place and then revers
memory deficits by providing a useful cognitive strategy which depressed people did not
elect spontaneously.
As discussed earlier, even if the reduced initiative model provided the locus of
effect in depression, making the model more testable, compared to other models, it does
not address whether the source of reduced intiation of cognitive strategy is from
motivational or the reduced cognitive resources (Ellis, 1990; Baker & Channon, 1995).

If it originates from motivational deficits, it would focus on the lowered expectations o
depressives and diverted attention to task-irrelevant thoughts without assuming a
reduced capacity. The model become similar to narrowing attentional focus (Hartlage et
al., 1993). If the reduced intiative is due to the reduced capacity, it is similar to the
initiated activity hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). As a result, it assumes both
reduced resources and narrowoing attentional focus (Hartlage et al., 1993). Apart from
this ambiguity in a theorectical aspect, one contradictory finding was reported by Baker
and Channon (1995) study, which failed to show any differential effects between
depressed and nondepressed people when helpful cues in the reasoning task of the

Levene task was provided. In effect, regardless of the provision of helpful cues, overall
depressive deficits were found, lending more support for the reduced capacity hypothesis

with or without narrowing attentional focus. These contradictory findings suggest further
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work to elucidate the relationship between the reduced initiative vs. reduced resources is
necessary.
In addition, in relation to depressive memory deficits, various theoretical
concepts from various theoretical frameworks such as irrelevant/extra-task processing,
off-goal path thoughts, negative automatic thoughts, narrowing attentional focus, and
self-focused attention have been proposed. However, they are not exclusive, rather
complimentary to each other and appear interlocked in explaining depressive memory
deficits. These diverse concepts can be classified into two different concepts; overall
depressive thoughts and depressive self-focusing style (narrowing attentional focus)
apart from the problem of reduced capacity. These various claims can be integrated in
the following way; depressive thoughts characterising depressed people, may interfere
with or intrude into working memory functioning through their self-focusing attentional
style as a mediating variable. Due to this process, depressed people are expected to show
poor elaboration, concentration deficits, and poor performance because the priority of
their attentional focus is assumed to be given to depressive thoughts rather than to the
criterial task at hand. This assumption does not necessarily argue that depressive
thoughts and self-focusing style is necessarily causative in accounting for cognitive

deficits. In effect, it is very difficult to test for the reduced capacity's prediction; i
of studies related to this prediction, the evidence for reduced capacity was inferred from
the lowered performance such as in recall and cued recall. Therefore, more tractable
factors such as negative thoughts should be explored in the first place in the area of
memory deficits, as in effects of context-dependent encoding/retrieval (moodcongruent/state-dependent learning). More work in the role of depressive thoughts
should be undertaken either by measuring depressive thoughts during task performance
or by the direct manipulation of depressive thoughts. Therefore, one of purpose of the
thesis is to explore the role of depressive thoughts during the task performance as
measured by the ATQ-N/-P and CIQ.
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CHAPTER 2
Memory Deficits in Depression

2.1 Depression and Memory Performance
Recent reviews of memory deficits in depression suggested that the degree of
memory deficits are influenced by three factors; the severity of depression (subject

factor), task characteristics, and emotional valence of materials (Ellis & Ashbrook, 198
Johnson & Magaro, 1987; Weingartner & Silberman, 1982; Hartlage et al., 1993;
Kuiper, MacDonald, & Deny, 1983; Williams et al., 1988). The general prediction from

the above review is that the more severe depression and the more effortful the task, th
greater the deficit with neutral stimuli employed. Also emotional valence of materials
appears to affect the performance of depressives; neutral materials including
concrete/abstract materials encoded semantically are adversely affected by depression,

but personal and emotional ones processed with reference to the self are not (Kuiper et
al., 1983; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In regard to these differences, Ellis and Ashbrook

(1988) claimed that emotional materials pertinent to subjects require minimal attention
capacity and thus, do not cause depressive memory deficits. Memory performance with
emotional contents will be discussed in another chapter on schema/network-related
studies. The following sections review the previous literature on depressives memory

deficits in terms of two broad categories; one is subject characteristics and the other
characteristics. The reason for this distinction is that depressive performance is
considered to be determined by the interaction of those two variables.

2.1.1 Subject Characteristics
2.1.1.1 Severity of Depression
Memory impairment is more frequently found in clinical depression than in
mild/moderate depression (Hartlage et al., 1993). The relationship between severity of

35

depression and memory deficits has become apparent through studies of treatment using
ECT (Electric Convulsive Therapy) and drug treatment (Stromgren, 1977; Cronholm
and Ottoson, 1961; Sternberg & Jarvik, 1976). The general findings are that clinical
improvement of depressive symptoms seems to be positively related with improved
memory performance. The severity of depression contributes to the impairment of
memory in depression.
Cronholm and Ottosson (1961) compared endogenously depressed patients with
surgical patients, who were matched on educational level, age, sex, and area of
residence. Subjects were tested on three kinds of memory tests (Twenty Figure Test,

Thirty Word Pair Test, Thirty Personal Data Test) immediately and three hours later. I
both testing sessions, depressed patients showed memory deficits across all three
memory tests. After ECT, clinical improvement was associated with improved learning.
In a subsequent study replicating Cronholm and Ottosson's (1961) study, Sternberg and
Jarvik (1976) found similar results. Before the treatment, depressed patients showed
poorer memory performance than normal controls on all measures. After 26 days of
treatment, depressed patients were divided into four groups: recovered, markedly
improved, moderately improved, and unimproved according to the degree of
improvement in their depressive symptoms. The comparison of the four groups in their
memory performance showed that the greater improvement of the depressive states, the
greater improvement in immediate reproduction. Similarly Stromgren (1977) explored
memory deficits of depressed patients before and during a course of ECT using the
Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS). The general findings are consistent with the above two

studies, severity of depression was correlated with degree of impairment and degree of
clinical improvement was correlated with degree of improved performance. Depressed

subjects showed more sensitivity to digit span forward, mental control, and orientatio
tasks compared to other tasks.
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In contrast with those positivefindings,Glass, Uhlenhuth, and Weinreb (1978)
found that clinical state of depression has no any consistent relationship with memory
performance as measured by errors in an item recognition procedure. They interpreted
these finding as that clinical improvement in depression states may occur via increased
arousal. Such an argument indicates that depressive memory deficits may be mediated by
another variable rather than be directly related with the severity of depression.
In sum, it seems that the severity of depression is negatively correlated with
memory performance and that a third variable, such as arousal may mediate memory
performance.

2.1.1.2 Psychomotor Retardation
One complaint by depressed people is about their slowed motor and mental
functioning. This self-reported complaint of psychomotor retardation has been tested

using a variety of objective tests, eg., writing speed, Digit Symbol Test, and speech rat
etc. Depressed people were found to be retarded in the tapping test, Digit Symbol Test,

writing speed, and speech rate (Szabadi et al,, 1976; Glass et al., 1978; Berndt & Berndt,
1980). Among these tests, the retarded speech rate is particularly interesting to the
current thesis as speech rate is assumed to determine memory span (Baddeley, 1986).
Szabadi et al. (1976) wanted to find a single index of behaviour, which is
sensitive to the short-term mood variation in depressives over two months' treatment.
Several tests were employed; speech rate, tapping test, nurses' rating of mobility and
talkativeness, and the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960).
Four normal and four depressed patients were employed as subjects. Sampling of speech
rate was conducted over the period, with subjects instructed to count from 1 to 10 in

their own time. For the tapping test, the total time was measured for subjects to press t
lever 210 times. The results showed that the speech rate (pause time) was most sensitive
to improvement in depressive symptoms; the decrease in pause time was parallelled by a
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decrease in depressive symptoms when depression is measured by the H R S D , For normal
subjects, pause time was constant over a long period. Teasdale, Fogarty, and Williams
(1980) complemented the study by Szabadi et al. (1976) by investigating the covariation
of self-reported depression and speech pause time. As dependent measures, mean pause
time between digits and total time when subjects were asked to count from 1 to 10 were
used in single case study experiments employing naturally occurring depression, some
subjects showed that variation of depressed mood and speech rate was significantly
correlated over time; when they were more depressed, the longer mean pause time. Also
similar findings were found for experimentally induced mood variation. As mean pause

time is highly correlated with total time, having the same relationship with self-report
mood measures, the total time measure can be used instead. In subsequent studies, using
the Velten-like mood induction procedure, Teasdale et al. (1980) and Teasdale and
Taylor (1981) replicated the finding that induced depression slows down speech rate
relative to induced elation. However, Williams (1980) also employed speech rate as the

manipulation check for the effectiveness of a story mood induction procedure, but he did
not find a difference between depressed and neutral subjects. These discrepant findings
may be associated with different mood induction procedures (VMJJP vs. tape recorded
story) but a more important difference is that Teasdale and his colleagues employed an
elated group for the comparsion with the depressed group, while Williams (1980) used
neutral controls. So the slowed speech rate found in Teasdale and his colleges could
occur due to either slowing effects of depression or speeding up effects of elated mood
states. In a standardized interview situation, Natale (1977) examined the relationship
between induced mood states (elated, depressed, and neutral) and various indexes of
psychomotor function; mean words per response, response time, speech rate, articulation
rate, and silent quotient. Depressed subjects showed more total duration of all pauses
and no difference in other measures, compared to neutral subjects. Speech rate and
articulation rate were calculated by a word count divided by total speech time and

38

phonation time respectively. In contrast, elated subjects revealed shorter response

latencies, faster speech and articulation rates, and less total duration of all pauses,
compared to neutral subjects. Thus, depressed mood lengthens the duration of pauses
during communication.
Some studies distinguished between cognitive and motor retardation (Cornell,
Suarez, & Berent, 1984; Byrne, 1976). For example, Cornell et al. (1984) examined
psychomotor function in subtypes of depressive patients (melancholic vs,
nonmelancholic) on a reaction time task and a matching task. Cognitive and motor

retardation were measured by a cognitive reaction time task, simple reaction time task,
and a motor reaction time. The simple reaction time task was measured by asking

subjects to press the button when the stimulus appear. The motor reaction time task was
measured by instructing subject to hold down the "ready" key and when the stimulus
appears on the computer screen, to move to a "response" key. In the cognitive reaction
time task, Posner's method (Posner, Boies, Eichelman, & Taylor, 1969; Posner &
Mitchell, 1967) was employed in which subjects were presented with two letters to
identify if they are the same in terms of physical or nominal aspects. In the simple
reaction time task, there was no difference among groups. In the more complicated
motor task, both depressive groups were slower compared to normal controls. In the

cognitive reaction time task, only melancholic patients were slower than normal control
in both physical and nominal tasks. Such a difference in cognitive task according to
subtypes of depression was found using a different methodology (Byrne, 1976). A
choice-reaction time performance was divided into two components; a decision phase
and an executive phase. Pyschotic depressives were retarded in both phases, whereas
neurotic depressives were retarded only on the movement time.
In summary, relatively consistent findings were found with the speech rate across
induced and clinical depression except Williams' (1980) study. The other measurements

such as the writing test and the digit symbol test also revealed a depressive retardati
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Thus, in general it can be claimed that depressives suffer from psychomotor retardation.

One restriction to this argument is that such a retardation is subject to the type of tas
and subtype of depression (Cornell et al., 1984; Byrne, 1976). Cognitive retardation is
found in endogenous depressives, while psychomotor retardation is found in both
endogenous and nonendogenous groups. Some reasons for these differential effects of
subtypes of depression on psychomotor and cognitive retardation were considered by

Williams et al., 1988. Cognitive retardation in endogenous depressives is possibly due t
their higher proportion of negative thoughts relative to neurotic depressives (Nelson &
MaZure, 1985) and/or the low arousal typical of endogenous depressives. On the other

hand, retardation in psychomotor function was attributed to motivational deficits (Mille
1975). Natale (1977) interpreted this excessive pause time in depressed people as due to
their excessive awareness of self and others,

2.1.1.3 Negative and Positive Cognitions
Depressed people are characterized by negative thoughts of self and the world as
well as their depressed feeling (Beck, 1967). Depression as a thought disorder can be

explored from two perspectives; process disorder and content disturbances (Braff, Glick,

& Griffin, 1983). The process disorder was studied by investigating abstraction ability o
depressed patients (Braff & Beck, 1974; Dennelly, Waldman, Murphy, Wyatt, &
Goodwin, 1980; Braff et al., 1983). The current discussion will focus on thought content
disturbances (idiosyncratic thinking). Nelson and Mazure (1985) defined ruminative
thinking as one of the distinctive symptoms of melancholic depression, whose
characteristics are repetitive and intrusive thoughts and in its milder forms selfpreoccupation. In a similar vein, negative automatic thoughts were proposed by Beck
(1967), the attributes of which seem similar to ruminative thoughts. These depressive
thoughts can be classified into two groups; negative self-referent thoughts (called
negative automatic thoughts) and task-irrelevant thoughts (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988).
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Negative and positive automatic thoughts are self-referent (e.g., I will be successful in

the future), while task-irrelevant thoughts include any thought or images excluding self
referent things.
When the possible disruptive effects of automatic thoughts are discussed, caution
needs to be taken. The processes leading to automatic thoughts may be automatic, but
the thoughts themselves may occupy considerable attention (Moretti & Shaw, 1989;

Brewin, 1988; Dalgleish, & Watts, 1990). So it is important to distinguish the automatic
process from the products-negative automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts are
assumed to occupy some portion of hmited attentional resources, while automatic
processing uses only minimal resources. Putting it another way, automatic thoughts tend
to intrude into consciousness, whereas automatic processes occur outside of the
subject's awareness. The automatic features of negative thoughts are discussed in view
of the automaticity of self-referent processing (e.g., Bargh & Tota, 1988;Wenzlaff,
Wegner, & Roper, 1988). The possible logic behind disruptive effects of automatic
thoughts is as follows. Assuming that automatic thoughts get priority for cognitive
processing, depressed subjects are put into a dual task situation in which they have to
deal with both automatic thoughts and the current task (Krames & McDonald, 1985).
Two questionnaires have been developed to measure negative and positive
automatic thoughts in depression separately (Hollen & Kendall, 1980; Ingram &
Wisnicki, 1988). As these two questionnaires were used in the current studies several
times, a detailed discussion of these questionnaires follows. The positive automatic

thought questionnaire (ATQ-P) consists of 30 items, and each item (e.g., I am in a great
mood) is rated on a 5 point Likert scale according to how frequently each thought or
similar thoughts had occurred to subjects during the past week (Ingram & Wisnicki,

1988). The scale ranges from never (1), to sometimes (3) to all the time (5). The result
of a factor analysis on this scale produced four factors; positive daily functioning,

positive self-evaluation, others evaluations of self, positive future expectations. The
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factors reflect a positive cognitive triad the opposite of a negative cognitive triad (Beck,
1967); positive cognition about the self, the world, the future, plus other's evaluation

the self. As most of the items are related to self, the ATQ-P seems to represent positiv
self-referent processing.
Similarily the ATQ-N (Hollen & Kendall, 1980) consists of 30 items (e.g., My
future is bleak) and each item was rated in the same way as the ATQ-P. The factor

analysis of the items indicated four distinctive factors; personal maladjustment and des
for change, negative self-concept and negative expectations, low self-esteem, and
helplessness. It has good concurrent validity and reliability (Hollen & Kendall, 1980;
Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Hollen, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986; Harrell & Ryon, 1983;
Burgess & Haaga, 1994).
To determine the discriminitive validity of the ATQ-P and ATQ-N, they were

administered to three different levels of depressed groups; depressed, mildly depressed,
nondepressed groups, which were classified by the BDI (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988). The
results from the ATQ-P showed that the more seriously depressed group reported

significantly fewer positive automatic thoughts than the mildly depressed group, which i
turn, reported marginally fewer positive thoughts than the nondepressed group. On the
ATQ-N, both depressed groups reported more negative automatic thoughts, compared
to the nondepressed group. The ATQ-N and ATQ-P were relatively independent with a
correlation coefficient of -.17, suggesting that negative and positive self-referent
thoughts tap different processes in depression.
Regarding the specificity of positive automatic cognition to depressive symptoms,
Burgess and Haaga (1994) examined whether the ATQ-P is inversely related to
depressive symptoms. They administered seven questionnaires to the subjects including
the BDI, ATQ-P, and ATQ-N etc, with intercorrelations calculated. Showing concurrent
validity, the ATQ-P was inversely related to depressive symptoms. After controlling for
anxiety symptoms, the number of positive automatic thoughts was inversely related to
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depressive symptoms. Also the A T Q - P showed high internal consistency (coefficient
alpha was .95). So infrequent positive thinking seems to be specific to depression,
As the ATQ-P/-N mainly relies on the frequency measurement of depressive

thoughts, some other attributes of such thoughts are ignored such as the controllability
thoughts. Thus, some studies investigated the relationship between depressed mood and
controllability of the intrusive thoughts from daily life experiences (Edwards &
Dickerson, 1987; Sutherland, Newman, & Rachman, 1982), Both studies found that

depression reduced controllability for intrusive thoughts (similar to automatic thoughts
but more intense). In a normal college student population, Edwards and Dickerson

(1987) examined the characteristics of positive and negative thought intrusions. Positi
and negative intrusive thoughts and subjects mood states were collected over two weeks
using questionnaires. The analysis was conducted on the positive and negative intrusion
from the same subject in terms of controllability, duration, frequency etc. The mood
states were evaluated by the Profile of Mood States (PMS, McNair, Lorr &
Droppleman, 1971). The results showed that the increased depressed mood states are

associated with more uncontrollability for both positive and negative intrusive thoughts
Similarly, Sutherland, Newman, and Rachman (1982) more directly explored the
dismissal of unwanted intrusive thoughts in either depressed or elated mood states
induced by the VMTP and MMIP. Intrusive thoughts were defined as unacceptable and
distressing ones which occur regularly twice a week. After having been induced into
either a happy or a sad condition, subjects were instructed to form either neutral or
intrusive thoughts and then to dismiss them. Across mood induction procedures,

intrusive thoughts took more time to remove than neutral thoughts and particularly in t
sad condition it took more time to remove intrusive thoughts compared with the happy

condition. These results suggest that the controllability of intrusive thoughts is redu

depression, possibly contributing to the maintenance of depression. As a reason for such
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poor controllability, Sutherland et al. (1982) suggested the reduced accessibility of
positive thoughts, being able to replace negative thoughts.
In sum, from the above studies, it become clear that under depressed mood states, it is
difficult to remove negative intrusive thoughts. Compared to negative automatic
thoughts measured on the ATQ-N, intrusive thoughts are more individually selected and
thus directly related to individual problems. However, it seems desirable to consider
other dimensions of automatic thoughts such as controllability when the role of negative
automatic thoughts in depressive performance is explored.
The following studies are different from the above studies in that they focused on
task-irrelevant thoughts while subjects are doing some cognitive task (Ellis, Seibert, &
Herbert, 1990; Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Task-irrelevant thoughts measured in these studies

do not seem to be exclusively negative/positive self-referent thoughts. Ellis et al. (1990
measured the accessibility of unfavourable thoughts while subjects were doing a
cognitive task, using the thoughts-listing procedure, subjects were asked to report
whatever thoughts came to their mind during two situations, and after that the thoughts
were rated on the favourable vs. unfavourable dimension. The results showed that
immediately after the VMTP, depression-induced subjects reported having more
unfavourable thoughts than neutral subjects. However, in a second experiment, the

results of thought listing measured after 4 minutes of interfering task (incidental recal
task) after the mood induction procedure, did not show any difference among the three
groups (depressed, neutral, and elated) in the proportion of unfavourable thoughts.
These results suggest that the intensity of induced depression reduces sharply over time,
and accordingly the accessibility of unfavourable thoughts reduces. Using the VMIP,
Seibert and Ellis (1991) investigated the relationship between task-irrelevant thoughts
and memory performance. Task-irrelevant thoughts were collected immediately after the
task or concurrently while doing the task. After mood induction, subjects were asked to
study seven lists of trigram doublets (e.g., RI TW EL, LI NF UZ) for three minutes and
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asked to recall them. The results showed that both emotional states (depressed and

elated) created more task-irrelevant thoughts than a neutral state, and also their recal
performance was poorer than neutral controls. The task-irrelevant thoughts were
negatively correlated with performance. In summary, task-irrelevant thoughts tend to
increase during temporary variation of emotional states, whose relationship with the
task-performance is negative.
Taken together, depression makes negative thoughts more accessible and at the
same time reduces the accessibility of positive thoughts. Both emotional mood states can

produce more task-irrelevant thoughts, relative to neutral mood state and are negatively

associated with task performance (Ellis et al., 1990; Seibert & Ellis, 1991), This negati
relationhsip of task-irrelevant thoughts with performance supports the capacity-reduced
hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). However, as there was no

direct manipulation of negative cognitions, it is still unclear whether negative cogniti
have a causal relationship with poor recall performance. Secondly, the reduced

controllability of intrusive thoughts under depression supports the inefficient inhibiti
mechanism proposed by Hasher and Zacks (1988), and Kuhl and Helle (1986), claiming
that due to an inefficient inhibition mechanism, more negative/intrusive cognitions are
allowed to get into the mind.

2.1.1.4 Response-bias
Some researchers raised a question of whether performance deficits and/or

negative memory bias in depression is based on reponse bias rather than a true difference
between nondepressed and depressed groups (Miller, 1975; Johnson & Magaro, 1987).
These two types of phenomena typical of depression were examined to check whether a
response bias can account for them. The response bias hypothesis attempts to explain
memory deficits and selective memory in depression on the basis of differences of
response strategy rather than of a pure memorial process, between nondepressed and
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depressed people. In a study on selective recall and recognition, Zuroff, Colussy, and
Wielgus (1983) defined response bias as follows: " at the most general level, response
bias refers to those motivational factors that, independent of a subject's encoding,

storing, or retrieving of information, affect his or her decision to respond in a certain
manner on tests of memory". This argument suggests that depressives do not differ in
their ability to retrieve the information from memory from nondepressives, rather that

more or less strict criteria in response bias can be chosen by depressives, depending upo

the emotional contents of stimuli. That is, they can choose a more or less lenient criter
to negative and positive information respectively,
In relation to neutral materials, often observed depressive memory deficits can be
artifacts rather than poor performance of memory and learning (Miller, 1975; Johnson &
Margo, 1987). In spite of the fact that depressed people have the same memory capacity
as nondepressed people, they may use a more conservative cognitive strategy; that is,
unless they are sure that their answers are correct, they may be withdrawn from
responding. The response bias hypothesis has met with mixed findings. In this area, most
studies employed a recognition memory test using signal detection theory and/or analysis
of types of errors (commission, omission) with either neutral or emotional materials
(Miller & Lewis, 1977, Larner, 1977; Dunbar & Lishman, 1984)
Miller and Lewis (1977) investigated the response bias among elderly depressed,
demented, and normal groups on the continuous recogniton signal detection procedure
(Kimura, 1963) using geometric designs. The signal detection theory assumes that the
measure of d' reflects the sensitivity of pure memory processes, whereas the criterion
(13) indicates the adopted decision strategy. On the d' measurement, elderly depressives
did not differ from normal controls, but on the B measurement, they differed from normal
controls. These results suggest that depressives take a more conservative response
strategy. On the basis of these results, they concluded that memory deficits found in

depressives do not result from memorial functioning but rather reflect their conservative
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decision strategy on m e m o r y tasks, Similar results were found by Larner (1977) w h o
explored response bias among three groups (demented, depressed, physically ill groups)

using a signal detection task. The results showed that depressed and physically ill pati
adopted a cautious response bias, while demented patients apppeared to adopt an
optimal response strategy.
Contrary to the above supportive findings, Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, and
Erlerimeyer-kimling (1989) did not find a conservative response strategy in depressed
patients on a recognition memory test of number and shape. The analysis of errors

showed that particularly in the shape recognition task with distraction, depressives ten
to emit more commission errors compared to schizophrenic and normal controls.
However, in the hit rates both depressives and normal controls did not differ. These
results of more commission errors in depressives are hard to fit into a conservative

response style of depressives. These different results might be due to the distracting t
leading depressives to adopt a different cognitive strategy (Williams et al., 1988).
Other supportive evidence is that even if subjects were required to guess when
they did not know the answer to remove the response bias, depression-induced students
still obtained lower recall scores (Leight & Ellis, 1981). Hertel and Rude (1991b)
administered free recall in the first place and then forced recall, where subjects were
encouraged to guess the answers. The difference between recall and forced recall
conditions was not significant, suggesting that any conservative response style of
depressives did not lower recall performance.
These conflicting results were considered by Watts, Morris, and MacLeod
(1987). The study aimed to examine recognition memory of words using a signal
detection procedure in depressed patients and normal controls. However, they added

another variable (vocalization vs. silent) to the experiment. In the vocalization condit

subjects were to speak aloud the word presented, whereas subjects in the silent conditio
read the word silently. Depressed patients showed poor performance on the 'hit' rates
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across vocalization conditions, compared to normal controls. For false alarm rate,

depression interacted with vocalization. In the vocalization condition, depressed patients
showed more false alarms than normal controls, while in the silent condition, the
opposite pattern was true. These results were interpreted as being due to procedural
differences affecting the rate of false alarms. The finding that in the vocalization

condition, there is an increased false alarm rate and at the same time a decreased hit rate
in depression can be contrast with a conservative response bias. It seems that the
vocalization could draw more attention from depressed patients to the words. In parallel,
the analysis of signal detection showed significant differences on d' but not on 13. Thus
memory deficits in the vocalization could not be attributed to a conservative response
criteria. These results suggest that a procedural variable can affect the level of false
alarm.
Some studies have examined how response bias in depression is affected by the
emotional contents of stimuli (Zuroff et al., 1983; Dunbar & Lishman, 1984). They
examined whether depressed people use a more lenient criteria accepting negative
stimuli, relative to positive and neutral materials. Zuroff et al. (1983) argued that most
studies related to the preferential recall of negative memory in depressed state can be
explained in terms of a response bias rather than in terms of a difference in pure memory
process. Three groups were employed; depressed, formerly depressed, nondepressed
students. They were presented with negative and positive adjectives for rating how
descriptive of them each adjective was and then for selecting adjectives (positive and
negative) which are most self-descriptive. One hour delayed recall, 2-day and 7-day
recall tests, and a 7-day recognition test were conducted.
The results for the recall data averaged over the three tests were consistent with
previous findings; depressed subjects showed a recall bias toward negative adjectives and

a negative intrusion when their errors in recall were analyzed. In the recognition test fo
negative adjectives, as expected, depressed subjects produced the most false alarms,
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compared to the other groups. The tendency of depressives to negative self-relevant
information was also confirmed from the signal detection procedure. For negative
adjectives, the 13 value of depressives was significantly lower, compared to
nondepressives, suggesting that they employed less stringent criteria. These results

indicate that depressives have a tendency to endorse negative self-relevant information a

previously seen items, thus supporting a response bias. Negative recall bias in depressio
can be accounted for to some extent by a response bais.
Dunbar and Lishman (1984) also used emotional materials on an unexpected
recognition test among depressed patients and normal controls. There was no difference
in overall performance (Hit rate). On the d' values, types of words interacted with
depression. Depressed patients show higher d' value for unpleasant words than controls,
suggesting that unpleasant memories seem to be more discernible for them. For
nondepressed people, the oppositie pattern was true, indicating that pleasant memories
appear to be more accessible. The analysis of B showed that depressed patients obtained
higher values in pleasant and neutral words than control groups. But nondepressives did
not show such a bias according to the type of words.
Taken together, the above studies show that response bias varies depending on
the types of words; response bias seems to be content-specific. Depressed patients show
greater bias against pleasant and neutral words and employ less stringent criteria to

negative self-referent information. On the basis of these results, the effects of depress
on memory are not wholly explicable in terms of poverty of output. In the case of

neutral materials, mixed findings were obtained, but procedural differences seem to affec
the level of false alarms. Thus, to examine a pure memorial difference between a
depressed and a nondepressed group, some measures should be taken to exclude the
possibility of the alternative explanation of response bias.
2.1.2 Task Characteristics
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It is generally accepted that tasks requiring relatively effortful processing are likely to
show depressive memory deficits (Hartlage et al., 1993; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). For
example, depressives are more subject to memory deficits in recall tests than in
recognition tests (Calev & Erwin, 1985). The following sections discuss cognitive
processes which are considered as requiring effortful processing and explore whether
depression interferes with such processing. Unfortunately there has been no systematic
examination of the attentional demands required by experimental tasks used to assess
performance deficits in depression (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). However, according to
Hasher and Zacks (1979), cognitive operations requiring elaboration, rehearsal, imagery,
and mnemonic activity were considered as effortful processes. Studies of
organisational/clustering processes, encoding effort, semantic encoding, rehearsal, and
problem solving will be discussed. These studies examined depressive memory deficits in
neutrally valenced materials.

2.1.2.1 Organisation/Clustering
Russell and Beekhnis (1976) compared schizophrenics and depressives to
normals on a list of randomly distributed nouns through a multitrial free recall task.
Despite the high semantic content produced in the to be remembered lists, both patient

groups disclosed inferior recall clustering relative to normals. These results suggest th
both depressives and schizophrenics displayed organisational memory deficits, such that
they are unable to impose any personal or idiosyncratic organisational structure on the
list. As a result, the failure of organisational process in memory impairs subsequent
memory performance. Similarly, depressed patients showed a low level of item clustering
in their free recall, compared to normal controls (Calev & Erwin, 1985). These
organisational deficits were found to be affected by types of stimuli (self-descriptive
adjective vs. abstract noun) used and a duration of depression (Davis, 1979b, Davis &
Unruh, 1980; Davis & Unruh, 1981) Among depressed students, the level of depression
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was negatively associated with the subjective organisation of self-descriptive adjectives

on the mutiltrial free recall, which did not held for the subjective organisation of abst
nouns (Davis, 1977b). Davis and Unruh (1980) did not find those organisational deficits
on the multitrial free recall test of randomly ordered abstract nouns among short-term,
long-term, nonpsychotic depressives and normal subjects. Unexpectedly, short-term
depressed subjects put a high subjective organisation on the recall test, compared to
long-term, and normal controls. Another study (Davis & Unruh, 1981), comparing short-

term, long-term depressives and nondepressed people in multitrial free recall, found that
short-term depressives showed lowest degree of subjective organisation for neutrally
toned personal adjectives, compared to other groups, which did not differ. These results
suggest that the content of stimuli and duration of depression affect an orgaisational

ability of depressives. Particularly short-term depressives appear in a transitional phas
the development of well differentiated negative self-schema, thus, showing a poor
performance in the self-referent processing of neutally toned personal adjectives due to
their unstable self-schema (Davis, 1979a).
Weingartner et al.'s (1981) second study examined how much organisation is
imposed on information and how that organisation is utilised for later recall. Subjects
were presented with a group of unrelated or related words and instructed to sort words
into categories and then to freely recall words. For related words, both groups did not
show a difference in grouping words, indicating that both groups take advantage of the
inherent relationship among words when the relationship is self-evident. However when
random words were used, depressed patients imposed more categories than normal
controls. In recall performance, the groups were not different in the related word

condition, whereas in the unrelated word condition, depressed patients recalled less than
normal controls. However, the correlation between the degree of organisation and recall
performance was not significant for word conditions and groups. A third experiment
varied the number of categories in lists of related words. In each category, the
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presentation of related words was either clustered or unclustered. The results showed
that depressed patients recalled fewer words when the structure of lists was not obvious
to them (unclustered presentation), but when the organisation of words was presented by
the experimenter (clustered presentation), memory deficits disappeared. Particularly
when the least organised words (random word list) were used, depressed patients
showed the largest difference from normal controls. The analysis of the degree of
clustering of recalled words showed that depressed patients were not different from
normal controls when words were presented in a organised way, whose structure is
apparent to them. In the randomly presented condition, much less sequential recall of
related words was found.
These structural/organisational deficits on word lists in depression were extended
to the recall of prose (Watts & Cooper, 1989). The question was to test whether
depressed patients take advantage of the structural organisation of prose as well as
normal controls. The selective recall of the prose provides an index of the degree of
organisation imposed on the passage. Two variables (structuring vs. imageability) were

investigated; structuring was seen as effortful processing, while imageability as a contr
variable is as reflecting automatic processing. The results showed that the effects of
imageability of prose were comparable in both groups (relatively automatic processing);
depressed patients show a strong bias towards selective memory for highly imageable
units as well as normal controls. However, depressed patients showed significantly less

bias towards recall of central units than did normal controls. Thus these results suggest

structuring deficits of depressives. On the contrary, contradictory findings were obtaine
by Levy and Maxwell (1968). They found that depressed patients benefit less than
normal controls as the level of approximation-to-text of 10 and 20 word lists increased
from random words to text. While normal controls showed an increased recall as the
degree of structure of the list rose, this did not hold for depressed patients. Group

differences in recall were more strong in the 20 word-lists condition than in the 10 word
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lists condition. These results are contrast with thefindingthat less organised word lists
lead to greater memory deficits, relative to organised word lists (Weingartner et al.,
1981),
These discrepant findings were taken up by Watt, Dalgleish, Bourke, and Healy
(1990) who applied both tasks from two studies (Levy & Maxwell, 1968; Weingartner et

al., 1981) to a single depressed patients sample. Also the experiment was designed to t
the prediction from the resource allocation model (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988); depression

interferes with processing of unstructured materials more than with structured/organise

materials. In each task (approximation to text lists and semantic category lists), three
levels of structure were employed; high, medium, and low. Averaging across both types
of task, there was no interaction between groups and levels of structure, which is
expected. At the post-hoc analysis of low and medium structure, the results were

opposite to the prediction from the resource allocation theory; depressed patients bene

less on the medium level of structure than on the lowest level of structure, compared to
normal controls. Results supporting the resource allocation model were obtained from
the comparison between medium and high levels of structure for approximation to text;
less difference between groups was found in the high level of structure than in the

medium level of structure. Similarly the Channon et al. (1993a) study mentioned earlier
compared recall performance across varying level of structure of word lists (high,
medium, unstructured) among depressed patients and nondepressed normal controls.
Depressive memory deficits were found only in the medium structure condition where
the categorised words were presented in a random order.
Two studies have employed the recall of stories containing emotional elements

(positive, negative, neutral). One study on dysphoric students (Hasher et al., 1985) did

not find any recall deficits across the immediate and delayed recall tests. In contrast,
Breslow, Kocsis, and Belkin (1981) found overall memory deficits among depressive
patients. The analysis on contents of materials showed that the recall of neutral and
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negative elements remained intact and the recall of positive elements were suppressed
rather than the preferential recall of negative elements of the story in depressed mood
states. So overall, recall deficits in depression are seen as a result of poor recall of
positive elements.
These discrepant findings by Hasher et al. (1985) may be attributed to the
severity of depression and/or the experimental procedure used. Hasher et al. (1985) used
dysphoric students, while Breslow et al. (1981) employed clinically depressed patients.
So memory deficits in the latter can be attributed to the severity of depression. A
procedural difference was that Hasher et al. (1985) induced subjects to identify
themselves with the protagonist of the story (self-referent processing), while Breslow et
al. (1981) simply asked subjects to read the story about person (close to other-referent
processing). According to Kuiper (1983), the self-referent processing paradigm seems to

be resistant to depressive memory deficits. Secondly, the filled retention interval used b
the Breslow et al. (1981) can make the task more difficult than an unfilled retention
interval condition (Hasher et al., 1985).
In summary, the structural/organisation deficit in depression is affected by i) the

level of structure of materials used, ii) affective valences of stimuli and iii) the durat
and severity of depression. In general, depressives have some difficulties in putting an
organisation/structure on the materials when such a cognitive process is implicitly
required, such as in the recall of words (e.g., Calev & Erwin, 1985; Russell & Beekhnis,
1976). Although conflicting results in the level of structure and recall were found, it
seems that depressive memory deficits are most likely to occur in the medium level of
structure in which organisation of materials should be put by subjects rather than when
organisation of materials is self-evident or too difficult (Channon et al. 1993a). With
emotional contents being presented with neutral ones, depressives seem to suppress the
processing of positive materials, causing memory deficits (e.g., Breslow et al., 1981).
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Finally, severe depression rather than mild/moderate depression interferes more with
organisational process.

2.1.2.2 Encoding Effort
Cognitive effort expended in encoding processes has been found to have a
positive relationship with memory performance on some tasks in normal people; the
items given more encoding effort were more memorable than those given less encoding
effort (Jacoby, Craik, & Begg, 1979; Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979; Krinsky &
Nelson, 1981; Johnston & Uhl, 1976). However, sometimes such a beneficial effect of
cognitive effort has produced contradictory findings (Zacks, Hasher, Sanft, & Rose,
1983; Kellog, 1984; Hertel, 1989). Despite such mixed findings, several studies have

asked whether such a beneficial effect of cognitive effort holds for depressed people. Th
reason for this is because several theoretical frameworks predict that depression has
more disruptive effects on cognitive-effort demanding tasks than on automatic tasks
requiring little cognitive effort (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In this
regard, Mitchell and Hunt (1989) described cognitive effort as a boundary condition for
studies of depression rather than a sufficient cause for a poor memory performance in
depression. They suggested that it is desirable to study memorial processes which

consume the limited capacity, energising cognitive effort. As with the normal population,
several studies relating cognitive effort and memory performance in depression show
inconsistent findings.
Regarding cognitive effort in depression, the study of normal people by Tyler,
Hertel, McCallum, and Ellis (1979) has been frequently cited and whose materials have
been used in subsequent studies. Their second study was designed to test the relative

effects of cognitive effort and levels of processing in an incidental paradigm. Two leve
of processing (anagram solving vs. sentence completion) were factorially combined with
two degrees of effort (high vs. low effort) in an incidental learning paradigm. For the
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anagram task, in the low effort condition, anagrams were scrambled very little, while in
the high effort condition, anagram were scrambled a lot. For the sentence completion
task, in the low effort sentence condition, sentences had an obvious completion, whereas
in the high effort sentence condition, sentences were more difficult to complete. For
example, for the missing word 'dream', "the girl was awakened by the
frightening' ' ( low-effort) and the man was alarmed by the frightening' '
(high-effort). The results showed that across both tasks, the high effort condition was
associated with greater recall than the low effort condition. Cognitive effort was
measured by a secondary tone detection task, and probe latencies were longer for the
high-effort sentence-completion task than for the low-effort sentence-completion task.
Furthermore, a difference in reaction time was parallel to a difference in recall
performance; that is, high effort led to better recall.
The cognitive effort effect was applied to studies of depressive memory deficits

(Ellis et al., 1984, study 3). Ellis et al. (1984) reported several experiments on normal
subjects who had undergone the VMIP. They compared the recall performance of
depressed subjects with a neutral mood induced group in the sentence completion task.
They replicated findings of superior recall of words processed in high-effort sentence
completion to that of words processed in low-effort sentence completion. However, such

a recall superiority in the high-effort condition disappeared in an experimentally induce
depressed mood state. They interpreted poor performance of depressed subjects in the

high-effort condition as inadequate allocation of cognitive effort. However, as there was

no secondary task to measure the degree of expended effort, such an interpretation is not
conclusive.
Potts, Camp, and Coyne (1989) examined whether poor elaborative processing
found in a mood induction study (Ellis et al., 1984, study 1) could be generalised to a
naturally occurring depressed population. Using similar types of sentences (base vs.
elaborated sentences) as a within-subjects variable, they did not find an overall recall
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difference between groups but nondepressed subjects recalled more targets words in the
elaborated condition than in the base sentence condition, whereas depressed subjects did
not show superior recall in the elaborated condition. These results were interpreted as,

that depression interferes with adequate allocation to the elaborative condition (cognitive
effort deficits). Like Ellis et al. (1984), they did not employ any measurement to verify
the allocation of resources.
A study by Hertel and Rude (1991a) also attempted to extend the study of
cognitive effort deficits found in experimentally depressed states to naturally occurring
depressed people. Using a sentence-completion task similar to that of Tyler et al. (1979).
they varied sentence difficulty and task instruction. A secondary task with a varying
delay of tone detection, was employed with sentence frame task while processing
sentences. Three groups were employed: naturally dysphorics, induced dysphorics, and
normal controls (study 2). The experimentally induced subjects replicated Ellis et al.,'s
(1984) results; they showed overall recall deficits and did not benefit from difficult
sentences, compared to normal controls in the unstructured condition. In contrast,
naturally occurring depressives did not show overall recall deficits. Natural depression

interacted with task instruction and sentence difficulty. In the unstructured condition, no
significant effect including depression was not found, but in the structured condition,
they recalled fewer words from easy sentences but similar amount of words from difficult
sentences (study 2). Across three experiments, they did not find memory deficits with
natural depression as predicted by cognitive effort account. The lack of depressive
memory deficits in the difficult task are contrasted with the previous study (Ellis et al.,
1984). Three experiments taken together, induced mood subjects perform differently
from naturally depressed subjects; induced depressed subjects show overall poor deficits,
while naturally depressed subjects did not, The beneficial effects for later recall from
difficult decision task (difficulty task) are disrupted in induced depression but not in
natural depression. These results of naturally depressed subjects do not fit resource
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not fit resource allocation and capacity-reduced models. Particularly, the finding that
naturally depressed subjects recalled equal amount of words from difficult sentence
frames but recalled less from easy sentence frames in the structured task condition,
appears to support reduced initiative hypothesis. This is because mildly depressed
subjects could allocate adequate resources to a difficult task. This argument was tested
again in clinically depressed patients in a subsequent study (Hertel & Rude, 1991b).
Hertel and Rude (1991b) applied the same encoding effort procedure described
previously (Hertel & Rude, 1991a) to outpatients. This was because the equal
performance of naturally occurring depressed subjects in difficult sentences seems to be
associated with the mild depression of the student population. The aim of the study was
the same as the previous study (Hertel & Rude, 1991a), to investigate whether cognitive
effort effects are impaired in depressed outpatient subjects. Recovered, depressed,
normal controls were employed. The results showed that depressive memory deficits
varied upon attentional manipulation; unfocused attention produced memory deficits,
while focused attention did not, compared to normal controls. So effortful encoding does
not always accompany depressive memory deficits and thus puts a restriction on the
cognitive effort account of depressive memory deficits. These results suggest that a more
controlled task procedure, like the focused task, could prevent depressive memory
deficits by mustering their attention to the current task instruction,

2.1.2.3 Semantic Encoding
Using a depth of processing paradigm (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), materials given
semantic processing are better recalled than those given acoustic processing. The
following studies which questioned whether this is true of depressed people assumed that
semantic processing requires more attentional capacity than acoustic processing,
Weingartner et al. (1981; study 1) compared semantic and acoustic processing in
depressed patients and normal controls. In the semantic processing condition, subject
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were instructed to produce semantically related words in response to the stimulus word,
and in the acoustic processing condition subjects were told to produce an acoustically
related word to the stimulus word, After 24 hours, free recall of stimulus words were
tested. The results showed that normal controls remembered significantly more
semantically processed words than acoustically processed words, but this pattern did not
hold for depressed patients. The superior recall of semantic processing to acoustic
processing disappears in depressed people. Such results were interpreted as due to the
poor elaborative encoding of depressives.
A similar experiment was conducted by Ellis et al. (1984, study 2), in which the
VMIP was used to induce depressed and neutral mood states. For semantic processing,
subjects rated words on a pleasantness scale and for nonsemantic processing, subjects
were instructed to count the number of "s" in each word. In an unexpected recall,
depressed subjects recalled less words than nondepressed subjects in both semantic and
nonsemantic conditions. However, the superior performance of semantic processing over
nonsemantic processing held in depressed mood states. These results suggest that
induced depression reduces the effectiveness of both semantic and nonsemantic orienting
tasks in its effect on recall. Roy-Byrne, Weingartner, Bierer, Thompson and Post (1986)
induced semantic processing using comparative judgement of noun pairs in depressed
patients and normal controls. Once subjects completed the task and were asked to recall
words and to identify which of 4 judgemental attributes had been applied to each word
pair presented. Depressives showed memory deficits in the recall test but not in the

identification of judgemental attribute, Roy-Byrne et al. (1986) interpreted these result
on the dimension of effortful (free recall) vs. automatic processes (identification).
However even though the identification task at retrieval is more close to automatic
processing, both tasks involve the same semantic encoding process. Depressive memory
deficits may occur due to incongruence between encoding and retrieval which made the
recall test more difficult, relative to the identification test. The identification test
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retrieval is congruent with identification-oriented encoding, while the free recall test is

incongruent with identification-oriented encoding. Thus, rather than the effortfulness o
cognitive operations demanded by the task, incongruency between encoding and retrieval
stages may be responsible for the memory deficits (cf. Tulving & Thomson, 1973;
Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977).
In summary, semantic processing of neutral materials seems to be disrupted, and

the encoding requiring deeper elaborative processing is more likely to be interfered wit

by depression. Induced depression is different from clinical depression in that it disru
nonsemantic as well as semantic processing. This difference could be caused by
temporarily strong depression induced by the mood induction procedure (Hasher et al.,
1985).

2.1.2.4 Rehearsal
According to the working memory model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974), rehearsal rate is
responsible for memory span in the normal population. Many studies have been
conducted as to whether memory span (serial recall) is interfered with by depression.
Such a question is relevant to the assumption by Hasher and Zacks (1979) that rehearsal
as an effortful process is impaired by depression. The claim of rehearsal deficits by
Hasher and Zacks (1979) reviewed earlier was supported by the finding that depressives

made less semantic confusions in the forced choice recognition test than normal controls.

These results were interpreted as due to the lack of elaborative rehearsal by depressives
However, this argument is based on the performance of depressives, but not on the
actual measurement of rehearsal strategy/rate taken. The previous studies in this area
show inconsistent findings due to various tasks, diverse subjects population, and some
methodological problems assessing short-term memory functioning (Colby & Gotlib,
1988).
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M a n y studies explored the serial recall of digits and words in depressed people
but did not find memory deficits. One of the most extensive studies on severe
depression's effects on cognitive and perceptual functioning was conducted by Friedman

(1964). On only 4 % of the possible 82 test scores were depressed patients significantly

different from matched nondepressed controls. Examples of the tests are reaction time to

a light signal, reaction time for a common object and Digit Symbol. On the basis of thes
findings, he suggested that the possible depressive memory deficits lie in short-term
memory or the capacity for sustained concentration. In effect, he did not find poor
performance of depressives in the digit span task.
Whitehead (1973) compared elderly depressed patients with demented patients
on a variety of learning and memory tasks including the digits span forward test.
Depressives served as their own controls. The performance on the digits forwards of
depressives did not differ from one when they recovered from depression, suggesting
that depressives do not suffer from impaired immediate recall of digits. One of the

problems, as he suggested, lies in that recovered depressives were retested on remissio
which might not be complete. Thus, the results would be different if healthy elderly
people had been employed as normal controls and such a limitation makes the null

findings in immediate recall inconclusive. Henry, Weingartner, and Murphy (1973) tested

short-term memory functioning as a part of serial learning (6 trials) when the first tr
considered as representing short-term memory. The depressed patients comprised both
unipolar and manic-depressed patients. Subjects served as their own control; the
comparison was made between when they are more and less depressed during the antidepressant treatment. The immediate recall of random words was not different between
more depressed and less depressed phases, Gibson (1981) tested immediate free recall
for elderly depressed, dementing elderly, and normal controls. A list of 10 words were
auditorily presented and a set of pictures were also presented, and subjects were asked
for immediate free recall. In comparison to normal controls, depressed subjects showed
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lower overall performance in both the verbal and visual task. But the pattern of a U -

shape appearing in the serial position curve in free recall was similar in depressed and
normal subjects, with memory loss in depressed subjects being more severe at the
absolute level. Across depressed and nondepressed groups in either task, there was a
strong recency effect on the last position. Assuming that the recency effect comes from
the short-memory store, it can be claimed that the short-term memory in the depressed
group remains intact.
Slife, Miura, Thompson, and Shapiro (1984) compared serial learning of trigrams
(consonant-vowel-consonant) among elderly depressed, matched normal elderly and
normal college students. The trigrams were simultaneously presented for 30 seconds and
three trials of recall of the same list of trigrams were administered. Considering the
trial as reflecting short-term memory, the depressed elderly did not differ from the

normal elderly, but on the third recall trial the depressed elderly recalled less trigr
than normal elderly. This result suggests that the depressed elderly have a learning
difficulty, but no short-term memory deficits.
Berndt and Berndt (1980) did not find short-term memory deficits in depressed
college students. The task they used was remembering consonant-vowel-consonant
trigrams in a Brown-Peterson task with 10 seconds filled retention interval. Gass and
Russell (1986) investigated the relation among organicity, depression and memory
performance on the Digit Span Scale (WAIS) and Logical Memory test (30 minutes
delayed recall, WMS-revised). Subjects included four groups; depressed and organic
(brain-damaged), depressed and not organic, nondepressed and organic, nondepressed
and not organic. The organicity variable impeded digit span performance and logical
memory, while the depression variable did not. On the basis of these results, they
concluded that depression has a negligible effect on both STM and LTM.
Unlike those studies aforementioned, a more extensive study on STM functioning
was conducted employing a range of working memory tasks among depressed patients
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and normal controls (Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993b). A range of tasks were
designed to tap components of the working memory model proposed by Baddeley and
Hitch (1974). The working memory model proposed a central executive as a supervisory
system which controls the allocation of resources and mediates problem-solving and
decision making, and two subordinate systems i.e., articulatory loop and visuospatial
sketch pad. The articulatory loop is responsible for verbal STM and the visuospatial
sketch pad is for visual STM. On several measures involving the articulatory loop and
visuospatial sketch pad, depressed patients and normal controls did not differ. On the
basis of these measures, they concluded that the articulatory loop and visuo-spatial
sketch pad responsible for verbal and visual rehearsal respectively remain intact in
depression.
In contrast with the above null findings, several studies claim that serial recall is
disturbed by depression. Colby and Gotlib (1988) investigated whether mild/moderate
depressed mood states can have disruptive effects on rehearsal in short-term memory
task. A Digit span task with varying length (6, 8, 10, and 12 items) was employed with
varying retention intervals (1, 20, 30 seconds). In overall performance, depressed
subjects were poorer than nondepressed subjects. A depressive memory deficit was
found in 8 and 10 digits strings. In longer retention intervals (20, 30 seconds),
depressives showed poor performance compared to immediate recall, whereas such a

pattern did not hold for nondepressives. On the basis of these results they proposed tha

depressives have difficulties in maintaining information in short-term memory, that is,
rehearsal difficulty. However, it seems possible that the simultaneous presentation of

digits as used in their experiment may allow subjects encoding strategy to improve later
recall rather than to just retain information. As the duration of presentation was
equivalent to 1 second per digit, there must be enough time to use an encoding strategy

such as chunking in case of 8 or 10 digits presented. Also rehearsal difficulty might be
caused by the psychomotor retardation frequently found in depressed mood states.
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Krames and MacDonald (1985) assumed that negative automatic thoughts from
negative schemata will occur recurrently, thus occupying the STM space. Under this
assumption depressed people seem to be forced to divide their attention to both the
immediate task and the negative thoughts competing for the STM space, To test the
idea, the concurrent memory task was employed; subjects were asked to recall digits

visually presented and a list of words read to them at the same time. The memory load o

numbers varied from zero, to three, to six digits. The results of the free recall of wo
showed that normal controls recalled more words than depressed patients across memory

load and serial position. When serial position was divided into three sections: primacy
middle, recency the performance in the primacy segment was determined by the
interaction of memory load and depression. A group difference was found in the zero

memory load condition which is relatively easy and the difference disappeared in the s

digit memory load condition, which is more difficult. The middle and recency parts were
not affected by depression. For the recall of digits, the two groups did not differ

according to memory load. On the basis of no group difference in the recency part, they
concluded that there is no decrement in STM capacity for the depressives. Instead, on
the basis of interaction in the primacy part, they proposed cognitive interference of
depressive thoughts during maintenance of information in STM. That is, depression does
not reduce STM capacity but interferes with encoding of information and/or the
maintenance rehearsal.
Dannenbaum, Parkinson, and Inman (1988) compared three groups (elderly

depressed, demented, normal elderly) on the letter span task. The letter span was based
on the longest list length recalled when 70 % or better accuracy was obtained over 10
trials. They found that the elderly depressives have a shorter memory span than normal

controls, suggesting memory span deficits. These individuals' difference in letter span
were considered on the Brown-Peterson task in immediate and delayed recall with

distractors. Equating for capacity differences resulted in equivalent overall performan
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in both immediate and delayed performance. O n the basis of these results, they suggested
that depressive memory deficits in serial recall appear to be restricted to encoding
information. This interpretation is contrasted with one by Colby and Gotlib (1988),

proposing rehearsal difficulty for memory deficits in delayed recall. With considering th
limitation of Colby and Gotlib (1988) study, it seems a tentative conclusion that
depressive memory deficits are associated with encoding strategy.
In summary, the previous literature on STM functioning in depression showed

inconsistent findings. The possible reasons for these contradictory findings are that som

studies have methodological problems; e.g., no control for effects of statistical regress
when subjects serve as their own controls (e.g., Henry et al., 1973; Stromgren, 1977),
and mixed used of subtypes of clinically depressed patients (e.g., Henry et al., 1973).
Secondly, studies employed various methods and subject groups. Subjects groups varied

from clinically depressed patients, elderly depressed people, mildly/moderately depressed
subclinical people. Also various tasks have been used; serial learning, serial recall,
immediate free recall, and recognition. The presentation of stimuli is sometimes

simultaneous rather than sequential, allowing subjects to use a cognitive strategy (Colby
& Gotlib, 1988, Slife et al., 1984). Finally, some studies were not conducted in the
context of a clearcut theoretical framework. This diversity in subject population and
tasks among studies makes forming a conclusion on STM functioning in depression
difficult.

2.1.2.5 Problem Solving Strategy
As claimed in the reduced initiative model (Hertel & Hardin, 1990), the failure of
spontaneous election of beneficial cognitive strategy in depression is responsible for
depressive memory deficits. This argument stresses the importance of cognitive strategy
in the study of memory functioning in depression. According to Hasher and Zacks
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(1979), problem solving strategies belong to effortful processes and the review by
Hartlage et al. (1993) showed difficulties of depressives in solving problems.
In a category learning task, Smith, Tracy, and Murray (1993) tried to understand
depressive learning strategy. In terms of automatic vs. effortful processing, it was
assumed that holistic processing is fast and effortless (automatic processing) and an

analytic approach is slow and effortful (effortful processing). Accordingly, depression i
more likely to show performance deficits on a task requiring an analytic approach rather
than a holistic approach. To test this hypothesis, subjects (depressed vs. nondepressed
community students) were subject to category learning which allowed either an analytic
and systematic approach, or holistic processing. Two types of category membership were
developed; criterial-attribute (CA) and family resemblance (FR). In the CA task, only

one attribute contributed to categorisation of stimuli, all the others were uninformative
about the category membership. This task requires subjects to use selective attention and
flexible analysis. On the other hand, in the FR task, no attributes are diagnostic of
category membership. The results showed that across groups, the CA task produced
overall better performance than the FR task. However, depressed subjects revealed
performance deficits in the CA task, but not in the FR task. It appears to contradict the
prediction from the effortful processing because the FR task is more effortful than the
CA task; the difficulty of the FR task was evidenced by the failure of a number of
subjects to meet the criteria. Thus performance deficits with the CA task indicate that

depressives suffer from rigid and inflexible strategy of analysis rather than from effort
or difficult task processing.
This poor analytic and systematic cognitive strategy employed by depressives was
also evidenced by Abramson, Alloy, and Rosoff (1981) study on hypothesis testing
strategy. The comparison between a subject-generated hypothesis condition and an
experimenter-provided hypothesis condition was made. The subject-generated condition

required subjects to arrive at the solution of the problem (controlling a green light), wh
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the experimenter-provided

condition supplied subjects with several alternative

hypotheses including the correct one. The task was to control the green light onset by
pressing a button. They found that in the self-generated condition, depressed students
gave fewer correct responses than nondepressed students, but in the experimenterprovided condition, the groups were not different. These results may be due to a

tendency that depressives are less likely to engage themselves in hypothesis testing in t
self-generated condition. On the basis of these results, they concluded that depressives
do not seem to actively engage in cognitive strategies; for example, attention focusing,
memory search and rehearsal.
Similarly, Silberman, Weingartner, and Post (1983) also investigated problem
solving behaviour on a discriminant learning task (Levene, 1966) for depressed patients
(unipolar and bipolar) and normal controls. The task is to gradually reduce the number of
possible correct hypotheses according to the feedback from the experimenter (yes or no).
There are two conditions, standard vs. report. In the reported condition, subjects were

asked to list all hypothesis sets after the first and second feedbacks, while in the stan
condition, they did not. The results showed that depressives generated fewer correct
hypotheses than nondepressives across both standard and report conditions. In the

standard condition depressives did not differ from nondepressives after the first feedbac
but after the second feedback, they could not reduce the set of possible correct
hypotheses, sampling from an overly large set of hypotheses. However, in the reported
condition, both groups did not differ. These results were interpreted as an inability of
depressives to narrow down a set of possible solutions and by discarding hypotheses,
reflecting a cautious response strategy. Using a similar Levene task (1966), Baker and
Channon (1995) found depressive impairment only on the 4 dimensional problems.
Despite various strategies such as memory aid and focusing attention, there was no clear-

cut evidence that any of these experimental manipulations had a differential facilitatory
effect on the performance of the dysphoric group and moreover, overall poor
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performance w a s found. The overall poor performance is consistent with results of
Silberman et al. (1983), but no facilitatory effects are contradictory to them.
In a conceptual problem solving task, Dobson and Dobson (1981) also studied a
cognitive strategy that depressed students use. The problem that subjects had to solve
was to learn an operational rule by discovering through card choices (and; conjunctive,

and/or; inclusive disjunctive, if and only if; biconditional). The problem solving strateg
score as well as the number of card choices were calculated, based on the degree of a
chosen card giving new information relevant to the solution of the problem and on
hypothesis generation. They found that depressives needed more cards to reach the
solution criteria in the inclusive disjunctive and biconditional conditions, but no
difference was found in the conjunctive condition. Similarly, in the strategy score,
depressives were less efficient than nondepressives in inclusives, disjunctive and
biconditional conditions, but not in conjunctive condition. However, depressives and
nondepressives did not differ in the number of hypotheses generated. Assuming that

inclusive distinctive and biconditional conditions are relatively more difficult than the
conjunctive condition, these results suggest that depressives are more likely to show
problem solving deficits in tasks requiring a more complex cognitive strategy.
All the above results taken together suggest that depressive deficits in the use of
cognitive strategy are more easily found in the situation where subjects generate their
own hypothesis, employ an analytic approach, and are required to use a more complex
strategy. These consistent results of poor problem solving seem to lend more support to
the reduced initiative model, emphasising the lack of spontaneous cognitive strategy

election in depression, than the reduced capacity model, which emphasises task difficulty.
One of contradictory findings to the reduced capacity model is from the Smith et al.
(1993) study using a category learning task; poor performance was found in the task
requiring the flexible and analytic approach rather than in the difficult task. This
contradictory finding can be explained because in a flexible condition using cognitive
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strategy, the reduced initiative of those strategies can impair the performance of
depressives. Depressive deficits in either subject-generated-hypothesis or a no cue
condition presented by the experimenter might result from the poor focused attention of
depressives in an uncontrolled task condition. However, the finding by Baker and
Channon (1995) appears to be difficult to fit into the reduced initiative model because
the helpful strategy of reporting hypotheses in the Levene task did not facilitate
performance of the depressed group compared to the normal group. Rather this finding
of overall poor performance is consistent with the reduced capacity model that
depressive deficits may arise from an actual reduction in total cognitive resources with
without narrowing attentional focus. In summary, neither models can give a satisfactory
explanation of current findings in the problem solving area. Further work is needed to
elucidate the relationship between the reduced cognitive initiative and the reduced
capacity model on problem solving tasks.
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CHAPTER 3
Relationship among Self-schemata, Negative Cognitions, Self-focused
Attention, and Depressed mood

3.1 Self-schematic processing
Much evidence supporting the operation of negative self-schema in depression

has been accumulated using a self-referent processing paradigm. The idea of self-referen
processing was borrowed from the depth of processing approach in cognitive psychology
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972). The typical paradigm is as follows. Subjects are presented
with a list of personal adjectives (eg., bleak, weary, dismal: Kuiper & Deny, 1982) and
are asked to respond yes/no in terms of whether the adjective describes themselves or
not. As dependent measures, decision time of the yes/no decision and incidental recall
performance are used. Using this paradigm with a normal population, Rogers, Kuiper,

and Kirker (1977) found that greater incidental recall occurred for adjectives rated und

a self-referent decision task (Does this word describe you?) than for the same adjective

rated under a structural or semantic decision task. The results were interpreted as that

the self-schema, activated via the self-referent judgement task, acted as an interpretati
frame to facilitate deep and elaborate memory encodings. They concluded that this
schema-based elaborative encoding accounts for the enhanced recall of self-referenced
adjectives. Similarily, Markus (1977) defined self-schemata as the knowledge about
oneself stored in long-term memory. Regarding the operation of self-schemata, she
claimed that within a specified domain, one should make a relatively rapid judgement of
consistent behavioural evidence and one should be able to resist counter-schematic
information. Consistent with her prediction, people with a dependence schema took less
time in deciding on whether words (e.g., comforrning, obliging) related to such traits

were self-descriptive than they did to describe themselves as independent adjectives (e.

70

assertive). T h e opposite pattern w a s true of aschematic people (independent). The
concept of a self-schema can be seen as both a knowledge about self and also a process
engaged in the selection and interpretation of incoming information. A subsequent study
(Bargh, 1982) using the same criteria to classify people into aschematic and schematic
groups showed that information about a person's self-schema receives automatic
processing through the use of a dichotic listening paradigm. Subsequently the attributes

of these self-schema operations were applied to explore negative self-schemata operation
of depressed people.

3.1.1 Self-referent Processing and Depression
According to Beck (1967), depressed people have negative self-schema,
characteristics of which are maladaptive and give rise to distortion in the way

information is encoded and evaluated. Thus, in the perspecitive of self-schema prediction
(Rogers, et al., 1977), depressed people give a more rapid judgement to and better recall
of adjectives related to negative self-references than nondpressed people. Davis (1979a)
applied a self-referent processing paradigm to depressed patients, utilizing the same
personal adjectives used in the Roger's et al. (1977) study whose content is not
negative/depressed. The results replicated earlier findings of enhanced recall for selfreferent decisions in the nondepressed group but not in the clinically depressed group.
On the self-referent level, depressives recall significantly fewer words than
nondepressives, which contradicts the precidiction from depressive self-schema (Beck &
Rush, 1978). These results were taken to cast doubt on the existence of a welldifferentiated negative self-schema in depression. However, since Davis (1979a) did not
include negative or depressive content adjectives congruent with a depressive selfschema, he was not able to appropriately test the question of negative self-referent
processing in depression (Deny & Kuiper, 1981, pp. 145).
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D e n y and Kuiper (1981), building on Davis' experiment of information
processing in depression added an adjective list that contained both depressive (eg.,

loser, inferior, hopeless) and nondepressive (eg., amiable, sociable, capable) content int
the similar paradigm used by Davis (1979a). The results showed that depressed patients
showed superior recall of depressives adjectives under self-referent rating. Conversely

both normal and non-depressed psychiatric control subjects exhibit superior self-referent
recall for non-depressed content. In addition to addressing the negative content of the
adjective list, Deny and Kuiper (1981) drew attention to the efficiency with which
depressive content is processed; that is, schema-congruent materials are processed more
efficiently in terms of time taken judging adjectives when adjectives characterize their
self-schema. As predicted, clinical depressives were no less efficient in their speed of
negative content processing than normal controls when response times for the selfreferent decisions were employed as an index of processing efficiency. These results in
recall performance and processing efficiency suggest that both depressives and nondepressives employed an efficient and well-organized self-schema to assist in selfreferent processing, which supports Beck's negative self-schema model of depression.
This content-specific hypothesis predicts that information (adjectives) congruent with
content of a self-schema would give rise to the most elaborative encoding and analysis in
memory.
The same depth of processing paradigm was also utilized with mildly depressed

students to take account of the possible effects of different levels of depression on self
referent encoding (Kuiper & Deny, 1982; Kuiper, Olinger, & MacDonald, 1985). Their
experiments required both the depressed and normal subject to make semantic and selfreferent ratings on depressed and nondepressed content adjectives. In the analysis of
subsequent incidental recall, nondepressed subjects recalled more nondepressed than
depressed self-referent information, while depressed subjects showed the equal amount
of recall for both depressed and non-depressed self-referent content. On the basis of
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these results, they suggested that mild depressives utilize a self-schema that incorporates
both depressed and non-depressed content. This even-handedness of depressed and
nondepressed content in mildly depressed subjects was further supported by Greenberg
and Alloy's (1989) study on self-referent judgment of, and reaction time to, positive and
negative adjectives; depressed subjects did not show any preference for positive or
negative adjectives in terms of their self-descriptiveness and no difference in reaction
time to positive and negative adjectives. These data indicate that mildly depressed
subjects process positive and negative content with relatively equal facility, but at the
expense of efficient processing for either. In relation to this even-handedness of
response, Ingram and Reed (1986) suggested that the pool of stimuli used (loser, weak,
inadquate) is too strongly depressive, which are not appropriate to tap their particular
depressive self-schema. Mildly depressed subjects would have shown efficient processing
of less strong stimuli (eg., blue, criticized, troubled).
Ingram (1984a) investigated the content specificity hypothesis by giving
nondepressed and depressed students either success or failure experience immediately
before the depth of processing task. The stimulus adjectives were nondepressed content,
which was used in the Roger et al.,'s (1977) study. After the the depth of processing
task, the recalled words were assessed by subjects in terms of favourability and selfdescriptiveness. Nondepressed subjects in the success condition gave more favourable
ratings on words recalled under a self-reference rating. However, depressed subjects did
not show any difference in favourability for recall of words between success and failure
conditions. These results suggest that depressed people have difficulties in using a
success experience to activate the processing of positive self-referent information,
compared to nondepressed. Depressed people inhibit the use of positive information
rather than facilitate the activation of negative information. However, this conclusion is
tentative because no treatment (neutral control) was included as a criteria to compare

with other treatments. On the other hand, this lack of differential favourability of recal
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words as a function of treatment condition is consistent with the even-handedness of
response in mildly depressed people.
In summary, in the review of self-referent processing in depression, Ruehlman,
West, and Pasahow (1985) concluded that depressed patients show a negative recall bias,
mild depressives even-handedness of recall, and normal controls a positive recall bias.
These results support the negative self-schema theory of depression in terms of

development of a negative self-schema. That is, as the severity of depression increases, a
more organized negative self-schema develops, accordingly, facilitating processing of
negative information (cf. Davis & Unruh, 1981; Davis, 1979a). In relation to the
development of negative self-schema, Davis and Unruh (1981) emphasized the duration
of the depression episode. Other supportive evidence of the efficiency of the stable

negative self-schema comes from the finding that the self-referent processing of negative

contents of depressed patients is as efficient as that of positive self-related informati
nondepressed patients. Finally what happens when depressed episode remits? Slife et al.
(1984) showed that this negative information processing of the self is reversed over
psychotherapy.

3.1.2 Criticisms of Self-referent Processing
Even though much evidence on negative self-schema has been accumulated in
studies using the depth of processing paradigm, it is still not clear from the normal
population why there is this superior recall of self-referent over semantic processing.
According to Rogers et al. (1977), the recall superiority of self-referent material over
semantically encoded materials indicates that the self-referent encoding creates richly
elaborated memory traces (elaborative processing explanation). The self is seen as a
highly elaborated memory structure. In contrast, Klein and Kihlstrom (1986) proposed
an organizational processing interpretation. They noted that the self-referent question
(e.g., Does this word describe you?) encourages subjects into categorical organization;
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words which describe m e or words which do not describe me. The study by Klein and
Kihlstrom (1986) showed that self-reference and semantic encoding produce virtually

identical free recall levels if the categorical organization of the material is controlled

Futhermore, self-referent encoding may result in significantly poorer recall if it does no
encourage categorization as self-descriptive vs non self-descriptive. In a subsequent
study, Klein and Loftus (1988) tested the relative contribution of both factors
(elaboration vs. organization) to self-referent recall. The superiority of self-referent
encoding depends on the properties of the words presented (unrelated vs., related). In
the unrelated word condition, recall performance of subjects given an organiztional
process task using category sorting was equal to that of ones given self-referent
encoding. In the related word condition, recall performance in the elaborative encoding
condition was equal to that of the self-referent encoding group. So the advantage of selfreferent encoding may be partly due to both elaborative and organizational processes.
In relation to the use of rating latencies as a measure of the efficiency of schema,
Bargh and Tota (1988) argued that raw judgement latencies are inappropriate indices of

efficient or automatic processing because multiple factors besides the activation of store
intenelated constructs may influence the response times (e.g., subject's degree of
confidence in his or her judgement; how much of it was due to the construct activation
stage and how much of it was due to the decision and response selection stage?).
The review by Segal (1988) of studies related to self-schema in depression
suggested that the difference found among depressed and nondepressed subjects can also
be explained by an alternative framework such as accessibility or mood itself rather than
a deeper elaboration by the operation of self-schema structure. First of all, the

preferential recall of negative trait adjectives of depressive patients could be due eithe
negative self-schema or the mood congruence effect between the content of adjectives
and subject's affective states when subjects were asked to rate or recall. Thus, these
results could be explained under mood-congruent encoding and recall in terms of
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network theory (Bower, 1981). Segal (1988) himself tried to explain this differential
recall between depressed and normal controls as a heightened accessibility of negative
and positive adjectives as a function of mood. Similarily, in regard to the role of
depressed mood, Hammen, Marks, deMayo, and Mayol's (1985) study on depressionvulnerability strongly suggests that mood plays a part in the maintenance of depressive
symptoms rather than self-schema. Similarily, Teasdale and Barnard (1993) suggested
the pivotal role of depressed mood in the maintenance of depressive symptoms rather
than a negative self-schema. In a similar context, the review by Blaney (1986) noted that
the problems with current schema-related studies is to distinguish response effects of
mood itself and the response effects of cognitive schema structures associated with
mood.
In sum, Beck's negative self-schema theory of depression has received supportive
findings from those self-referent studies using the depth of processing paradigm.
However, with the above criticisms, the necessity of negative self-schema as a cognitive
structure remains ambiguous in explaining the superiority of negative self-referent
information. This is because other alternative explanations are feasible, such as moodcongruent learning and recall, and heightened accessibility as a function of depressed

mood itself. There are some difficulties in distinguishing mood effects and the effects of
cognitive structures. Furthermore, even in the case of the normal population, there is
some controversy of whether the underlying mechanism of self-referent processing lies in
the elaboration activities of the self as a knowledge structure.

3.1.3 Relative Accessibility of Negative/Positive Cognitions
Unlike the self-referent processing studies focusing on the existence and
operation of negative self-schema, the following studies are interested in the change in
relative accessibility of negative/positive cognitions as a function of emotional mood
states; thus, more focus was on the role of depressed mood. The two areas seem
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complementary rather than antagonistic to each other, in terms of dealing with negative
memory bias, particularly in depression. Perhaps the first study in this area, Lloyd and
Lishman's (1975) study examined the accessibility of personal memories among
depressed patients using a correlational study. The accessibility of personal memories
was measured as the time taken to retrieve a memory. Subjects were presented with a list
of neutral words and then asked to recall either a pleasant or unpleasant personal
memory that was somehow associated with each word. They found that the more severe
the depression measured by the BDI, the less time it took to retrieve unpleasant
memories and the greater the time to report pleasant experiences. Thus depression
increases the accessibility of negative personal memories, while decreasing the
accessibility of positive personal memories. However, their study could not clarify
whether the increased accessibility of negative memories was due to the retrieval of
genuinely depressing experiences with the severity of depression and/or whether the
more severely depressed may simply be evaluating more of their neutral or ambiguous
experiences as more unpleasant (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).
Taking account of these drawbacks, Teasdale and his colleagues conducted a
series of experiments to examine the effects of depressed and elated mood states on

associated variables such as a differential memory effect and psychomotor retardation i
each mood state (for review, Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). The reason for
using a mood induction procedure is because emotional contents of personal experiences
can be equalised across depressed and elated groups. The differential memory effect was

to assess the relative accessibility of negative and positive cognitions in depressed/e
mood states. Some studies employed a mood induction procedure (Teasdale & Fogarty,
1979; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981; Teasdale & Russell,
1983) and one study used clinically depressed patients (Clark & Teasdale, 1982).
Through these experiments, he concluded that depressed mood state increases the

accessibility of negative cognitions and decreases the accessibility of positive cognit
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Three studies (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980;
Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) examined a differential effect of mood variation on retrieval of
personal past experiences when subjects are induced by the Velten-like mood induction
(depressed vs. happy). According to their prediction, subjects in depressed mood take
less time to retrieve unpleasant memories, relative to pleasant memories. On the other
hand, when they are induced into happy mood, it takes less time to retrieve happy
memories than unpleasant memories. That is, current mood states regulate the relative
accessibility of pleasant and unpleasant memories. The typical experimental procedure is
as follows. The same subject experienced both depression and happy induction on

different occasions. Stimulus words prompt subjects to retrieve past real life experience
and the latency to remembering the actual experience is measured. Except for the results
of Teasdale and Fogarty (1979), the general results are consistent with the prediction.
However, Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) showed that depressed mood state increased the
latency to retrieve pleasant memories rather than decreased the latency to retrieve
unpleasant memories. Clark and Teasdale (1982) subsequently replicated the earlier
results by examining diurnal variations in the mood of depressed patients. Patients were
given words as cues and asked to respond with the first personal memory which came to
mind. These were rated for pleasantness/happiness. It was again found that high levels of

depression were related to significantly more unpleasant than pleasant memories recalled.
For time periods of relatively low depression in these same patients, more pleasant than
unpleasant memories were retrieved. Negativity in ratings of the experiences were also
mood-congruent; the more depressed ratings which were given, the more depressive the
current mood which existed.
Teasdale and Russell (1983) shifted their focus from the retrieval of personal
memories to recall of verbal materials which subjects had learned. The study aimed to

explore the differential accessibility of positive, negative, and neutral personality tra
words at recall. The results are consistent with the prediction of the differential
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accessibility hypothesis. Subjects in elated m o o d states recalled more positive words than
subjects in depressed mood states. More negative words were recalled in depressed
mood states than in elated mood states. The recall of neutral words was not affected by
mood manipulation.
One of the drawbacks across Teasdale and his colleagues mood induction studies
is that they did not employ a neutral group or no induction group and instead used the
happy group as a control group. As suggested by Williams et al. (1988), significant
effects obtained in their experiments can be attributed to either slowing effects of
depression or speeding up effects of elated mood, in explaining the differential
accessibility of negative and positive contents obtained in the mood induction studies.
this regard, Blaney (1986) maintained that elated mood seems to contribute more to a
differential recall effect rather than depresed mood, because the actual depressed mood
change by the VMIP was very small as measured on the dispondency rating on the visual
analogue scale. When a neutral group (no induction) was employed as a control, Natale
and Hantus (1982) found that the elation induction significantly increased the number of
happy memeories recalled, but the depression induction did not increase the number of
sad memories retrieved. Elated subjects also recalled significantly more happy than sad
memories, while depressed normal control subjects recalled a fairly equal number of
happy and sad memories. So it seems that temporary depression inhibits the accessibility
of positive memories rather than increases the accessibility of negative memories. This

conclusion is also consistent with findings from Ingram et al. (1984a) and Breslow et al.
(1981), which were mentioned earlier. One of the problems with employing the retrieval
of personal memories as an index of accessibility is that temporarily depressed people

still might inhibit the recall of negative memories for self-esteem serving reasons even
they are readily available. Thus, it seems desirable to employ more unconsciously
processed tasks such as the Stroop interference task.
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A more basic question in relation to the relative accessibility of negative and
positive cognitions is as to whether such an effect is achieved either through a changed
mood (depressed or elated), a priming of a cognitive structure (schema), or self-focused
attention. In this aspect, the finding by Teasdale and Russell (1983) is of interest in
subjects who did not meet the acceptance criteria on the mood manipulation check did

not show differential recall by contents of words. These results suggest that mood state

play an important role in affecting accessibility of emotional words. In contrast with a
emphasis on mood for memory bias, cognitive priming effects were proposed (Riskind,
Rholes, & Eggers, 1982; Riskind & Rholes, 1984, 1985; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane,
1987). According to this argument, the cognitive information provided by the moodinducing events such as mood induction procedures (e.g., VMIP, success or failure) can
directly prime memory independently of subject mood, consequently affecting memory
accessibility. As a supportive evidence, Riskind, et al.,'s (1987) study using the VMIP,
found that independent of mood state, negative self-evaluative statements of VMIP had a
significant impact on recall latencies for real life experiences.
Taken together, the current results from both experimentally induced mood and

clinical depression, suggest that the cunent depressed mood state plays an important rol

in regulating the relative accessibility of negative and positive memories/words whether

this is measured by latency of retrieval or probability of recall. Depressed mood increa

the relative probability of recall of negative memories against positive memories, while
the opposite is true for elated mood. Compared to Beck's cognitive theory of depression
assuming that depressed mood is a consequence of negative cognitions, these results

suggest the converse may be true. If there is a selective bias of depressed mood in acces
to memory, more negative material can be retrieved and used. However, relative
accessibility of negative and positive memories as a function of depressed and elated
mood states seems to be more dependent upon the elated mood (Natale & Hantas, 1982;
Teasdale & Forgarty, 1979). The reason for this asymmetry effect in temporarily
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depressed m o o d states could be because depressed people suppress reporting or
responding to negative memories to protect their self-esteem. However, this possibility
can be excluded by the finding that when subjects are instructed to record every
emotional incident over the course of a week and then to recall every incidents under
either depressed or elated mood, (Bower, 1981), the results support the relative

accessibility hypothesis. To ward off this possible response tendency in depression, task

involving relatively automatic processing are required. The following section will explor

whether an attentional bias toward negative/positive information is found in such tasks a
the Stroop interference task and dichotic listening.

3.1.4 Attentional Bias in Depression
As with memory bias, several studies have explored whether the attention of depressives

is drawn to negative information in the first place (attentional bias). If this is the cas
ongoing information processing of negative contents in depression might interfere with

encoding of other information. This attentional bias is contrast with memory bias in that

the former is a relatively automatic process, while the latter is effortful and elaborati
This suggestion was tested by Gotlib and MaCann (1984) through the use of a modified
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Depressed and non-depressed subjects were shown rapidly
presented words with depressed, neutral, and manic content, and required to name the
colour that the words were printed in. They expected that the ongoing negative cognitive

thinking might interfere with the colour-naming response latencies for depressive content
words. As expected with this hypothesis, response times in the presence of depressed
words were slower for depressed sujects but not for nondepressed subjects. However,
such interference effects of depressed words were not the case in experimentally induced
depressed subjects. These results suggest that the deployment of attention to depressed
contents get priority, relative to the other information, thus causing the performance
deficits. They explained these results in terms of depressive self-schema (construct
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accessibility), and suggested that it is not a transient m o o d which is responsible for the
interference. However, this biased attention towards depressed contents has not been
replicated when a visual probe task was used. Gotlib, McLachlan, and Katz (1988),

contrary to the findings in the Stroop task, found that depressed people did not show an
attentional bias according to the emotional valence of manic, depressed, and neutral
words. Only nondepressed people showed a positive attentional bias to manic stimuli.
Similarly, MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) did not find an attentional bias of
depressed subjects to threat words in a visual probe test.
In another experiment using a dichotic listening task with a concunent lightprobe reaction time task, McCabe and Gotlib (1993) showed that depressed patients
were more distracted by negative- than positive- and neutral- content words presented
through the unattended channel. However, nondepressed subjects did not differ among
the three content words. This attentional bias toward negative content words
disappeared when they recovered from depression. These findings suggest that depressed

contents are automatically processed and the accessibility to negative content material
increases during depression.
More recently Ingram, Bernet, and McLaughlin (1994) also investigated
attentional bias among nondepressed and remitted depressed people who were subjected
to the mood induction procedure (depressed vs. neutral). To this end, the dichotic
listening task was employed; in the attended ear, a 3 minute neutral story was played,
while in the unattended ear, at 10 seconds intervals, positive, depressive, and neutral
words were presented. The subjects were to repeat the story aloud, which was recorded
for analysis. The total enor scores in reading the story aloud was used as a dependent
measure. The results showed that remitted depressed people under the negative mood
induction produced more errors when both positive and negative materials were
presented, compared to neutral materials. In contrast, never-depressed people in the
negative mood induction did not show any differential bias towards emotional materials.
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Subjects in a non-mood primed condition did not show any difference according to the
valence of materials. These results were interpreted as a re-activation of a negative
schema, which has been dormant, but was primed by the negative mood induction,
leading to a biased attentional allocation to emotional materials. These results were
interpreted as emotional diffusion of depressives in the early information stage. The
finding of no bias effect towards positive and negative stimuli in nondepressed people
whose mood was induced into a transient depressed mood is consistent with one by

Gotlib and MaCann (1984). This result supports the idea that an attentional bias does not
occur during a transitent depressed mood state.
In sum, the findings of effects of depression on attentional allocation to negative
materials have been mixed. The results varied on tasks used (visual vs. dichotic
listening), materials (depressed vs. threat words) and subject population (natural
depression vs. induced depression). In general, naturally occurring depression, but not
temporarily induced depression, biased attentional processing towards negative contents
when a dichotic listening test is employed with depressed content words. This difference
between natural and induced depression suggests that negative cognition preceeds rather
than follows depressed mood, which contrasts with the depressed mood priority position
by Teasdale and his colleagues. This difference in relative accessibility of negative

cognition between natural and induced depression was attributed to the different types o
memory tasks used (Gotlib & McCann, 1984). They claimed that episodic memory such

as in the recall of personal experiences used in Teasdale's studies seems to be influenc
by mood, while attentional processing is affected by the activation of schema.

3.2 The Effects of Distracting Procedures on Depressed Mood, Negative
Cognitions, and Performance.
The previous section suggests that maintenance of depression depends on
relatively higher accessibility of negative cognitions, so that depressed people are
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characterized by persistent ruminative activity on depressive themes. Putting it another
way, this implies that depressives are self-preoccupied and their attention is inwarddirected. According to the self-focused attentional model (Pyszynski & Greenberg,

1987), depression is maintained and exacerbated due to their tendecny to direct attention
inward to negative cognitions. Assuming that this depressive self-focused attention as a
mediating variable is redirected outward by distraction procedures, it can be expected
that depressed mood is relieved, the frequenices of negative cognitions are reduced, and
also performance deficits can be reversed by distraction. Although most of the studies

related did not measure self-focused attention as a mediating variable, these studies we

included when they seem possible to interpret in terms of self-focused attention. Several
studies investigated the distracting effects on mood, thinking, and performance of
depressives (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Noeksema, 1993; Monow & Nolen-Hoeksema,
1990; Foulds, 1952; Fennell & Teasdale, 1984).

3.2.1 The Effects of Distracting Procedures on Depressed Mood
Monow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) induced a depressed mood state using the
combination of a sad story and depressing music and then explored how initially induced
depressed mood state interacted with four different types of response style to depressed
mood. They were interested in how the ways of responding to their depression are

related to the severity of depression. Two factors (ruminative vs. distracting; active v
passive response) was factorially combined, making up four groups. The manipulation of

ruminative and distractive dimension was achieved by directing their attention to intern
or external aspects respectively while reading appropriate notes. The passive and active
dimensions were manipulated by instructing subjects to either sit and read notes or to
walk forward and backward to sort cards into appropriate slots. The most effective
method of alleviating a depressed mood was a distracting plus active response, followed

by a distracting plus passive response. The degree of distraction had a greater impact on
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alleviation of depressive affect than the level of activity. These findings suggest that
diverting self-focused attention to external matters can relieve depressive symptoms
including depressed mood.
In the subsequent study by Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), they tried to
generalise the findings in an induced mood condition to naturally occuning depression.
Subjects (depressed vs. nondepressed) and treatment (ruminative vs. distracting) were
factorially combined. Consistent with the findings in the mood induction study, for
depressed subjects, ruminative treatment significantly worsened the level of depressed
mood and distracting treatment significantly relieved the level of depressed mood,
compared to the initial mood level before treatment. The amoliation of depressed mood
by distracting self-focused attention was also found for clinically depressed patients
(Fennell, Teasdale, Jones, & Damle, 1987). When depressed patients were instructed to
focus on slides of outdoor scenes, they showed a greater reduction of depressed mood

than patients in a control condition who simply focused on a picture of a white rectangle.
Stile, Schroder, and Jonansen (1993) found distracting effects on dysphoric mood states
induced by the VMIP. Unexpectedly, the induced depressed mood states were alleviated
by either neutral or elated statements to the same extent. These findings suggest that

regardless of the contents of distracting materials, preventing depressives from focusing
on negative aspects of the self is effective in relieving dysphoric mood states. In sum,
effects of distracting task on the depressed mood state are positive. It seems that the

contents of stimuli (positive, neutral) do not contribute to the alleviation of depressio
However, as no measurement of self-focused attention was taken, it is not clear whether
such effects are mediated by a change in self-focused attention. The other questions are
concerned with how long such effects last, relative effectiveness among different
distracting tasks, and with how a distracting task interacts with personality variables.
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3.2.2 T h e Effects of Distracting Procedures on Negative Cognitions
Teasdale and Rezin (1978) explored the effects of external information presented
at a high rate on the frequency of negative cognitions and depressed mood in depression
in single case-study experiments. The subjects were selected by their symptom (negative
content thoughts) rather than diagnostic criteria for depression. The speed of

presentation of information (A, B, C, D) varied from the 0 bit/sec, 1/2 bit/sec, 1 bit/se
and 2 bits/sec. Subjects were asked to repeat aloud each letter immediately after they
heard it through the headphones. After each trial, subjects were asked whether they

experienced negative thoughts during the trial and after each block (5 trials) they rate
their current mood on the 1- 10 scale ranging from "I am not at all depressed" to "I am
extremely depressed". The results showed a general decreased frequency of negative
thoughts at a high rate of information presentation, also accompanying decreased
depressed mood.
Teasdale and Rezin (1978) used thought stopping (eg., Wolpe, 1958) to reduce
negative thoughts and examined their effect on depressed mood. In the treatment
session, whenever spontaneously occurring negative thoughts arise, depressed patients

were taught to say "stop" to themselves and to think a substitute thought. In the control
procedure, subjects were allowed to mind-wander. They found that the thought-stopping
method was not effective in reducing the frequency of negative thoughts. The reason for

this seems to be either due to the lack of consideration of personal contents of thoughts
or due to a strong intensity of intrusiveness in severe depression.
Considering the relatively unsuccessful attempt to reduce negative thoughts,

Fennell and Teasdale (1984) also investigated the effects of a brief distracting procedu
on the frequency of negative cognition and depression. The thoughts patients were
experiencing were sampled by asking subjects to report their thoughts aloud. Each

subjects experienced two interventions; in the distraction condition (5 minutes), subject
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concentrated on outdoor scenery projected on the wall, in the control condition (5
minutes) they looked at the square of white light projected on the wall. They found that
only the low endogenous depressives with low scores on the Newcastle Diagnosis Scale
(NDC, Carney, Roth, & Garside, 1965) showed a significant change in self-report
depression, speech rate, and writing speed in the predicted direction. The NDC is a
questionnaire consisting of 10 items measuring the endogeneity of depression.
Furthermore, the distraction condition produced thoughts ( 83%) related to the current
task, while the control condition did person concerns (88%). These results indicate that
directing their attention outward can reduce spontaneously occurring depressive

thoughts and is also effective at relieving depressive symptoms, but these positive effe
can be different for low and high endogenous depression. The low endogenous
depressives are more responsive to treatment than the high endogenous depressives. In a
subsequent study, Fennell, Teasdale, Jones, and Damle (1987) replicated previous

findings using a similar distracting procedure. In detail, distraction reduced particular
the frequency of thoughts related to actual life in both high and low endogenous groups
and did not affect the frequency of thoughts related to the experiment. Depressed mood
was significantly more reduced after distraction than after the control condition in low
endogenous patients, which did not hold for high endogenous patients. In regard to these
differences, they suggested that low endogenous depressives are associated with

reactive, ruminative thoughts about past loss, disappointment, personal problems in their
life, whereas high endogenous depressives are associated with some internal, biological
factors.
In sum, beneficial effects of distraction on negative cognitions and depressed
mood were affected by the types of distracting tasks and subtypes of depression
(endogenous vs. nonendogenous). Why is the occurrence of negative cognitions
reduced? As in the case of depressed mood, diversion of the depressive self-focusing

style to external stimuli, which attract subjects' attention, seems to account for it. St
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requiring more attention from subjects (outdoor scenery) was more effective than just
just passive watching (square of light) in reducing the frequency of negative cognitions
(Fennell & Teasdale, 1984). In the same way, rapid presentation demands more attention
than slow presentation. However, if depressive thoughts are taken as a ratio of positive
to negative thoughts, it would be more desirable to consider the ratio than only negative
cognitions, and to investigate how positive thoughts are affected by the distracting
procedure.

3.2.3 The Effects of Distracting Procedures on Performance
As suggested by the previous sections on distracting tasks, self-focused attention
in depression contributes to the maintenance of depressed mood and cognition. This
section will turn to performance deficits in depression and is concerned with whether
performance deficits would be reversed or alleviated by manipulating the self-focused

attention or using a distracting task. Reversal of performance deficits as well as reduced
depressed mood was found by lowering self-focused attention in depressed subjects
(Strack, Blaney, Ganellen, and Coyne, 1985). Three studies were conducted; in the first
study, they found that depressed subjects had performance deficits, lowered expectancy
of success, and higher self-focused attention while doing in anagram solving task,
compared to nondepressed subjects. On the basis of these findings, in the second study
performance deficits in normal controls were elicited by the manipulation of expectance
and self-focused attention. As predicted, the most worst performance deficits were found
in the lowered expectancy and increased self-focused attentional condition. In the third
study, task-focus instructions (reducing self-focused attention condition) significantly
reduced performance deficits, compared to a control group (depressed subjects who
were not given any manipulation of expectancy and self-focused attention). These results
suggest that self-focused attention plays a part in depressive performance deficits, and
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performance deficits can be reversed by redirecting self-focused attention to the cunent
task.
Williams (1980) used a tape recorded story for mood induction and examined the
effects of induced mood states on a behavioural indice (speech rate; Teasdale et al.,
1980) and problem solving behaviour. In the finger shuttle box test, subjects were to
stop the escapable noises by sliding the knob. The results showed that immediately after
the story, induced depression did not affect speech rate, but when speech rate was
measured while performing the shuttle box task, there was a tendence for depressives to
speed up their speech rate. Also depressed subjects were faster in escaping from the
noise than normal controls.
Fould (1952) also found that distraction by a secondary task could improve maze
performance speed in depressives. As a distracting task subject were asked to repeat
digits after the experimenter while they were doing the maze task. His explanation of the

facilitating effects of a distracting task was that the distracting task disrupts depress
self-preoccupation (self-focused attention). Taken together, distracting tasks sometimes
facilitate performance of depressives. Even though some studies (Williams, 1980; Fould,

1952) did not measure self-focused attention, facilative effects of distracting tasks see
to arise from reducing the heightened self-focused attention.
However, Williams et al. (1988) was doubtful of such an interpretation of
reduced self-focused attention (self-preoccupation). They argued that such beneficial
effects of a secondary task is specific to the speed of performance because enors rates
were increased in depressed patients (Fould, 1952). Instead, they suggested a strategy
change of depressives in performing the maze task; without a secondary task, they opt
for a conservative strategy, but with a secondary task, they speed up at the expense of
accuracy. However, a similar result to Fould (1952) was found in a free recall test with a
concunent memory load. Increase in a concurrent memory load while performing the
free recall task facilitated recall performance practically to the same level of
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nondepressed people in the primacy component (Krarnes &

MacDonald, 1985).

However, the analysis of digit recall enors showed that depressed subjects made more
commission enors and that the enors tend to increase as the memory load increases.
There was no interaction between memory load and depression. This result in enor rates
seems to be consistent with the argument of a strategy change of depressives in a more
difficult task condition (Williams, et al., 1988). Krarnes and MacDonald (1985)
explained this beneficial effect as follows; as memory load increases, self-preoccupied
depressed thoughts are gradually replaced by task-relevant thoughts.
However, distracting tasks do not always accompany facilitatory effects on the
performance of depressives. Cornblatt, Lenzenweger, and Erlenmeyer-Kimling (1989)
studied attentional recognition tests on both numbers and shapes with or without
distraction. Both visual and auditory distraction tasks were employed by modifying the
target stimulus and playing a background story respectively. Schizophrenic, depressive,
and normal subjects were to decide whether two successively presented stimuli (numbers

or shapes) were identical and then to respond as fast as they could. Contradictory results

to the above supportive studies were found. Regardless of types of distraction (visual vs
auditory), distractions impaired the performance of depressed patients. These results
contrast with previous facilitating effects of a distracting task. What factors are

responsible for such discrepant findings? The facilitative effects seem to rely on the ty
of tasks used. According to Cornblatt et al. (1989), their tasks are attention demanding.
So, when the task requires most of attentional capacity, distracting tasks seem to
debilitate performance in depressives.
The possible mechanism of facilitative effects on depressive performance is that
the negative cognitions accompaning the heightened self-focused attention are reduced
by distracting tasks so that more attentional capacity is available to the current task.
is, more task-relevant processing is feasible. As an alternative perspective to this
argument, the distracting task may increase the arousal level of low-aroused depressed
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people, enhancing performance. Also a change in cognitive strategy under the secondary
task condition may account for improvement of performance in depression. In a broad
sense, the cognitive strategy view can be accomodated into the self-focused attention

view. That is, when a conservative strategy used by depressives is seen as a kind of self
preoccupied behaviour, the improved performance of depressives can be seen as
redirecting self-focused attention to task-oriented attention.
In sum, the distracting procedures can achieve the alleviation of depressed mood
and a decreasement in the frequency of negative cognitions when more active

involvement of depressed people in the distracting task is required rather than a passiv
involvement. In relation to increase in performance with a secondary task, depressed
people seem to change their strategy from a conservative response to maximum effort in

a dual task condition, so that they can increase their performance at the expense of enor
rate. These beneficial effects of distracting procedures or secondary task on depressed

people seems to be achieved by redirecting their self-focused attention to a task-releva
processing by breaking up depressive thoughts, even though a direct measurement of
self-focused attention was not undertaken in most studies. This argument suggests that
negative cognitions, depressed mood, and self-focused attention is closely interwoven.

3.3 Summary and Implications for Depressive Memory Deficits
A number of experimental paradigms have now been used to examine differences
between depressed and control subjects in the processing of emotional materials:

incidental recall of self-referent adjectives, cued autobiographical memory, intentional

recall of stories with mixed affective content, dichotic listening, and the Stroop test.

summarise these experiments, it might be said that in depression, attention is biased and
memory biased towards negative contents. In general, this would be consistent with the
predictions of two main frameworks: associative network theory (Bower, 1981) and the
negative schema model (Beck, 1967),
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In relation to the operation and existence of Beck's negative self-schema theory
of depression, a number of studies employing the self-referent processing paradigm have
been conducted and their results were positive, supporting the negative self-schema
theory. However, an important source of difficulty Beck's negative schema model faces
is whether negative thinking in depression originates purely from the negative schema.
That is, negative thinking in depression may be a consequence rather than an antecedent
to depressed feelings. This question was raised by a series of experiments by Teasdale
and his collegues and Teadale and Barnard (1993). The purpose of these experiment was
to investigate the possible biasing effects of depressed mood on aspects of memory

thought to be related to negative thinking. These findings suggest that negative thinking
may be the result of depressed mood selectively biasing access to memory so that

negative materials are more likely to be accessed and used, and positive materials are le

likely to be accessed and used (relative accessibility of negative and positive cognition

Also these results suggest that the biasing effects of depressed mood is partly responsib

for negative thinking. In contrast with the biasing effect of depressed mood for negative
thinking, cognitive priming effects were proposed, claiming that the mood inducing
events such as mood induction procedures like the VMIP can directly prime memory,
consequently affecting memory accessibility (Riskind, et al., 1982; Riskind & Rholes,
1984 Rholes, et al., 1987).
Two contradictory positions can be accomodated by the associative network
model focusing on the reciprocal relationship between negative thinking and depressed
mood; that is, negative thinking can be a consequence of depressed mood as well as an

antecedent to depression. This reciprocal relationship places depressd people into a self
perpetuating vicious cycle. Once in a depressed mood more negative interpretation of
experiences is likely to be made. The patterns of thinking reactivated are exactly those
that had been involved in the production of depressed mood in the past. Consequently
those same negative patterns of thinking are likely to act to maintain depression in the
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present. This vicious cycle is also in line with the differential accessibility hypothesis of
negative and positive cognitions (Teasdale, 1983). The differential accessibility
hypothesis claims that depressed mood increases the relative probability of recall of
negative memories against positive memories.
From a different perspective, the self-focused attention model maintains that
depressed mood is maintained and exacerbated due to depressive tendency to direct
attention inward to negative cognitions. This claim is consistent with the heightened
accessibility of negative thoughts (Teasdale, 1983), implying that self-focused attention
might be a mediating variable to the heightened accessibility of negative cognitions. This
hypothesis can be supported by the evidence from studies of the beneficial effects of
distraction on negative thoughts, depressed mood, and depressive performance deficits.
Here the distracting procedure was assumed to act to redirect attention outward from
internal focusing on negative cognitions. Taken together, the integration of the

differential accessibility hypothesis with the self-focused attention could provide a bette
explanation of the cunently available data.
What does this intergrated framework view suggest about depressive memory
deficits? Once the negative self-schema is activated during a depressive episode, negative
automatic thoughts (self-statements) as cognitive products appear to play a part in
interfering with the cunent task (Beck, 1967). Similar reasoning can be drawn from the
heightened accessibility of negative cognitions in the depressed mood states. Brown
(1988) suggested that negative automatic thoughts in depressives intrude on the
attentional capacity area with or without consciousness. The role of negative automatic
thoughts was not given much attention in terms of memory task performance relative to
negative self-schema or content. Williams et al. (1988) claimed that their conelation with
task performance is not clear. Furthermore, the role of positive automatic thoughts
characterising normal controls has been neglected in the area of memory performance.
Assuming that for nondepressed people, positive self-schema structure is more activated
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and accessible, as with negative automatic thoughts in depression, they are assumed to

intrude or occupy attentional capacity area, presumably having the same disruptive effect
on task performance
A stronger prediction of depressive memory impairment can be made from selffocused attention. As many studies on self-focused attention have shown, depressed
people have a heightened self-focused attention towards internal matters. If this selffocused attention is influential during the task performance, depressive memory deficits
should occur. Finally, how these negative congitions, self-focused attention, and
depressed mood are intenelated was discussed in the previous section of the distracting
procedures. In conclusion, regardless of theoretical frameworks, they converge on the
prediction that depressives will show memory deficits.
The following experiments aim to explore depressive memory deficits and
consists of three major parts. The first part was to investigate the long-term memory
functioning based on the precision of elaboration hypothesis. The aim of the second part
was to compare three mood induction procedures in terms of the strength and duration

of their initially induced depressed mood states. The third part was to examine the shortterm memory functioning in verbal and visual memory span tasks. More specific
rationales for the experiments are provided in the introduction section of each chapter.
An additional goal of these experiments was to explore the role of negative/ positive
automatic thoughts and task-irrelevant thoughts in determining task performance.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiment 1A

The Effects of Naturally-Occurring Depression on Elaborative Encoding and
Recall in College Students

Many studies have shown that disturbances of memory frequently accompany

depressive states (Williams, et al., 1988; Teasdale & Bernard, 1993; Hartlage et al.,

1993; Burt et al., 1995). There is considerable evidence that the availability of memo
depends on their congruence with cunent mood (see for a review, Blaney, 1986; Bower,

1981). Also, there is some evidence for state-dependent effects of depression in memor

such that memory is superior if learning and retrieval occur in the same state (Leigh
Ellis, 1981; Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977; Eich, Macaulay, & Ryan, 1994).
There is also evidence for a more general memory deficit in depressive states, which
shown by reduced performance in learning and retention of neutral stimuli which have
mood associations (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Williams et al., 1988, ch. 3; Hartlage et

1993). This general deficit suggests that the neural or cognitive processes which medi
memory are disrupted by depressive states. The current study is concerned with this

general deficit in depression, particularly memory deficits in elaborative processing
simple sentences.
The disruptive effects of depression on memory performance of neutral materials
have been suggested by many studies (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Pysyzenski & Greenberg, 1987; Williams et al, 1988; Hertel & Hardin, 1990;

Miller, 1975). However, the literature in this area has shown inconsistent findings (c
Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988, Colby & Gotlib, 1988). Memory effects
observed with depression appear to vary depending on the population studied and the

task used. For example, recall of stories has been investigated by Hasher et al. (1985
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using dysphoric students. N o m e m o r y deficit or m o o d congruence effects were observed
in these studies. However, in clinical depressives, poorer recall of a prose passage
occuned, compared to normal controls (e.g., Watts & Sharrock, 1987; Breslow et al.,
1981). Similarly, using induced depression, recall of target adjectives from a sentence
completion task was reduced when the appropriateness of the target adjective to the

sentence frame was difficult to decide (Ellis et al., 1984). Subsequently, in a similar t

condition, an overall deficit in recall was found with the experimentally depressed grou
but not with the naturally occurring dysphoric group (Hertel & Rude, 1991a). Depressed
populations employed in previous studies are various; clinically depressed in-patients
(Roy-Byrne et al., 1984), outpatients (Hertel & Rude, 1991b), induced depression (Ellis
et al., 1984), and dysphoric students (Hasher et al., 1985). These various subject
popluations might be different from each other in many aspects such as maniage,
education, age, and the severity of depression (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992). Particularly,
according to various populations, the severity of depression is associated with memory
deficits (e.g., Cronholm & Ottosson, 1961). These differences among subject populations
contributed to inconsistent findings in the previous literature.
In addition, a review by Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) claimed that various task
variables affect depressive memory deficits such as task difficulty, organization of
materials, and personal relevance. More poorly organized and framented material shows
depressive memory deficits more than well organized and meaningful material does (e.g.,
Weingartner et al., 1981, study 3). In a more difficult task, depressives are likely to
memory deficits (e.g., Ellis et al., 1984, study 3). Memory performance of personally

relevant materials is relatively impervious to disrupting effects of depression (cf. Kui
MacDonald, & Deny, 1983).
Accordingly, a boundary condition for depressive memory deficits should be
required (Kuiper et al., 1983; Hertel, 1994). Three boundary conditions will be
considered; the distinction of neutral vs. emotional materials (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988),
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of automatic vs. effortful processing (Hartlage et al., 1993; Hasher & Zacks, 1979), and
reduced cognitive self-control (Hertel, 1994). Firstly, when a mixture of positive,

negative and neutral materials has been employed, it has been difficult to find depressi
memory deficits (e.g., Deny & Kuiper, 1981). Secondly, tasks requiring more effortful
processing show depressive memory deficits rather than ones requiring automatic
processing (cf. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hartlage, et al., 1993; Hasher & Zacks, 1979).

Finally, a more uncontrolled task condition in which subjects can elect some strategy for
their later performance can show depressive memory deficits (Hertel & Hardin, 1990).
To describe the boundary condition, several theoretical frameworks have been proposed
and put forward different reasons for disruptive effects of depression on memory.
Inadequate allocation of limited attentional resources on neutral material,
compared to emotional materials leads to poor elaboration of neutral materials,
consequently causing depressive memory deficits (Williams et al., 1988). In a similar
vein, reduced mental capacity under depressed mood states accounts for memory
deficits, which are found in difficult tasks requiring a high mental load (Ellis &
Ashbrook, 1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In contrast with the reduced capacity model,

the lack of initiative view (close to motivational deficits, Miller, 1975) claims that gi
specific task instruction, mustering their attention, depressive memory deficits can be
reversed (Hertel & Rude, 1991b). These results suggest that depressive memory deficits

lies in the reduced initiation of effortful processing rather than inherent limitation o

capacity for effortful processing. Similarly to the reduced intiative model, several othe

studies also posit the lack of self-initiated activities in depression particularly when
task requires the subjects self-generated solution, in contrast to an experimenterprovided one (e.g., Abramson, et al, 1981). Also, consistent with this argument, Hasher
and Zacks (1988) contend the lack of self-initiated activities due to reduced mental

capacity, which casues poor elaborative processing, in turn laying down a less distincti
memory trace, leading to poor performance. In addition, it was claimed that due to
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inadequate allocation of attentional resources to neutral task, m e m o r y deficits can occur
through poor elaborative processing (Williams et al., chap 10).
More specifically, in the area of elaborative processing of sentences under
depression, the literature suggests that depressed subjects are unable to make use of the
more precisely elaborated information, compared to base sentences (Ellis et al., 1984,
study 1; Potts et al., 1989). Similarly, using the depth of processing framework (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972), depressed people showed relatively poor performance at the semantic
level of processing, compared to acoustic processing of words (Weingartner et al.,
1981, study 1; Ellis et al., 1984, study 2). Assuming that the usual superiority of
semantic processing to acoustic processing is based on elaboration, depressive memory
deficits found in semantic processing of words can be attributed to poor elaborative
processing. In a general theoretical framework, these elaborative deficits can be
explained by a cogntive effort account of depressive memory deficits, predicting that
depressive memory deficits are found in an effortful task. This is because poor recall
performance was found in relatively more effortful tasks such as in the processing of
elaborated sentences or in semantic processing of words. However, this cognitive effort
account for memory deficits was challenged by several subsequent studies (e.g.,
Channon, et al., 1993b; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel, 1994; Hertel & Rude 1991b).
This is because simply more difficult tasks requiring more cogntive effort did not show
depressive memory deficits or that the provision of helpful cognitive strategy for later
performance can reverse depressive memory deficits. Rather in a situation in which the
subjects' attention is not contrainted by the demands of tasks, that is, allowing subjectinitiated activities, depressive memory deficits were found.
Considering recall deficits found in elaborative processing of sentences and words
(Ellis et al., 1984, study 1, 2; Weingartner, et al., 1981, study 1; Davis, 1979a on the

self-referent level), an inability to use elaborative information (Potts et al., 1992), the
lack of self-initiated activities particularly self-generated problem solving approach
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(Abramson et al., 1981; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983), and a suggestion of
poor elaborative encoding ( Hasher & Zacks, 1988), it is expected that depression
impairs elaborative processing particularly when the subject-generated elaboration
method is employed. However, the argument for such elaboration deficits in depressive
memory was mainly supported by the poor recall performance of depressed people, but
the investigation of the quality and/or quantity of elaboration was not made as was done

in the studies of problem solving strategy in depression. In this regard, the self-gener
approach to elaboration of sentences seems better than the experimenter-provided
approach because the former gives an insight into the actual processing of elaboration
acitivities of depressed people. The following section will discuss "elaboration and
recall" in normal people, which was applied to the cunent experiment.
According to Craik and Tulving (1975) the beneficial effect of elaborative

processing on retention is increased by the addition of rich contextual information to t
items provided in the experiment, relating new information to what one already knows. If
presented information is elaborated at encoding, the trace is more distinctive and more
durable, and consequently facilitates later recall (Jacoby & Craik, 1979; Fisher, 1981;
Fisher & Craik, 1980). However, additional context does not always facilitate retention
of the target; subjects must make use of the appropriate knowledge for elaboration to be
effective (cf. Anderson & Reder, 1970; Stein, Morris, & Bransford, 1978; Franks,
Bransford, Auble, 1982; Stein, Littlefield, & Bransford, 1984).
Stein & Bransford (1979) investigated the effect of quality of elaboration, in
which subjects were asked to recall target adjectives in the two types of sentences
varying in the quality of elaborated detail but with the same amount of elaboration. A

base sentence such as The tall man purchased the biscuits containing the target word tall
was extended by either (i) an imprecise elaboration consisting of a congruous but
irrelevant phrase e.g. that were on sale or (ii) a precise elaboration that were on the
shelf which had a direct relation to the target adjective.
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Precise or imprecise elaboration of this type can be experimenter-provided as in
the case of Stein et al. (1978) or subject-generated, in which the subject is asked to
supply his or her own elaborations (Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein, Bransford, Franks,
Owings, Vye, & McGraw, 1982). In both cases recall of target words with precise
elaborations is superior to recall of the same words given imprecise elaborations. Stein
and his colleagues (1979, 1982) concluded that precision of elaboration is important in
improving recall.
With the concept of this precise vs. imprecise elaboration concept, the present
study aims to explore memory deficits for natural dysphoria in an elaborative processing
paradigm where subjects supply their own elaborations. This study measures both the
extent to which elaborative processes are used and the extent of recall. This experiment
follows the Stein and Bransford (1979) study by using subject-generated elaboration of
base sentences. Similar types of base sentence have been employed as an experimenterprovided elaboration (Ellis et al., 1984, study 1; Potts et al., 1989). Assuming that all
students have the necessary knowledge to elaborate base sentences precisely, the
important point is whether they are able to use their knowledge to provide precise
elaboration of sentences. Secondly, based on previous findings, it can be expected that

depressed subjects will not take advantage of precise elaborations for later recall where
nondepressed subjects will ( cf. Ellis et al., 1984; Potts et al., 1989).
In summary, three predictions were made. First, that with subject-generated

elaborations the recall of target adjectives in naturally depressed subjects would be wor

than in normal subjects. Second, that the depressed group will not benefit from precisely

elaborated context for later recall but the nondepressed group will. Third, that naturall

depressed subjects would generate less precisely elaborated phrases than normal subjects.

Method
Subjects
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Thirty-nine subjects from an introductory psychology class volunteered and

received course credits for participation. Subjects were allocated to either the depres
or nondepressed group using a median split on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI),
which was administered at the end of the experiment. The nondysphoric group consisted
of 21 subjects with a Beck score in the range 0-6, whereas the dysphoric group
included 18 subjects with scores ranging from 7 to 23. The mean of the nondepressed
group was 4.33 and the mean of the depressed group was 11.5,
Materials
Fifteen common adjectives were employed as target words. Ten of the base
sentences were selected from Stein et al. (1984) and five new ones were constructed
following the procedure described by Stein et al. (1978). The base items consisted of
simple and coherent sentences, for example, the old man went into the library. The base
sentences were recorded on tape in a female voice, with a 15 second gap between
sentences. Subjects spoke a short phrase to continue the base sentence, and a second
tape recorder was used to record these elaborations. In the recall phase, the same
sentences were presented in a random order, but with the word blank substituted for the
target adjective, and with only 7 seconds between each item.
Procedure
Once subjects arrived in the experimental room, they filled out a experimental
consent form. They were told that the aim of the experiment was to measure the
frequency of phrases generated in response to each sentence, which was played by the
cassette recorder. Sentences were presented auditorily at a rate of 1 every 15 seconds
and each sentence was preceded by a beep sound. Subjects were instructed to extend the

base sentence by speaking a short phrase, without repeating the initial base sentence. A
subjects received the sentences in the same order. After all fifteen sentences were

presented, subjects were given an interference task, counting backward by threes, for 60
seconds to eliminate any short-term component of recall. At the recall stage, subjects
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were read the same 15 base sentences, in a different order, as cues for the recall of target
adjectives. The target adjectives were substitued by the word "blank". Subjects were to
write down a target adjective on an answer sheet provided. Subjects were encouraged to
guess if they could not remember the answer. Following the recall task, subjects
completed the BDI.
To evaluate the elaborations generated by subjects, three judges rated each base
sentence plus its generated phrase on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) "very
badly elaborated" to (5) "very well elaborated" in terms of how well the target words
were clarified in the context of sentence. Each rater was blind to the experimental
condition and given three blocks of 168 sentences. Within each block sentences were
shown in a random order and the order of the three blocks presented was randomized
among judges.

Results
1) Recall scores
The mean number of target words recalled for nondepressed and depressed
subjects were 5.38 (SD=2.7) and 3.39 (SD=2.9) respectively. The mean difference
between groups was significant, t(37) = 2.18, p < .05, indicating that the depressed
group recalled fewer target words than the nondepressed group. Thus in the present
experiment, using subject-generated elaborations, a deficit in recall performance of
naturally-occurring mild depressives was observed. The relationship between depression
and memory performance was further examined by measuring the correlation between
BDI scores and recall. The Pearson conelation coefficient was significant ( r = -.35, p
.05), showing that across both groups, the more severe levels of depression were
associated with poorer performance on the recall test.
(2) Precision of sentence elaborations
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Because of recording failure, sentence completion were not obtained for five
subjects, three of them from nondysphoric and two from dysphoric groups. Analysis of

sentence elaboration was therefore based on 34 subjects only. Interrater agreements were
conelated (r= .73, for raters 1,2; r= .64, for raters 2,3; r =.66, for raters 1,3 all_p
with mean ratings of 2.77 (SD=1.66), 3.00 (SD=1.45), and 2.03 (SD=1.33) respectively
on the 5-point scale. When analyzing the ratings, the average score of the 3 judges was
used. The mean ratings for the nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects were 2.56 and 2.65

respectively and the difference between groups was not significant, t(32) = .50, p > .05
This result shows that the elaboration activity of the two groups did not differ.
To assess the relationship between elaboration rating and accuracy of recall, a
repeated measure analysis was conducted on the ratings of correctly and incorrectly
recalled words with a mean elaboration rating as a within-subject variable. The results
are shown in Table 4.1. The effect of recall accuracy was marginally significant, F(l,
32)=3.52, p= .07 and also an interaction between group and recall accuracy was
marginally significant, F(l,32)=3.39, p = .075. These results showed that targets words

recalled were given more precise elaboration rating than those not recalled. The further

analysis of interaction effect was carried out using a paired t-test. It revealed that f
nondysphoric group, elaboration ratings were higher for words that were recalled than
for words that were not recalled, t(18)=3.76,_p < .01. However, the depressed group
showed no difference in the degree of elaboration according to recall accuracy,

t(14)=.04, p > .05., indicating that the depressed group did not benefit from the precis
elaborations in later recall.
Table 4.1 Mean Elaboration Rating Score for Each Group
as a Function of Recall Accuracy.
Target words
Recalled

N o t recalled

2.17 (.47)
Nondysphoric 2.81 (.72)
Dysphoric
2.55(1.22) 2.54(70)
Note. Standard deviations in brackets.
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T o confirm the significant difference between mean ratings for correctly and
inconectly recalled items for the nondepressed subjects, an additional paired t-test by
items was conducted, which was significant,_t(14)=3.20, p < .01. This result provides
clear evidence that nondysphoric subjects benefit from precise elaboration. Also this

result is consistent with previous results in normals showing that target adjectives given

more precise elaboration are better recalled (Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein et al., 1982).

Discussion
An overall recall deficit found in this study using a subject-generated elaboration
task, supports the capacity-reduced model (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988). The model suggests that there are more chances to observe the impairing effect of
depression by imposing a high encoding demand on depressed subjects. In that sense, the
subject-generated elaboration method seems to increase the encoding demand, relative to
the experimenter-provided elaboration. These results suggest that the subject-generation
task appear more sensitive for naturally depressed subjects than relatively passive
learning tasks such as story recall (Hasher et al., 1985) and experimenter-provided
elaboration (Ellis, et al, 1984; Potts et al, 1989) in revealing depressive memory
deficits. However, we should be cautious in accepting that the subject-generated method
is more demanding than the experimenter-provided method because there was no
independent measure of cognitive demand of subject-generated elaboration, compared to

experimenter-provided elaboration. This tentative conclusion is based on recall deficits o
depressives. The two previous studies using similar sentences to the current study met
with inconsistent findings. Ellis et al,'s (1984) first study using a mood induction found
overall recall deficits but attempts to generalize this finding to naturally depressed
subjects have not been successful, ie., no overall deficits (Potts et al, 1989). Compared
to Potts et al (1989)' study, one major difference from the cunent study is that they
employed an experimenter-provided approach, while the current study used a subject-
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employed an experimenter-provided approach, while the current study used a subjectprovided approach.
Secondly, the elaborative encoding activities of dysphoric and nondysphoric

groups were investigated. Such a self-initiated elaboration activity like subject-genera
elaboration was assumed to be interfered with by depression (Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
Abramson et al., 1981). Contrary to expectation, the precision of elaboration did not
vary between the groups. This result could suggest one possibility, that dysphoric
students could elaborate as well as nondyphoric students even under relatively
ambiguous task instruction. In particular, in this task instruction, mild depression in
students does not seem to interfere with the generation of elaboration of base sentences.
Another possibility is that the task instruction is so ambiguous that subjects could
generate any thoughts which pop into their minds. This assumption is based on the
argument that a task instruction variable can affect memory performance in depression
(e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1991; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988).
Thirdly, a more detailed analysis was conducted to assess the effectiveness of
precise elaborations in promoting recall accuracy. The nondysphoric group produced
more precise elaborations in sentences whose target word was recalled than in sentences
whose target word was not recalled. Thus, for the nondysphoric group the precision of
elaboration facilitated recall. For the depressed group there was no such relationship
between precision of elaboration and recall, their elaborations were equally precise
regardless of whether the target word was recalled or not. This suggests that dysphoric
subjects do not take advantage of precise elaborations for remembering target words.
These results extend previous findings (e.g. Ellis et al, 1984; Potts et al, 1988) which
used experimenter-provided elaborations. Depressives appear to be insensitive to the
precision of elaboration for some reason, inespective of how the elaboration occuned.
Generally, memory deficits in overall recall performance in this study are
consistent with the idea from the capacity-related model that the encoding demands of
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the task play an critical role in finding depressive m e m o r y deficits. So the subjectgenerated elaboration method seems to place a relatively high mental load on subjects.
However, the finding that nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects do not differ in

elaboration activities is contradictory to the argument that self-initiated activities are
impaired by depression (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Abramson et al, 1981). A weaker and
incomplete elaborative processing was proposed by Weingartner et al (1981) study
using depth of processing in depressed patients. This argument was based on the finding
that depressed patients suffer from a semantic processing deficit. However they did not
measure elaboration activities like in the current study.
On the other hand, the reduced initiative model (Hertel & Hardin, 1990) states
that depressives are apt to show memory deficits in an uncontrolled experimental

situation, in which nondysphoric students can elect any beneficial strategy for later reca
(Hertel & Hardin, 1991; Hertel, 1994). According to this model, depressive memeory

deficits found in spite of the same extent of precise elaboration, imply that little use of
their own elaborations is made at the retrieval stage even if their elaborations are

available. In sum, tentative conclusions are that i) depression is more likely to interfer

with recall performance when subject-initiated elaboration is required, ii) dysphorics hav
some problems in taking advantage of elaboration at the recall phase and iii) their
memory deificts seem related to the task instructions. Two subsequent experiments were
conducted to investigate each of these last two problems; one manipulated the
availability of their own elaboration at retrieval and the other manipulated the task
instruction given at the encoding stage.

Experiment IB
The results from experiment 1A suggest the availability of the subjects own
elaboration at the time of the cued-recall test may explain depressive memory deficits. To

examine this possibility, the availability of elaboration at retrieval was manipulated. Fo
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half of the sentences subjects were given their o w n self-generated phrases plus a base
sentence to aid with recalling target words, while for the other half they were only

provided with the base sentences. If the unavailability of their own elaborations in the
retrieval stage is responsible for memory deficits, depressives should reveal a deficit

the non-elaborated retrieval condition, but not in the elaborated retrieval condition, i
which their elaborations are provided. That is, there should be an interaction between
retrieval condition and group.

Method
Subject
According to the recommendation by Kendall, Hollen, Beck, Hammen, and Ingram
(1987), the selection of dysphoric students was changed to a two stage screening to get

more stable depression. In the first screening phase of selection, 21 nondysphoric and 1
dysphoric students were screened out from the first year psychology students pool who

filled out the BDI. Those who scored less than 6 and higher than 9 were contacted by the
telephone and were asked to volunteer for a further experiment on "mood and thinking".
In the second administration of the BDI on the day of experiment, subjects who shifted

out the range were discarded. All volunteers received an extra point in return for their
participation.
Materials and Design
The similar type of 20 base sentences was constructed. A 2 (group) X 2 (retrieval
condition) ANOVA was employed with the last variable as a repeated measure. Two
blocks of 10 base sentences were counterbalanced across group.
Procedure
All subjects were given the second BDI when they arrive in the experimental room.
Subjects who shifted out of the range were dismissed. The task instruction was changed
from experiment 1 to "to continue each base sentence with a short phrase in a
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semantically congruous way". T w o examples of base sentences were orally presented by
the experimenter without having subjects recall the target word to make sure that
subjects understood the instruction. Any questions about the task instruction raised by
the subjects was answered. Subjects appeared to understand what they had to do. All
sentences were presented auditorily in the same way as in the experiment 1 except that
subjects were instructed to write down their continuation from the base sentence on the
answer sheet provided rather than speaking to the microphone as in experiment 1. When
they completed two blocks of 10 sentences, the experimenter collected the answer sheets
and gave them the next instruction for recall
In the recall phase, each subject went through two retrieval conditions. In the
elaborated retrieval condition, he/she was read the base sentence plus their own
elaboration, while in the nonelaborated retrieval condition they were read only the base
sentence. The experimenter read aloud 20 sentences from their answer sheet in a

different order from the initial order of presentation, 10 of which are base sentences p
their own short phrases and the other ten without their own short phrases. A fixed order
of presentation was used and two blocks of sentences were counterbalanced across

group. Subjects had to try to recall the target adjective substituted by the word "blank
Subjects were given 7 seconds for a response.
Results and discussion
On the second BDI test, the mean scores of nondysphoric and dysphoric students were
1.5 and 14.5 respectively, which was significantly different, t(34)=10.88, p < .01. Mean
recall scores are shown in the Table 4.2
Table 4.2 Mean Recall Scores in Nondysphoric and Dysphoric Groups as a Function of
Retrieval Condition
Elaborated retrieval Non-elaborated retrieval
condition
condition
Nondysphorics
6.29(2.19)
5.10(2.83)
5.88 (2.03)
4.73 (2.81)
Dysphorics
Note. Standard deviations in brackets. N = 2 1 in nondysphoric group N = 1 5 in dysphoric
group.
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The analysis of 2 x 2 repeated measures A N O V A reveals a significant main effect of the
retrieval condition, F(l, 34) = 16.23, p < .01, suggesting that the elaborated retrieval
condition enhanced recall performance, relative to the base retrieval condition. The
interaction of group and retrieval condition was not significant, F(l, 34) < 1 and neither
was the main effect of group, F(l, 34) < 1.
The possibility that dysphoric students have a problem with the availability of

their own elaborations at the retrieval stage was not supported. The significant effect of

retrieval condition suggests that providing their own elaboration at retrieval enhances t

recall of target adjectives for nondysphoric and dysphoric students to the same extent. So
these results suggest that the cause of depressive memory deficits does not lie in the
availability of elaborations at retrieval. However, the overall recall deficits found in
experiment 1 disappeared in this experiment. A possible reason for this seems to be
associated with the change in the task instruction. Another possible reason lies in the
selection method of depressed subjects. In experiment 1A, the BDI was administered at
completion of the experimental task and using a median split, subjects were classified
into depressed and nondepressed groups. In contrast, in the cunent experiment, the BDI
was administered twice in a group testing in the first place and on the day of experiment
on the second occasion. Thus, in the experiment 1A, recall performance can affect
subjects' response to the BDI. In the subsequent experiment IC, the task instruction was
varied with the same subject selection criteria.
Finally, to investigate whether depressive memory deficits are related to task
instruction, experiment IC was conducted. Task instruction was varied to investigate its
effects on recall performance among dysphoric and nondysphoric students using similar
types of sentences. Task instruction is claimed to affect the memory performance of
depressives (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988) and also that the well controlled task instruction
could reverse depressive memory deficits (Hertel & Rude, 1991b).
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Experiment IC
The experiment is designed to explore how two different types of task instruction
during encoding of base sentences affects recall. These two task instructions are assumed
to guide subjects to elaborate base sentences in either more or less precise elaborations.

More specifically, with the specific instruction, subjects are instructed to ask themselves
"why might xxx person be engaged in this particular type of activity" when they continue
the base sentences with a short phrase. The xxx represents the target adjective to be
remembered. Such a specific task instruction is assumed to guide more precise
elaboration by lessening the arbitrary relationship between type of person and his action,
so that it facilitates recall performance (Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein, et al, 1982). On
the other hand, with a nonspecific task instruction, subjects are instructed "to continue
each base sentence with a short phrase in a semantically congruous way". So the
nonspecific task instruction is the same as the one in experiment IB, In the Stein and
Bransford's (1979) study, the question of "What else might happen in this context?" was
used for a nonspecific task instruction (imprecise elaboration). They found that the
specific task instruction helped subjects to recall more target adjectives than the
nonspecific task instruction.
So in the case of normal controls, they will recall more adjectives in the specific
instruction than in the nonspecific instruction. According to the capacity-related models,
a reduced attentional capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), predicts
that regardless of task instruction, dysphorics should show overall depressive recall
deficits because both instructions require effortful processing of sentences. More
specifically as these models predict a poor and weaker elaborative processing in
depression, dysphoric subjects should differ in a quality of elaboration in terms of the
extent of precise elaboration, relative to nondysphorics. In sum, due to the reduced
attentional capacity, dysphoric students should show an overall performance deficit and
less precise elaboration of base sentence regardless of task instruction. In contrast,
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according to the reduced initiative model (Hertel & Hardin, 1990), the dysphoric group
will be affected by the type of task instruction; particularly, in the specific task
instruction, dysphoric subjects are apt to be subjected to memory deficits because they
are less likely to utilize their prior knowledge to elaborate base sentences precisely,

requiring more self-initiated activities. On the other hand, in the nonspecific condition
depressive memory deficits are not found because such elaboration activities are not
assumed to affect the extent of precise elaboration.

Method
Subjects
The selection procedure was same as the experiment IB. 60 subjects were
screened out, 30 subjects in each of dysphoric and nondsyphoric groups. Half of the
subjects in each group were randomly allocated to the specific and nonspecific task
conditions.
Materials and Design
The factorial combination of group and task instruction produced four groups
with 15 subjects in each group. A 2 (nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) x 2 (specific vs.
nonspecific) full factorial design was employed, and 15 base sentences were newly
constructed including some of old sentences used in experiment 1A and IB.
Procedure
All sentences were auditorily presented in a female voice through the cassette
recorder as in experiment 1A. In the specific task instruction condition, subjects were
instructed to ask themselves the following question when they continued each base
sentence with a short phrase; "why might xxx person be engaged in this particular type of
activity", while in the nonspecific condition subjects were asked to continue a base
sentence with a short phrase in a semantically congruous way as in the experiment IB.
They were given an answer sheet on which they wrote a short phrase. Before they
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started the main experiment, they went through three practice sentences without being
asked to recall a target word. Through these three example sentences, subjects were
ensured to understand the task instruction. The experimenter explained any question in
regard to experimental instructions. Upon completion of the sentence elaboration task,
all subjects were asked to count backward for a minute. Afterwards, all base sentences
were read again aloud with "blank" spoken for the target adjective, in a different order
from the initial presentation. Subjects were given 7 seconds to recall a target word and
were encouraged to guess the answer if they do not know. Finally they filled out the
combined version of ATQ-N and ATQ-P and also the cognitive interference
questionnaire (CIQ, Sarason, 1980), in order to measure how frequently subjects
experience task-inelevant thoughts during the experimental session. The combined
version of ATQ-N/-P was produced by randomly reordering all items of both
questionnaires (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987). As with Ingram et al.
(1987), the instruction of ATQ was modified from the "in the past week" to the "during
the experiment". The CIQ included two additional questions measuring controllability
and mind-wandering as well as task-inelevant thoughts.
It should be noted that these kinds of delayed self-report of thoughts are subject
to possible distortions from various sources. One of the confounding factors is that
subjects' awareness of their level of performance influences the ratings of thoughts
occurring during the task. Therefore, subjects could report having experienced
depressive thoughts more or less frequently. Another potential problem is whether all

items included in the questionnaire represent all thoughts subjects experienced during th
task. Despite these problems, similar kinds of self-report techniques have been employed
by researchers (e.g., Ellis et al, 1990; Seibert & Ellis, 1991; Folkman & Lazarus, 1985).
Among the others, to my knowledge, no previous studies have been undertaken to
explore the intrusion of negative/positive cognitions using ATQ-N/-P. The inclusion of
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these self-report measurements can be a useful means of providing some information on
the role of negative/positive thoughts in terms of memory impairment in depression.

Results
The mean BDI scores in four groups are as follows; 2.00 for nondysphoricprecise instruction, 2.33 for nondysphoric-imprecise instruction, 13,60 for dysphoricprecise instruction, 13.27 for dysphoric-imprecise instruction. The analysis of the BDI
scores did show a significant difference between dysphoric and nondysphoric groups,
t(58)=14.39,p<.001.
(1) Recall scores
The results are shown in Table 4.3. The 2-way full factorial ANOVA on recall

scores revealed no main effect of group or instruction variables, F(l,56) < 1 and F(l,56
= 1.78, nonsig, respectively. However, the interaction between group and instruction

was significant, F(l,56) = 4.8, p < .05. The simple main effect of the interaction showe

that in the specific task instruction nondysphoric people recalled more target adjective
than dysphoric people, t(28)=2.06, p <05, while in the nonspecific task instruction the
groups did not differ, t(28)=l .06, nonsig.

Table 4.3 Mean recall scores among nondysphoric and dysphoric groups as a function of
task instruction.
Nondysphorics Dysphorics
Recall in specific 10.73 (1.99) 8.73 (3.20)
(n= 15)
(n= 15)
Instruction
Recall in nonspecific 8.27 (3.15) 9.33 (2.29)
Instruction
(n=15)
(n=15)
Note. ( ) means standard deviations, M a x i m u m recall score is 15,
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Also nondysphoric students recalled more adjectives in the specific task instruction,
compared to the nonspecific condition, t(28)=2.57, p < ,05 while this result was not true
of dysphoric students, t(28)=59, nonsig. These results replicated those of the Stein and
his colleagues' study and suggest that the dysphoric students did not take advantage of
the specific task instruction for later recall.
(2) Extent of precise elaboration and recall
As with study 1A, three raters judeged how well phrases generated by subjects
elaborated the target adjectives. The raters were blind to subject group and task
instruction. The sentences were randomly presented by the computer one at a time and
the rater was asked to rate each sentence on a five point likert scale ranging from "1 very badly elaborated" to "5 - very well elaborated". Interrater agreements were highly

conelated (r= .91, for raters 1,2; r= .82, for raters 2,3; r =.88, for raters 1,3 all p < .
with mean ratings of 2.25 (SD=66), 2.46 (SD=.72), and 2.99 (SD=85) respectively on
the 5-point scale. In the following analysis, an average score of the 3 judges was used.
To assess the relationship between average rating scores and accuracy of recall, a
3 way ANOVA on mean ratings was conducted with group and instruction as between
subject variables and recall accuracy as a repeated measure. The results are shown in the
table 4.4. The results showed significant main effects of all three factors, group,
instruction, and recall accuracy, F(l,56)=13.03, F(l,56)=9.49, F(l,56)=20.71, all p < .01
respectively. However there were no interactions amongst these variables. The
significant group difference in average elaboration rating scores means that nondysphoric
subjects give more precise elaboration of base sentences, compared to dysphoric
students. The significant effect of task instruction is in the unexpected direction;
nonspecific task instruction gave more precise elaboration, compared to specific task
instruction. This unexpected finding may arise from the rating process as the three raters
evaluated subject-generated elaborations in terms of its relevance to the target adjective
rather than how well it explained the behaviour described in the sentence, which could
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give rise to better elaboration scores in the nonspecific task instruction. For example,
"The slow man went into the library", the completion can be evaluated by the relevance
to the target adjective (slow), rather than by the reason why the slow man went into the
library. The provision of elaboration in terms of its association with the target word
would be much easier than one in terms of its reason for that action. To exclude this

possibility, a new rating was conducted in a manner close to the specific task instruction,
but none of the conelations among raters was significant, suggesting that it is very

difficult to evaluate the completion in terms of the precision of elaboration. This finding
suggests that the sentence completion task in this experiment was too difficult to be
completed in a precise way.
Examination of the subjects responses revealed that very few of the sentences
were elaborated in the way the instructions requested. Evidence for this argument is
provided by the low average elaboration scores by the three raters (2.25 (SD=.66), 2.46
(SD=.72), and 2.99 (SD=85), on the 5 point scale), suggesting that in general subjects
elaborated less precisely than the raters would expect on average (3 on the scale).
The significant main effect of recall accuracy means that the more precise
elaboration of base sentences is associated with a greater probability of the target
adjective being recalled, which is consistent with the results of Stein and Bransford's
(1979) study. This relationship between recall and the extent of precise elaboration was
further supported by the significant conelation between mean rating scores and recall,
r=.212, p < .05 (one tailed). In contrast, mean elaboration rating scores showed a
negative conelation with the BDI, r^-37, p < .01 (two tailed), suggesting that the more
depressed subjects the less precisely they elaborated. In sum, i) dysphoric people
produced less precise elaboration to a base sentence, relative to nondysphoric people, ii)

the probability of a target adjective being recalled is contingent on the extent of precise
elaboration; the more precise elaboration resulting in higher recall and iii) the severity
depression is negatively conelated with the precision of elaboration.
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Table 4.4 M e a n Elaboration Rating Score as a Function of Recall Accuracy.
Target adjective Target adjective
recalled

not recalled

Spe. Inst. Nonspe Inst. Spe. Inst. Nonspe. Inst.
Nondysphoric 2.78 3.17 2.27 2.59
group
(.39)
(.43)

(.79)

(.45)

Dysphoric 2.22 2.27 1.96 2.22
group
(.51)
(.61)

(.74)

(.75)

Note. ( ) indicate standard deviations.
n=30 in each group

Despite the lack of interaction between group and recall accuracy, a between
group comparasion was made as a function of recall accuracy across task instruction as
part of a planned comparasion. Paired t-tests revealed that for both nondysphoric and
dysphoric groups, mean elaboration ratings were higher for words that were recalled
than for words that were not recalled. Mean rating scores of the nondysphoric group was
2.97 (SD=.45) and 2.43 (SD=65) for target adjectives recalled and not recalled
respectively, which was significant, t(29)=5.60, p < .001. The counterparts for the
dysphoric group were 2.46 (SD= 59) and 2,09 (SD=.74), which was also significant,

t(29)=2.12, p < .05. In the specific task instruction, nondysphorics produced significant
more precise elaboration than dysphorics. In general, these results suggest that more
precise elaboration regardless of type of task instruction, facilitates recall of target
adjectives. However, these results are different from experiment 1A in that dyphoric
subjects recalled more target adjectives from more precisely elaborated sentences, which
was not true for experiment 1A. This discrepant finding will be addressed again in the
discussion section.
(3) ATO-P/ATO-N and Recall.
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A ratio of the A T Q - P to A T Q - N was calculated which was considered as an
index. As shown in table 4.5, dysphoric students reported relatively equal numbers of
negative and positive automatic thoughts, whereas nondyphoric students reported more

positive automatic thoughts experienced during the experimental session, A 2 (group) X
2 (task instruction condition) ANOVA was conducted with the ratio as a dependent
measure. Only the main effect of group was significant, F(l, 55) = 7.7, p < .001,
suggesting that dysphoric students experienced more negative automatic thoughts,
compared to nondysphorics. However, in the total scores (ATQ-P + ATQ-N), there was

no group difference, t(57) = 1.27, nonsig., suggesting that nondysphoric and dysphoric
students experienced the same amount of automatic thoughts during the experimental

session. It seems that depression reduces the availability of positive cognitions, whi

increases the availability of negative cognitions, which is also consistent with the c
specificity hypothesis (Deny & Kuiper, 1981; Kuiper, et al., 1983).

Table 4.5 The indices of depressive thoughts measured as on
the ATQ-P/-N and C I Q
Nondsyphorics Dysphorics

ATQ-P

58.76(34.81)

51.36(20.66)

ATQ-N

32.93 (3.90)

51.63 (15.37)

Ratios
(ATQ-P/ATQ-N)

1.75
(n=29)

1.02
(n=30)

CIQ

21.73
(n=30)

27.20
(n=30)

Controllability

2.45
(n=29)

3.17
(n=30)

Mind-wander

2.50
(n=30)

3.14
(n=29)
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The content specificity hypothesis claims that the ratio of positive to negative thoughts is
decreased as depression becomes more severe. Particularly, in the state of mild
depression, people show an even-handedness of positive and negative cognitions.
T o examine h o w these ratios are associated with performance, the conelation
between ratios and recall was calculated, which was not significant, r = .11. This result
suggests that the ratio of positive automatic thoughts to negative automatic thoughts is
not associated with recall performance. The conelations of each of A T Q - P and A T Q - N
to recall performance were not significant either, r = -.02, and r = -.23 respectively.
These results further suggest that regardless of the contents of automatic thoughts, they
are not associated with recall performance. Furthermore, given that positive automatic
thoughts are as disruptive as negative automatic thoughts, a lack of difference in the total
frequencies of both types of automatic thought suggests no overall performance deficits
between groups. So the disruptive role of negative automatic thoughts predicted by
several theoretical frameworks was not obtained (Beck, 1967; Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). C o m m o n in these frameworks is that these negative automatic
thoughts are assumed to compete for the limited mental capacity with task-relevant
thoughts, causing performance deficits. However, as no direct manipulation of negative
automatic cognition w a s made, this conclusion of no impairing effects of negative
automatic thoughts should be tentative.
(4) C I O and Recall
The analysis of a 2 X 2 A N O V A on C I Q scores as a dependent measure revealed
a significant main effect of group, F(l,56) = 11.62, p < .01. The other effects were not
significant. These results suggest that dysphoric students experience more task-inelevant
thoughts than nondysphoric students. The correlation between the C I Q scores and recall
performance was significant r=-.28,_p < .05 Taken together with results in the ATQ-N/P, dysphoric people experience more task-inelevant and automatic thoughts, compared
to nondysphoric students. The difference between automatic thoughts on the A T Q - P / N
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and the C I Q in their relationship with recall performance seems to be related to the fact

that the CIQ includes both negative self-referent and task-inelevant thoughts, while the
ATQ-N/-P only covers self-referent thoughts.
(5) Controllability. Mind-wandering and Recall
Two separate questions were included to measure controllability of taskinelevant thoughts and mind-wandering on 7 point likert scales. On the controllability
scale ranging from (l)"not at all difficult" to (7)"extremely difficult", subjects were
to report "how difficult was it for you to remove these thoughts you just report in the
CIQ and ATQs from your mind". On the mind-wandering scale ranging from (1) "not at

all" to (7)"very much", subjects were asked to indicate the degree to which you felt your
mind wandered during the task you just completed". A 2 X 2 ANOVA on the
controllabihty measure showed that only the main effect of groups was marginally
significant, F(l, 55) = 3.96, p < .051. An analysis on the mind-wandering measure also
found a marginally significant difference between groups, F(l, 55) = 3.13, p < .081. In
relation to their conelation with performance, both controllability and mind-wandering
measures showed a significant negative correlation with recall, r (59) = -.29 and r(59)
.37, all p < .05 respectively. These results suggest that dysphoric students have more
difficulties controlling automatic thoughts and let their mind wander more frequently,
relative to nondysphoric people. In comparison with the results in the ATQ-N/-P, the
controllability and mind-wandering measure appear to be a better predictor of recall
performance than the frequency of automatic thoughts.
To examine the relative contribution to various variables of recall performance, a
stepwise multiple regression was conducted. The dependent variables entered in the
equation were BDI, ratio, controllability, mind-wandering, and CIQ. The results showed
that only the mind-wandering factor was significant, F(l,55) = 8.71,p<.01,R square =
.14. These results suggest that losing concentration (mind-wandering) is the best
predictor of poor memory performance.
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Finally, to ward off multicollinearity a m o n g the variables entered into the multiple
regression, some caution was required as interconelations among these variables are
assumed to be high. According to Tabachnick and Fiedell (1989), multicollinearity
causes logical and statistical problems when a bivariate conelation is .70 or more
including two variables. However, none of the bivariate conelations among the five
variables included in the cunent experiment exceeded .60, therefore there appears to be
no serious multicollinearity problems in this analysis. Moreover, when the high
conelation among these variables suggest the possibility of multicolinearity, most
statistical programs including SPSS-X have a routine screening procedure against it. If

the multicollinearity causes statistical instability, such variables do not enter the anal
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1989).

General Discussion
Several studies suggested that depression interferes with elaboration for different
reasons (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1988; Williams et al, 1988; Abramson et al, 1981;
Weingartner et al., 1981). Some studies (Ellis et al, 1984, study 1, 2; Potts, et al, 1989
Weingartner, et al, study 1) investigated recall performance through the elaborative
processing of sentence and words in induced depression, naturally occurring mild
depression, and clinical depression. However, elaborative deficits have not been directly
investigated in terms of the amount or quality of elaboration given to words or sentences,
and this has only been infened from the poor recall performance of depressives.
In this regard, the cunent three experiments aimed i) to examine overall memory
deficits of dysphoric students in the subject-generated elaboration of sentences, ii) to
investigate how depression affects the extent of their precise elaboration activities for
reducing the arbitrary relationship between type of person and his action in an arbitrary

base sentence, iii) to investigate whether recall performance in both groups is facilitated
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by precise elaboration to the same extent, and iv) to explore the relationship between
task-irrelevant and positive/negative automatic thoughts and recall performance.

(1) Recall and the Extent of Precise Elaboration
The major findings from the three cunent experiments are as follow. Firstly, in
terms of recall performance depression interacts with the task instruction (study IC).
Nondysphoric people benefit from the specific task instruction whose aim is to reduce
the arbitrary relationship between type of person and his action, consequently enhancing
memory performance. In contrast, such a beneficial effect of specific instruction did not
hold for dysphoric people. On the other hand, in a nonspecific task instruction, the
groups did not differ in their recall performance. These results suggest that dysphoric
individuals did not make good use of the specific task instruction in producing more

precise elaboration to a base sentence, hence aiding later recall, relative to nondysphori
individuals. When we assume that both groups have knowledge to elaborate a base
sentence in a more preicse way, that is, reducing the arbitrary relationship between the
person and his action, the possible reason for this difference is that dysphoric subjects
appear to suffer from reduced self-initiated activity (cf. Hertel, 1994; Hasher & Zacks,
1988). However, the depressive deficits in overall performance in the experiment 1A
were not replicated in a similar condition of the subsequent experiments IB and IC. Two
possible reasons can be taken into account. First, the method of subject selection in
experiment 1A is different from experiment IB and IC. In experiment 1A, after the
completion of the experimental task, the BDI was filled out, so subjects' performance
could have affected their response to the BDI, Using the median split, subjects were
classified into dysphoric and nondysphoric groups. On the other hand, in experiments IB
and IC subjects were selected according to the recommendation by Kendall et al. (1987).
A second possible explanation of this difference between experiments is
concerned with the difference in task instruction. The task instruction in experiment 1A
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seems m o r e ambiguous relative to the one in experiment IB and IC. A s subjects in
experiment 1A were asked to continue each base sentence with a short phrase, this
situation is more uncontrolled and requiring self-initiative, thus leading to poor
performance in depressive as suggested by the reduced intiative hypothesis (Hertel &
Hardin, 1991),
Secondly, it was investigated whether recall superiority under specific task
instruction compared to nonspecific task instruction is associated with more precise
elaboration. However, the results showed that there was no corresponding interaction
between task instruction and groups when the extent of precise elaboration was used as a
dependent measure. Despite the lack of interaction, nondysphorics produced more
precise elaborations in the specific task instruction than dysphorics. Unexpectedly,
sentences under nonspecific task instruction were given more precise elaboration rating
scores by raters, compared to ones generated under specific instruction. This unexpected
finding, as discussed earlier, suggests difficulties in evaluating the precision of
elaboration and that the base sentences are difficult to be elaborated precisely.
Furthermore, the facilitation of recall of target adjective seems to rely not only on
precision of elaboration but also on relatedness of the completion to the target word.
This unexpected result might be associated with the rating process. To exclude this

possibility, a new rating was conducted with a different rating instruction in which raters
attempted to evaluate sentences in a manner close to the specific task instruction - how
well does the completion explain why the action described was performed by that
particular person. However, this new rating procedure yielded very low interconelations
among three raters; none of the correlations among the three raters was significant. The

failure to obtain a significant correlation among raters suggests that it is very difficult
evaluate sentences consistently in the "why-question" context.
Thirdly, the question was asked of whether recall probability of target adjectives
from more precisely elaborated sentences is higher than adjectives from less preciesely
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elaborated sentences. In general, regardless of group and task instruction, target

adjectives recalled were given more precise elaboration ratings than target adjectives no
recalled (study 1A and IC). These results are consistent with the precision of

elaboration hypothesis saying that in a relatively novel situation such as the elabolatio
of a base sentence, quality (precision) of elaboration plays an important role in
facilitating learning (Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein et al, 1984; Franks et al, 1982),
Finally, even though depression did not interact with either recall accuracy or
task instruction, dysphoric people made less precise elaborations to a base sentence than
nondysphorics, suggesting elaborative deficits in dysphorics. This elaboration deficit in
depression was also supported by the negative correlation between the extent of precise
elaboration and recall performance found across all variables. However, this conclusion
seems contradictory to the results of experiment 1A, because experiment 1A did not find
a difference between groups in terms of elaboration presision. This difference may be
because experiment 1A and IC employed different task instructions. A direct comparison
appears difficult, but the type of task instruction affects the quality of elaboration. As
suggested in the discussion section of study 1A, the task instruction can lead subjects to
speak out whatever phrases pop into their minds. In contrast, both task instructions used
in the study IC. must have encouraged subjects to think in the direction of precise
elaboration.
(2) Depressive thoughts and their relationship with performance
The previous literature put an emphasis on an etiological role of negative
cognitions for the maintenance of depression and on the disruptive impact on
performance of intrusive thoughts (e.g., Beck, 1976; Brewin, 1988; Hollen & Kendall,
1980). Particularly, impairing effects of negative thoughts on performance are the focus
of various theoretical frameworks (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988;
Kuhle & Helle, 1986; Hartlage, et al., 1993). However, according to Williams et al.
(1988, chap 2), the assumed negative relationship between negative cognition and
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performance is not clear. Furthermore, those theoretical frameworks did not pay m u c h
attention to the role of positve automatic thoughts, compared to negative automatic
thoughts.
Experiment IC showed that nondysphoric students experienced more positive
automatic thoughts, relative to negative thoughts, while dysphoric students experienced
equal amounts of both types of thought. Considering that all items in both ATQ-P/N are

self-referent (e.g., I am a failure), depression reduced the accessibility of positive self
referent thoughts while increasing the accessibility of negative self-referent thoughts,
which is consistent with previous studies by Teasdale and his collegues. Putting it
another way, these results are consistent with the content specificity hypothesis that
clinical depression is characterized by a higher proportion of negative thoughts,
mild/moderate depression by a even proportion of both negative and positive thoughts,
and normal mood by a higher proportion of positive thoughts, relative to negative
thoughts (for review, Ruehlman, et al, 1985). Thus, the dysfunctional thoughts shown
by dysphoric people support Beck's cognitive model of depression. Secondly, despite a
higher proportion of negative self-referent thoughts, the total frequency of automatic
thoughts was not different among groups. So if frequencies of these automatic thoughts
(negative and positive) have a detrimental effect on task performance as intrusive
thoughts, groups would not be differentially affected by these thoughts. In effect, there
was no group difference in recall. Furthermore, each frequency of negative and positive
automatic thoughts is not associated with performance. Thus, the assumed disruptive
role of positive/negative automatic thoughts as performance correlates was not found.
These results do not appear to be supportive of the assumption that automatic thoughts
can occupy some portion of the limited capacity, leading to the cognitive interference
with performance. This conclusion is tentative because there was not an actual
manipulation of negative and positive automatic thoughts to observe their effects on
performance.
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O n the measure of task-inelevant thoughts on the CIQ, the results are similar to
those in the ATQ-N except that the frequency of task-inelevant thoughts showed a
negative conelation with performance. That is, dysphoric students experienced more
cognitive interference during the task, compared to normal controls. Similar finding was
found in the Seibert and Ellis' (1991) study using a mood induction procedure.
Regardless of depressed and elated mood states, subjects in these mood states produced
greater proportions of inelevant thoughts than neutral controls. The proportions of
inelevant thoughts and recall performance were negatively related. Subjects reported
their thoughts after the memory task or while they were doing the task. However, of all
the other variables such as the BDI, ATQ-P/N, CIQ, the best predictor of recall
performance was the "mind-wandering" indice, suggesting that losing concentration on
the cunent task is associated with poor performance. Dypshoric people reported having
experienced more "mind-wandering" during the task, relative to normal controls.
In sum, depressed people show recall deficits in a more uncontrolled
experimental situation (experiment 1A), but in a more specified situation (experiment
IC), such overall memory deficits disappear. Thus, these results seem to lend support to
the reduced initiative hypothesis (Hertel & Hardin, 1991) rather than the reducedcapacity hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). According to the prediction from the
capacity-reduced model, overall memory deficits should have been found regardless of
task instruction because the subject-generated elaboration task is seen as effortful A
caution on this interpretation should be made that the different elaboration task
instructions may not be equally effortful; a more uncontrolled instruction (experiment
1A) could be more effortful than a more specified instruction (experiment IC), hence
causing memory deficits. Further work is needed in which the task instruction and

cognitive effort factors can be factorially combined to elucidate the relationship betwe
reduced initiative and cognitive effort in elaboration tasks.
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The extent of precise elaboration processing also seems to depend upon the task
instruction; in an uncontrolled condition, dysphoric people elaborate as well as
nondysphoric people (study 1A), but in a more controlled condition (study IC),
dysphoric subjects have difficulties in taking advantage of the instruction. Dysphoric
subjects have difficulties utilizing their previous knowledge to precisely elaborate
seemingly arbitrary information, so that it can be more memorable. Across experiment
1A and IC, for nondysphoric subjects, the probability of recall of a target adjective was
contingent upon the extent of precise elaboration, replicating the previous studies; the

more precisely elaborated the target adjective, the more likely it is to be recalled (Stein
Bransford, 1979; Stein, et al., 1984). On the other hand, for dysphoric subjects, a
facilitative effept of precise elabortion on recall was not found in a more uncontrolled
condition (experiment 1A), but in a more controlled condition (experiment IC), they
could benefit from the precise elaboration. Thus, nondysphoric people benefit from
precisely elaborated information regardless of task instruction, while the effect in
dysphoric students depends upon the task instruction. In general, these results suggest
the importance of task instruction in both recall performance and elaborative activities
particularly for dysphoric students.
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CHAPTER 5
Comparisons of Three Procedures for Inducing Depressed Mood

5.1 The Rationale and Purpose of the Present Study
The cunent chapter consists of two large sections; one is a previous literature
reivew of mood induction procedures of the Velten Mood Induction Procedure (Velten,
1968; VMIP) and Musical Mood Induction Procedure (MMIP), the other section
attempts to develop a better mood induction procedure by combining both mood
induction procedures. The first section addresses characteristics of the VMIP, MMIP,
effectiveness of each procedure in creating experimentally induced depression and,

whether induced depression has parellel effects on such variables as affected by natur
depression. The second section compares the relative effectiveness of the three mood
induction procedures (the VMTP plus MMIP, VMIP, MMIP) in inducing depression,
compared to neutral controls. One of reasons for the development of a new mood
induction procedure is that sometimes it is difficult to get large enough numbers of
naturally depressed subjects and the mood induction procedure is a convenient
alternative chosen by many researchers.
Many studies on depression employed mood induction procedures to
experimentally induce depressed mood states rather than to select naturally occurring
depressives by dint of psychometric measures. Also various types of mood-induction
techniques have been developed ( for reviews, Blaney, 1986; Goodwin & Williams,
1982; Genards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994); eg., VMIP (Velten, 1968), MMIP
(Sutherland et al, 1982), autobiographical recollections methods (Brewer, Doughtie, &
Lubin, 1980), taped depressing story (Williams, 1980), success/failure feedback (Isen,
Clark, Shalker, & Karp, 1978), hypnosis (Bower, 1981) etc. Sometimes, the combination
of those procedures was employed to increase their effectiveness. For example, Natale
and Hantas(1982) and Richardson and Taylor (1982) combined the VMIP with
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hyponosis and imagination respectively. A recent reivew (Gerrards-Hesse et al, 1994) of
the comparative evaluation of mood induction procedures for depressed mood states,
showed that the VMIP, a mood induction procedure using imagination evoking or reexperience the past experiences, the film/story mood induction procedure, and the
success/failure mood induction are effective,
One of the important questions in using the mood induction procedure is whether
the induced mood state really resembles naturally occuning depression in terms of its
effects on depression-associated vairables. Two reviews questionned whether the results
from the mood induction studies are similar to those from naturally occurring depression
(Clark, 1983; Goodwin & Williams, 1982). The general conclusion from those reviews is

positive; that is, findings from two areas show similar effects on the variables studied.
Clark (1983) summarized that relatively similar effects of the VMIP and naturally

occurrring depression were found in these variables; counting times, writing speed, Digit
symbol test, negative memory bias, and behaviour in social situations. Variables

unaffected by the VMJJP were as follows; skin conductance, time estimation, attributional

styles. On the basis of this evidence, Clark (1983) concluded that the VMIP and naturally
occurring depression are remarkably similar in their effects on depression related
variables, and the induced depression resembles naturally occurring retarded depression.
Despite this comparability between induced and natural depression, some
recent studies particularly in the memory area reported contradictory findings
(Kwiatkowski & Parkinson, 1994; Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991). These
studies used a shortened form of the VMIP. The recall pattern of natural and induced
depression is different in a similar/same cognitive task, compared to neutral controls.
Particularly, the experiment 2 by Hertel and Rude (1991) directly compared naturally
depressed, experimentally depressed, and neutral subjects in the recall test of target

words from sentences. An induction of depression caused overall deficits in recall, while
overall deficits in natural depression were not obtained. This lack of conesponding
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results between natural and induced depression in relation to memory suggests that
conclusion from employing experimental inductions of mood are confined to that
domain.
Considering these results in view of Clark (1983), it may be argued that findings
from experimentally induced depression employing simple tasks such as counting and
writing are more generalisale to natural depression than those from more complex tasks
such as a recall and recognition memory tests. At the moment, it is not clear why the
VMIP produces discrepant effects on the different tasks. Considering that the subjects
employed in those memory studies were only mildly depressed it is possible that the
differences related to the strength of depression and so the results may be different if

clinically depressed subjects are employed. Another possible reason for this difference i
findings is that different studies developed differently modified and shortened VMIPs,
leading to a relatively weak depressed mood in some studies; the reduced negative selfreferent statements of the VMIP alleviate the intensity of depressed mood and thus
duration may be shorter than that of the full-version of the VMIP. However, as the

VMEP is still frequently used in other research, further study is required to explore oth
kinds of variation of the VMIP (e.g., the combination of the VMIP and MMIP) as well
as the comparability of natural and the Velten-induced depression.

5.1.1 Velten Mood Induction Procedure (VMIP)
One of the most frequently used mood induction is the VMIP (Velten, 1968).
The VMIP consists of 60 self-referent statements for each of two depressed and elated
mood states. The neutral statements are not self-referent. The depression-inducing
negative self-referent statements contain self-devaluation and somatic problems
characteristic of depression. The statements progress from neutral tone to depressive
tone. The procedure is to ask subjects to read each of statements silently and then aloud
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at the rate of every 20 seconds while they are trying to feel the m o o d suggested by each
statement. In effect, subjects are required to work hard to get into the mood.
The general experimental procedure of using the VMIP is to adminster the mood
induction procedure and then to check the successfulness of the procedure by using a
self-report measure that assesses the mood in question (e.g., DACL; Depressive
Adjective Checklist, Lubin, 1965). And then experimenters select subjects who changed
the mood in the expected way and proceed to study behavioural or cognitive variables of
central interest,
Reading negative self-referential statements from the VMIP resulted in lowered
self-reported mood, slowed speech rate, retarded psychomotor functioning, reduced gaze
behaviour, decreased use of hand illustrators, and decreased accessibility of
positive/pleasant past memories (Aderman, 1972; Coleman, 1975; Gouaux & Gouaux,
1971; Natale, 1977; Natale & Bolan, 1980; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979).
However, several problems with the VMIP were raised by investigators. First of
all, not all subjects respond to the VMIP and so do not reach the criteria set up by the
experimenter (Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Sutherland, et al, 1982). So the loss of subjects in

selection causes a biased subject group, thus raising questions about the generability of
results obtained using the VMIP to naturally occurring depression. Secondly, the VMIP

can interact with individual differences such as personality factors. For example, Scheie
and Carver (1977) reported that subject who score high on the private self-consciousness
scale tended to repond to the VMIP more strongly than subject who scored low on the

scale. This result indicates that more self-conscious subjects who focus more attention o
themselves are more susceptible to the VMIP than less self-conscious subjects. Also
Cash, Rimm, & Mackinnon (1986) examined the susceptibility to the VMIP among
people classified by the Lrational Beliefs Test (Jones, 1968) measuring dysfunctional

beliefs. Irrationals people were susceptible to the depressed self-referent statements of
the VMIP, while rational people were not.
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Another issue raised by many investigators is demand characteristics of the
VMEP, ie., subjects responding in the way expected by the experimenter rather than
according to their true feelings (Buchwald, Strack, and Coyne, 1981). However,
Berkowitz and Troccoli (1986) argued that many of reactions by the VMTP are too
subtle to be deliberately faked. Also many studies using a mood induction procedure
have attempted to circumvent the probems of possible demand characteristics in such

ways as instructing subjects to report their true feeling. However, both Clark (1983) an
Berkowitz and Troccoli (1986) conceded that demand characteristics are partially
responsible for the mood effects on depression-associated variables.
Finally, another issue is whether the VMEP gives rise to a particular discrete

mood state. In effect, the VMIP produces multiple mood states, resulting in a significan
increase in anxiety and hostility (Polivy, 1981, study 2). These multiple effects in the
VMIP are similar to naturally occuring blended emotions in depression.
The problem of the VMIP, related to the cunent experiment, is that the duration
of induced mood by the VMIP may not be long enough for some investigators to
complete the task (cf. Ellis, Seibert, & Herbert, 1990; Polivy, 1981, study 2). For this

reason, null findings from an experiment are difficult to interpret becasue the initiall
induced mood tends to dissipate over time. Several studies measured the duration of the
initial mood state by the VMIP.
Frost and Green (1982) directly examined how long the initially induced
depression by the VMIP last using several questionnaires such as MAACL (Multiple
Affective Adjective Check List (Zuckerman, & Lubin, 1985), BDI and PFS (Personal
Feeling Scale; Frost, Graf, & Becker, 1979). The measurement of mood states took
place three times; prior to, upon completion of the VMIP, and after 10 minutes waiting
period after the VMIP. During the 10 minitues, there was no distracting task. The
comparison of scores in the PFS immediately after the VMIP with those after the 10
minute waiting period revealed a significant improvement in depressed mood. However,
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the depressed group was still more depressed than neutral controls. These results

indicated that induced depression dissipate over time and lives up to at least 10 minute
Isen and Gorgoglione (1983) compared the VMIP with other three mood
induction procedures in two times-of-measurement conditions. The first measurement
was taken immediately after the VMIP and the second one was taken after 4 minutes
intervening task of categorizing words. All mood checks were made through a set of five
seven-point mood rating scales. The time of measurement was a between-groups

variable. The results showed that immediately after the VMIP, subjects in the depression

induction felt more negative, less amused, and less alert than those in the no manipulat

condition. Such a difference in rating disappeared in the delayed condition. These resul
suggested that even though the VMIP initially created a powerful depressed mood state,
the intensity of depression dissipate very rapidly, particularly when subjects interact
other external tasks.
Chartier and Ranieri (1989) compared two mood induction procedures (VMIP
and success and failure manipulation) on the intensity and duration of the induced mood
over 30 mininutes after the induction. Mood was checked prior to, immediately after,

and at five 6 minutes intervals after the mood induction treatment. To manipulate succes
and failure experiences, 50 mutiple-choice word analogy problems were used. During the
30 minute waiting periord, subjects were allow to think about whatever they liked. The
mood was measured on the 7 alternative forms of the DACL (Lubin, 1965). The results
showed that compared to the failure manipuation, VMIP depressed subjects showed a
more intense depressed mood when it was measured immediately after induction.
However, the initially induced depressed mood by the VMIP only lasts about 6 minutes
and after that time, the comparasions with the mood prior to induction did not show any
significant difference. These results suggest that the VMIP-depression produces an
initially strong depressed mood state, which dissipates very rapidly, despite no
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intervening task. In general, these results are consistent with Isen and Gorgoglione
(1983).
Even though such a short-lived depression is induced by the VMIP as mesured on
the DACL, it is still unclear whether the lack of difference in mood is pararelled in
behavioural and cognitive tasks. This is because the VMIP can affect cognition
independently of induced mood (Riskind, 1989; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987). Riskind
(1989) proposed a cognitive priming effect of the mood induction procedure,

maintaining that the VMIP can prime a cognitive structure independent of its' effects on
mood. This claim was substantiated by the finding that even when the self-devaluative
statements of the VMIP failed to lower mood, they enhanced accessibility of negative
memories (Rholes et al, 1987).
Another isssue with the VMIP is about how the VMEP can achieve the desired
mood states. Frost et al. (1979) split the VMIP statement into two, representing a selfdevaluative component (29 statements) and a somatic component (21 statements). The
aim of the study was to investigate whether somatic statements are as good as selfdevaluative statements at inducing depression. The self-report mood state was evaluated
on the PFS and MAACL and BDI. The PFS is a 10-point self rating scale on eight

adjectives (eg., extremely optimistic-extremely pessimistic). The results showed that on

the PFS, subjects in the somatic condition differed from the neutral controls, but subje
in the self-devaluative condition did not. On the MAACL-depression subscale, there was
no such difference. On the BDI, the somatic condition induced more depressed mood

than neutral and self-devaluative conditions, which did not differ. These results led th
authors to conclude that the depressed mood states induced by the VMIP is primarily
due to the somatic suggestion rather than the self-devaluative suggestion.
On the contrary, Riskind, Rholes and Eggers (1982) found conflicting results to
the study (Frost et al., 1979). Riskind et al. (1982) examined effects of induced mood
states by the VMIP on recall latences of negative and positive life events. The Velten
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statements were divided into self-devaluation and somatic-related ones (cf. Frost, Graf,
& Becker, 1979). Four type of statememts (self-devaluative, somatic, combined, elated
statements) were used separately to induce depression with elated statements as a
control. The results showed that only self-devaluative statements made a difference in

recall latency between positive and negative events, compared to the elated statements as
a control condition. These results are contrasted with those in Frost, Graf, and Becker
(1979) in which only the somatic statements lowered the mood significantly. According
to Frost et al. (1979), negative memory bias should have been also obtained in the

somatic condition. Furthermore, changes in recall latencies from pretest to posttest were
not conelated with changes in mood between pre- and posttest-mood induction. On the
basis of these results, they suggested that the VIP self-devaluative statements may have
direct congitive priming effect on the accessibility of memories not via mood,
Other supportive data for the cognitive priming effect were obtained when the
relative effectiveness of instruction alone condition in which subjects were asked to
work hard to get into a designated mood and of the MMIP were compared for inducing
elation and depression (Lenton & Martin, 1991). Self-reported mood measurements
(VAS), psychomotor function (speech rate), and incentive ratings were employed as
dependent measurements. The analysis of pre- and post- induction difference scores

showed that the presence of the instruction was a sufficient factor to affect the depende
measurements regardless of the presence or absence of the MMIP. This result suggest
that the instruction condition of getting into a certain mood by any means is enough to
experience the mood. When subjects in the instruction condition were asked to report
strategies they used to get into a mood, more than 50 % of subjects achieved the mood

by recollecting past events or imaging future events. This great reliance of past memorie
seems to suggest that the way of mood induction procedures achieving their aim seems
to be through the cognitive priming on past events.

134

5.1.2 Musical M o o d Induction Procedure ( M M I P )

The MMIP was developed to rectify some drawbacks with the VMIP. Kenealy
(1988) used the MMIP to test if induced mood states (elated, depressed, and neutral) by
the MMIP have similar effects on the behaviour and self-reported mood, which had been
studied by the VMIP. The measurements were as follows; for self-reported mood,
MAACL and VAS, for psychomotor retardation, distance approximation, writing speed
task, decision task, and word association speed task. One of aims of the study is to
investigate whether without obvious instruction to get into the desired mood, the
intended mood state can be achieved. Clark (1983) suggested that without such a
instruction, it would be difficult to achieve the desired mood states. On the postinduction tests, comparison of happy and sad groups revealed significant difference on
two self-report mood measures and four behavioural measurements in the predicted
direction. However, compared to a no induction group, the results were not consistent.
In the case of the depressed group, they showed a significant difference in the VAS-sad
and-despondent scales, but not in the MAACL-depression on the post-induction. On the
behavioural measurements, depressed and control groups were different in the word

association and decision time tasks. In general these results were interpreted as that t
MMIP works without the suggestion of mood states desired by the experimenter.
Pignatiello, Camp, and Rasar (1986) also examined the effectiveness of the
MMIP (elation, depression, neutral control) on the self-report (DACL) and psychomotor
function (writing speed). Several pieces of music for each mood induction was compiled
and each procedure started with the same music. In their first study, elated group was
different from the depressed group on the DACL and no difference in the writing speed
was found between groups. Their second study with an additional measurement of
pretest on the writing test to be used as a covariate, found that only the elated group
different from neutral and depressed groups. On the writing speed task, the depressed
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group wrote fewer numbers than elated and neutral groups. The M M I P s used, did not
include any suggestion about changing mood states. These results suggest that the use
a neutral or an elated group as a control group can affect the results on the DACL.
Slyker and McNally (1991) tested relative effectiveness of instructions,
instructions plus MMIP, instructions plus the VTMP, instructions plus the VMEP plus
MMIP inducing anxious and depressed mood states. The instruction only condition
asked subjects to work hard to get into the expected mood state by using whatever
methods they could including memories, and imagery. The effectiveness of mood
induction procedures were evaluated in self-reported moods (MAACL; Visual Analogue
Mood Scale), psychomotor speed (speech rate) and Digit Span forward and backward,
The results showed that neither VMIP, MMIP, nor the combination enhanced the

effectiveness of the instruction alone condition. The argument that the MMIP is better
than the VMTP inducing mood, was not supported (Clark, 1983).
Albersnagel (1988) compared the relative effectiveness of the VMEP and MMIP
on self-report mood (VAS) and cognition (thought association). In the thought
association task, subjects were presented with neutral words and instructed to write
down the first thought evoked. Afterward the affective tones of associated words were
evaluated. To induce the depressed mood by the MMIP, Sibelius's 'Swan of Tuonela'
was selected. Each of the MMIP and VMEP included four conditions; anxious,

depressing, elating, and neutral conditions. The results showed no systematic differen
between the VMIP and MMIP on the VAS. The predicted differential accessibility of

negative and postive thoughts pertinent to the induced mood states was confirmed acros
the VMD? and MMIP.

Experiment 2A
The VMEP has been frequently employed to induce depressed mood states and
hence to study the effects of mood on cognitive and behavioural performance (e.g.,
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Clark, 1983; Goodwin & Williams, 1982 ; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1986). The effect of the
VMEP on mood state, when measured by self-reported instruments has been relatively

consistent across studies, whereas its effects on cognitive and behavioural variables ha

not (for a review, see Kenealy, 1986). Clark (1983) explained these inconsistent findings

by claiming that the effects of the Velten procedure would not last long enough to affec
performance measures on extended tasks. Several comparative studies of mood induction
procedures have suggested that depressed mood induced by the VME? is short-lived
(e.g., Frost & Green, 1982; Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983; Chartier & Ranieri, 1989),
Some of these studies describe the time course of the VMIP when subjects are
not engaged in a task. These estimates of duration may not always be appropriate since
the purpose of mood induction is often to influence performance on some task, so it is
necessary to determine if the task itself has an effect in changing mood. Hence it would

be better to measure the duration of mood induction effects in a situation where subject
perform some task.
In line with this argument, Isen and Gorgoglione (1983) measured mood

induction before and after a four minute neutral intervening task of word categorisation
They found that the Velten procedure created a very strong depressed mood state

immediately after induction but this was removed by only four minutes filled delay after
which there was no difference in mood between depression-induced subjects and neutral
controls. This suggests that the duration of Velten-induced depressed mood may be
shortened when a task is performed after mood induction. If so, then the failure to find
an effect of mood induction on performance measures may be explained by the rapid
dissipation of the induced mood (Clark, 1983).
Because Velten-induced mood is ephemeral, the music mood induction procedure
was developed as an alternative (Sutherland et al, 1982; Pignatiello et al, 1986). The
similarity of music mood induction to the Velten procedure has been examined (Kenealy,
1988; Slyker & McNally, 1991; Pignatiello et al, 1986). On the whole the results of the
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music induction procedure are consistent with those obtained using the V M E P (Clark,
1983). Slyker & McNally (1991) used three mood induction procedures: Instruction,
Music, and the Velten procedure. In the Instruction condition, subjects were told that
they could use whatever methods they chose, including recollecting past experiences, to
induce themselves into the intended mood state. These three procedures were then

combined to give four conditions (Instruction, Instruction + Velten, Instruction + Music
Instruction + Music + Velten) inducing anxiety and depression. Mood states were
measured prior to and immediately following mood induction, employing the Multiple
Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) and Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). There was no
significant difference among the four procedures in the extent of induced depression.
Pignatiello et al. (1986) also showed that the music induction procedure increased the
level of depression as measured on the DACL and slowed down writing speed, changes
which are also observed with the Velten procedure. Kenealy (1988) found that the music
induction procedure significantly affects behavioural measurements such as distance
approximation, writing speed, decision time, and word association speed. The music
induction procedure therefore appears similar to the Velten procedure in terms of its
effect on behaviour. However, we do not know to what extent the Velten procedure and
music induction differ in terms of the duration of the induced mood.
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relative effectiveness of three mood
induction procedures in terms of the durability and strength of the induced mood. Four
mood induction procedures were compared: (i) the reduced Velten induction procedure,

(ii) the Music induction procedure, (iii) the Velten-plus-Music induction procedure, and
(iv) Neutral music which served as a control. In the Music, Velten-plus-Music, and
Neutral music conditions, music was played through the whole session to determine if it
could keep the induced depression relatively stable. The dissipation rate of induced
depression was measured over a period of 18 minutes after the initial mood induction,
with mood states being checked at six minute intervals over that period. Although the
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target m o o d was depression, anxiety levels were also measured after m o o d induction
because studies of both naturally occurring depression (Greenberg & Alloy, 1989;
Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987; Watson & Kendall, 1989) and
depression induction (Slyker & McNally, 1991; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979) show a high
conelation between depression and anxiety. Previous studies of depressed mood

induction procedure have shown that anxiety levels increase as a result of the inductio
procedure (Clark, 1983; Slyker & McNally, 1991).
Three questions were asked. First, is the combination of the Velten-plus-Music
more effective than either the Velten procedure or Music induction alone? Second, does
continuous music throughout an experimental session help sustain an induced mood?
Third, how does each mood induction procedure influence anxiety level?

Method
Subjects
Forty-four subjects who were recruited from a first year psychology subject pool

were randomly allocated to four conditions. Twelve subjects participated in the Velten-

plus-Music, ten in the Velten, eleven each in the Music and Neutral control In return fo
their participation, subjects received course credits. In the assessment of depression
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) prior to mood induction, the Velten-plus-music
(M = 5.42), the Velten (M = 6.50), the Music (M = 4.45), and Neutral control (M =
7.45) were not different, F(3,40)=.73, p >1.

Materials
(1) Velten Statements.
The reduced form of the Velten procedure was used, as in previous studies
(Slyker & McNally, 1991; Teasdale & Forgarty, 1979). This consists of 30 negative selfreferent statements, each of which was typewritten on a separate card. The intensity of
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depression in the statements gradually increased from mildly depressing tones to severely
depressing ones.
(2, Music Stimuli.
To select a piece of music for the induction of depression, a pilot study
comparing several pieces of music was conducted for 25 students. The five pieces of
music were as follows: Sibelius' The Swan of Tuonela, Prokoviev's Russia under the
Mongolian Yoke, Greig's Aases Tod (Death of Aase), Satie's Description of
automatiques (Sur un Vaisseau), and the finale of Tchaikowsky's Symphony No. 6. The
five pieces of music were presented in counterbalanced order. Groups of five subjects

listened to each piece of music and each subject then rated the emotional qualities of
music using visual analogue scales. The scales represented "depressed" "anxious" "sad"
and "happy" and ranged from "very" to "not at all". The Swan of Tuonela was judged as
the most depressing piece of music. The neutral music was that by Pignatiello et al.
(1989).
(3) Visual Analogue Scale (VAS).
The VAS has been frequently used in mood induction studies (Teasdale &
Fogarty, 1979; Williams, 1980; Albersnagel, 1988). It consisted of 10cm horizontal
lines, one for each of three moods: 'anxious', 'sad', and 'happy'. Above each line 'At

moment' was written. For example, 'I do not feel at all anxious' was put at the one end
the line and 1 feel extremely anxious' at the other end. Subjects were asked to put a
on the line to indicate their feelings at this moment. Measurements of depression and
anxiety were taken in millimetres.
(4) Depression Adjective Check List (DACL).
This instrument consists of 32 or 34 positive and negative adjectives, which are

selected by subjects to describe their present mood. An advantage of the DACL is that i
exists in seven alternative forms, allowing repeated measurement of mood.
Procedure
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Each subject was told that this experiment aimed to explore the relationship
between feeling and thinking and was then randomly allocated to one of the four groups,
Then all subjects were given the DACL, the VAS and the BDI before the induction

started. In the Velten procedure, subjects were asked to read each statement aloud first
and think about the message suggested by the statement for 20 seconds. At 20 second
intervals subjects moved to the next statement when a tone sounded. It took 10 minutes
to complete a set of 30 statements. In the Music and Neutral control procedures,

subjects were asked to listen to music carefully to try to feel the mood suggested by t
music. Music continued throughout the experiment. In the Velten-plus-music condition,
while subjects completed the Velten procedure, music was played as background and
then continued throughout the experiment. They were told to try to feel the mood
suggested by music as much as possible while they were reading cards. Subjects in the
control group were given the same instruction as in the music procedure except that
neutral music was played through the experiment. In each of 3 six minute period,
subjects completed 2 questionnaires (a form of the DACL and the VAS) and then a

sentence completion task for the remainder of the time. In the sentence completion task,
subjects were asked to continue sentence with a short phrase. Different sentences were

used in each of the intervals. The experimenter left the room while subjects answered th
questionnaire and worked on the sentence completion task. At the end of the experiment,
all subjects in the depression induction groups went through a mood elating procedure.
This included reading elating statements while elating music was played for 4 minutes.
Subjects were then debriefed about the experiment; none of them showed any evidence
of negative mood on completion of the experiment.
Results
(1) DACL
As there were unequal numbers of items in the different versions of the DACLs,
raw scores were transformed to proportions. As shown in Figure 5.1, the Velten-plus-
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music and Velten groups produced an initially stronger depressed m o o d than Music

induction. But the rate of the dissipation is much faster for the Velten than the Veltenplus-Music procedure. At the final testing of mood after 18 minutes, the mood induced
by the Velten-plus-Music group was higher than in any other group. To test these
observations, the transformed scores were submitted to a 4 (Induction Procedures) x 4
(Time) split-plot analysis of covariance with DACL score in the preinduction as a
covariate and time as the repeated measure. Main effects of induction procedure,
F(3,39)=3.07, p < .05 and time of measurement F(3,120)=3.07, p <05 were found. Also
there was a significant interaction between time of measurement and induction

procedure, F(9,120)=3.18, p < 01. This interaction confirms that the dissipation rate is
different across procedures. To clarify this interaction effect, the simple main effect
time was examined for each induction procedure, using a Bonfenoni conection. This
analysis confirmed that only the Velten group's performance varied significantly over
time, F (3,120)=7.47. p < .001.
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Fig.5.1 DACL Mean Ratio Scores for the Three Induction
procedures and Neutral Controls at Preinduction (Timel),
Postinduction (Time 2), and Three 6 minutes Intervalss.

(2) VAS-Depression
As shown in Figure 5.2, the results obtained with the VAS-depression are quite
similar to those with the DACL. Compared to the other groups, it is apparent that the
Velten group showed a rapid dissipation over time. Also the Velten-plus-Music and
Velten initially appear to raise the level of induced depression higher than the Music
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procedure. But by the end of testing only the Velten-plus-Music shows depression levels
higher than controls. When the same analysis was applied to the VAS-depression, both
time and the interaction between time and induction procedures were significant, F
(3,120)=3.20,p<05, F (9,120)=2.39,p<05, respectively.
The effect of induction procedure was only marginally significant, F (3,39)=2.40, p < 09.
To explore the nature of the interaction effect, the simple main effect of time was
analysed for each induction procedure. Again only Velten-induced mood significantly
decreased over time, F(3,120)= 7.93, p_<001.

Fig. 5.2 VAS-depression M e a n Scores for the Three Induction
Procedures and Neutral Controls at Preinduction (Timel),
Postinduction (Timel), and Three 6 minutes Intervals.

(3) VAS-Anxiety
As Figure 5.3 shows, all induction procedures appear to increase the initial level
of anxiety immediately after mood induction. Paired t-tests on pre- and post-induction
measures for each induction procedure showed that the Velten-plus-music procedure, the
Velten procedure, and Music induction all increased the level of anxiety significantly,
t(ll)=3.57, p < .01, t(9)=4.36, p < ,01, t(10)=2.36, p < .05 respectively. Another
analysis using the score difference between pre- and post-induction measurements was
conducted. The result showed that there was a marginally significant difference among

143

induction procedures, F(3,40)=2.69, p < .058. This suggests that the procedures differ in
terms of their effects on induced anxiety, with the Velten procedure having the greatest

effect. In the 4 (Induction Procedures) X 4 (Times) split-plot analysis of covariance wi

time of previous anxiety level as a covariate, the only result of significance was the e
of time, F(3,120)=3.48, p < .05. This result shows that the initially increased level of
anxiety immediately after mood induction decreased over time. Thus the use of music
throughout the session did not sustain the increase in anxiety scores.

4

Time

Fig. 5.3 VAS-anxiety M e a n Scores for the Three Induction
Procedures and Neutral Controls at Preinduction (Time 1),
Postinduction (Time 2), and Three 6 minutes Intervals.

Discussion
This study examined the effects of three mood induction procedures (Veltenplus-music, Velten, and music procedures), and neutral music controls on the strength
and duration of induced depressed mood while undertaking a sentence completion task.
The main purpose of this experiment was to test whether the Velten-plus-Music was
more efficient in producing a strong and stable mood change than either the Velten
procedure or Music alone. In regard to the strength of the induced mood, the Velten and
the Velten-plus-Music both elevated depressed mood to the same extent, but the Velteninduced mood dissipated rapidly over time. Such a transient effect of the Velten
procedure on mood was shown on the both measures of DACL and VAS-depression,
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and is consistent with previousfindings(Frost & Green, 1982; Chartier & Ranieri, 1989;
Isen & Gorgoglione, 1983). It is possible that the failure of previous studies to show an
effect of induced depression on behavioural measures and cognitive performance could
be attributed to the rapid dissipation of Velten induced mood (Coleman, 1975; Natale,
1977, Hale & Strickland, 1976).
In contrast, the Velten-plus-Music and Music procedures kept induced mood
relatively stable over time. Mood induced by the Velten-plus-Music procedure was still
elevated 18 minutes after induction. Compared to previous findings that the durations of
the induced depression by the Velten procedure lasted approximately 10 minutes with a
significant decrease in its strength (Frost & Green, 1982), the Velten-plus-Music
procedure increased the duration up to 18 minutes or more. These results suggest that
the transient effect of the Velten procedure on mood could be overcome by playing
music throughout an experimental session. So the relatively long duration of the induced
mood could make the Velten-plus-Music most appropriate for studies of induced mood
on cognition, provided the music does not interfere with the cognitive task studied.
Even though the Music procedure was developed as an alternative to the Velten

procedure, in this study its initial effect on mood is weaker than either the Velten-plus
Music or the Velten procedure, but its effect on mood lasted longer than the Velten
procedure. Hence rather than using the Music procedure alone, it is desirable to use
music with the Velten procedure to sustain the initially induced mood. This argument is
contrasted with the Clark (1983) study, which compared two independent studies using
the Music and Velten procedures respectively (Teasdale & Russell, 1982; Clark &
Teasdale, 1982). The results showed that the Music procedure induced a more severe
depressed mood than the Velten procedure. This difference from current results could be
due to different musical characteristics used in both studies.
All the depression induction procedures used here increased the level of anxiety
immediately after mood induction. As with induced depression, this effect decreased over

time. These results are consistent with previous findings (Slyker & McNally, 1991) but
also imitate naturally occurring depression (cf. Watson & Kendall, 1989)
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CHAPTER 6
Serial Recall in Verbal Short-Term Memory in Naturally Occurring
and Induced Depression

The effect of depression on verbal short-term memory (STM) has been
extensively explored in several studies, but the findings have been inconsistent. Part

the reason for this is that a variety of tasks have been used to assess STM including t
Brown-Peterson paradigm, serial list learning, immediate recall of supraspan lists and
conventional memory span (e.g., Berndt & Berndt, 1980; Colby & Gotlib, 1988;
Dannenbaum, Parkinson & Inman, 1988; Friedman, 1964; Gass & Russell, 1986; Henry,
Weingartner, & Murphy, 1973; Krarnes & MacDonald, 1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986;
Richards & Ruff, 1989; Slife, Miura, Thompson, & Shapiro, 1984). Another possible

reason is that different kinds of depressive populations have been used in these studie

ranging in severity from hospitalised depressed patients, through depressed outpatients

and the depressed elderly to dysphoric college students. The issue of whether dysphoric
populations can be regarded as analogues of clinical depression has recently been
reviewed by Vrendenburg, Flett and Krarnes (1993), who concluded that similar effects
of depressed mood were observed in dysphorics and clinical patients.
The following studies employing serial recall will be addressed under the
assumption that memory span is dependent upon rehearsal process (Baddeley, Thomson,
& Buchanan, 1975; Baddeley, 1986). Krarnes and MacDonald (1985) used a free recall

test for words while varying a concurrent digit load. Their results showed that for the

primacy component of free recall, depressed patients recalled fewer words than controls
if there was no concunent load. As the digit load increased, recall in depressives

improved relative to the controls, and with a six-digit load the two groups performed a
about the same level They concluded that depressives have difficulty in maintaining
information, perhaps arising through rehearsal difficulty. One problem with this
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interpretation is the extent to which free recall performance as a whole reflects S T M ,
Much evidence suggests that free recall recency is a separable component of free recall,
perhaps reflecting STM. However, this component is itself dissociable from STM as
measured by memory span (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Richardson & Baddeley, 1975).
The primacy component of free recall is considered to be a measure of long-term

memory, since it is resistant to post-list interference, although it may reflect rehearsa
processes during the early part of list presentation. Krarnes and MacDonald proposed
that the deficit in free recall primacy arose through depressive thoughts which competed
for STM capacity at the beginning of the list. As memory task demands increased, these
depressive thoughts were displaced from STM and so the difference between groups
disappeared. However, no attempt was made to measure the extent of these depressive
thoughts during the task.
Colby and Gotlib (1988) employed a modified digit span task to assess short-term
memory functioning with dysphoric college students. This procedure involved
simultaneous presentation of supraspan lists of 8 or 10 digits, which were visible for 8
10 seconds respectively. They found that dysphoric students performed as well as

controls on a test of immediate recall, but showed deficits if recall took place after a 2
or 30 second unfilled retention interval. They interpreted their results as a failure of

rehearsal. While this interpretation is quite plausible, it is not clear to what extent t

task involves the same cognitive processes as traditional memory span. Neither this study
nor that of Krarnes and MacDonald (1988) investigated rehearsal processes directly,
Slife et al. (1984), used simultaneous presentation of 16 CVC trigrams presented
for 30 seconds followed by immediate free recall over three successive learning and
recall trials. Part of their aim was to investigate memory bias, but their results also
showed that elderly depressed subjects recalled fewer trigrams than matched controls.
This could be interpreted as a short-term memory deficit. However, no difference
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between groups appeared on thefirsttrial, suggesting that the difficulty arose in longterm learning.
Henry et al. (1973) investigated serial recall of 8-word lists over six successive
trials in bipolar and unipolar depressives, comparing each individual's performance at
different times when the severity of depression varied. They reported no effect of
severity of depression on serial recall for the first trial, but a significant difference

found for later trials. They claimed that depressed patients had difficulties in transferr
information from short-term to long-term memory
Berndt and Berndt (1980) used the Brown-Peterson paradigm with a ten second
filled retention interval and did not find any differences between dysphoric students and
nondysphoric controls. This memory task uses interference to prevent rehearsal, and

measures the decline in recall across retention intervals. Certain anomalies in this task,
particularly performance on the first trial, question the extent to which it assesses STM
(Keppel & Underwood, 1962). Thus the fact that there is no difference between
dysphorics and normals may be due to the control of rehearsal opportunities, or to the
fact that once again LTM is being assessed here.
A number of studies have compared depressed subjects and normals using digit
span to assess STM. Although Friedman (1964) suggested STM deficits in clinical
depression based on a wide variety of measures, he found no evidence of any STM
deficit using digit span. Similarly, both Richards and Ruff (1989) and Gass and Russell
(1986) failed to detect deficits in the digit span tasks of the WAIS (Wechsler, 1981) in

clinically depressed populations. Similarly, in Kule and Helle's (1986) study, no deficits
of word span were found in clinically depressed patients under normal conditions,
although differences were found when intentions were manipulated.
However, some studies have reported deficits in memory span with depression.
Rappaport (1968) reported that poor performance on digit span was commonly observed
in depressed patients. Breslow, Kocsis and Belkin (1980) showed impairments on the
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digit span subtest of the Wechsler M e m o r y Scale in hospitalised depressed patients
compared with a matched control group. A recent study by Dannenbaum, Parkinson, and

Inman (1988) investigated delayed recall of letters, using list lengths which were adju
in relation to individual subjects' letter spans. Short-term forgetting was examined by
asking for recall immediately or after a filled retention interval of 6.3 seconds. They
reported no difference in short-term forgetting rates between depressed and normal
elderly subjects when this adjustment was made. However, in assessing letter span, they

found that the depressives had lower spans than controls. These results were interprete
as showing encoding and storage deficits in depressives. In sum, serial recall in
depression was explored using diverse tasks and met with inconsistent findings.
Furthermore, most of studies were conducted without a clear theoretical framework. In

contrast with those studies mentioned earlier, Channon, et al. (1993b) extensively stud
short-memory functioning in terms of working model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) on range

of tasks exploring the articulatory loop, visuospatial sketch pad, and central executive
They concluded that both articulatory loop and visuospatial sketch pad remain intact in
clinical depression and rather central executive functioning appears impaired,
The framework adopted here for exploring STM in depression is the working
memory model proposed by Baddeley and his colleagues (e.g., Baddeley, 1986;
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 1975). According to this
model, performance in serial recall tasks such as memory span, is determined by a
dedicated component of working memory called the articulatory loop. Extensive

experimental work has shown that immediate serial recall is sensitive to the phonologic
similarity of list items (Conrad & Hull, 1964), the length of words estimated by their
spoken duration (Baddeley et al, 1975; Cowan, Day, Soults, Keller, Johnson, & Flores,
1992; Schweickert & Boruff, 1986), and by unattended speech or particular kinds of
nonspeech noise (Jones & Macken, 1993; Salame & Baddeley, 1982 ). With auditory
presentation, the effects of phonological similarity are resistant to the effects of
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articulatory suppression (rapid articulation of a short sequence of words such as

"one..two..three"), whereas the effect of speech rate can be blocked by this manipulation
under some circumstances (Baddeley, Lewis & Vallar, 1984). Hence the articulatory
loop is believed to consist of at least two components: an auditory store and a rehearsal

mechanism. In serial recall tasks, rehearsal of the items is used to preserve their order
recycling items through the store. The capacity of the loop is thus determined by the

duration of information in the store multiplied by the rehearsal rate. Since rehearsal is
assumed to be internal speech operating at something like overt speech rates (Landauer,
1962), there should be a close relationship between speech rates and memory span. This
relationship has been found to exist across normal adults (e.g., Baddeley et al, 1975),
across children of different ages (e.g., Nicolson, 1981) and across languages where
familiar terms differ in spoken duration (e.g., Ellis & Hennelly, 1980).
The articulatory loop is a dedicated component or slave system of the working
memory model, and one which is particularly adapted to serial recall tasks. Another

important component is the central executive, which is believed to allocate tasks to slav
systems and to regulate control processes. The properties of this component are poorly
understood, but it seems to be called upon in tasks requiring a high mental load, in
circumstances where two tasks are performed concurrently, and in tasks where strategy
decisions have to be made.
As explained previously, attempts to find STM deficits in depressed or dysphoric

subjects have met with inconsistent results, which can be attributed to the use of divers
and non-standard tasks which may draw on different components of cognition. The
cunent experiments address the issue of whether dysphoric mood affects performance in

standard serial recall tasks, thereby exploring the effect of dysphoria on the articulato
loop component of working memory. An effect of dysphoria on serial recall could take
place by inefficient encoding, disordered or slow rehearsal, or by reduced central
capacity. As reviewed earlier, a number of theories have been put forward to explain
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cognitive deficits occurring with depressed mood. Their possible implications for deficits
in serial recall are discussed.
First, Brewin (1988), on the basis of negative schemata theory (Beck, 1967)
argued that negative automatic thoughts generated by negative schemata intrude into
depressed people's minds either with or without awareness. According to this account
such thoughts may impair STM performance by reducing central capacity, or by
interrupting articulatory rehearsal.
Hasher and Zacks (1979) proposed that depressed mood imposes limits on
central capacity, and hence suggested that memory deficits would be found in difficult
tasks requiring effortful processing, such as rehearsal and elaboration, rather than in
automatic processing. Unfortunately, their theory did not address the question of how
depression reduces attentional capacity. More recently, Hasher and Zacks (1988) have
produced a revised theory of mental performance deficits, originally applied to ageing,
but also claimed to apply to depression (p. 194). According to this model, depressive
memory deficits may arise from an inefficient inhibition mechanism, which plays the
important role of preventing personal memories or other unwanted thoughts from
entering working memory space. Hence depressive memory deficits can be explained by
the intrusion of task-inelevant thoughts. Hasher and Zacks (1988) provide examples
such as: inelevant environmental details, personalistic memories or concerns, and off
goal-path interpretations. Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) also proposed that under depression

attentional capacity is taken up by task-inelevant processing. Memory deficits arise from
competition between tasks demands and these irrelevant thoughts.
A recent review by Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez & Dykman (1993) concluded that
depression causes deficits in tasks which require effortful processing, but not in tasks
which require only automatic processing. They proposed that the deficit was due to a
combination of two factors: a reduction in the total available cognitive capacity and a

focussing of attention on task-irrelevant thoughts. All these theories are very similar i
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that they emphasise the role of thought intrusions and argue that such intrusions should
reduce central attentional capacity.
Another aspect of depression which may affect STM performance is that
depressives show retarded psychomotor functioning (Friedman, 1964; for a review see
Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews, 1988). If psychomotor retardation in
depression also slows speech rate, then according to the working memory model,
rehearsal efficiency and memory span will decrease. Moreover, a measure of speech rate
has been used as an index of psychomotor retardation. For example, Teasdale, Fogarty,
& Williams (1980) asked subjects to count from 1 to 10 under elated conditions or under
negative mood induction. They found that mean pause time was correlated with the
increase in dysphoria occuring on mood induction.
The cunent experiment explores the effects of mild dysphoria on performance in
memory span tasks. The purpose of the first experiment was to investigate the
effectiveness of maintenance rehearsal over prolonged retention intervals in dysphoric

students and normal controls, using a serial recall task. If dysphorics have difficultie
sustaining rehearsal, then performance should decline more rapidly in dysphorics
compared to normals. This might occur for example if task-irrelevant or other intrusive

thoughts disrupted the rehearsal process. On the other hand if rehearsal rate was slowed

by depression, then this should affect initial encoding, leading to a deficit in immedia
serial recall Measures were also taken of speech rate, the frequency of negative
automatic thoughts (ATQ-N; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), and the frequency of taskirrelevant thoughts (Sarason, 1980) occurring throughout the experiment, to determine
the relationship, if any, between these measures and STM performance.

Experiment 3A
Method
Subjects
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T w o hundred and thirty-six first-year Psychology undergraduates at the
University of Wollongong were screened for dysphoric mood. Sixteen nondysphorics
and fifteen dysphorics served as subjects. In the screening procedure, subjects were
tested in groups of 10 - 20 and were administered the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Beck, 1967) together with other measures such as the State-trait Anxiety Scale and the
Style of Thinking Questionnaire, which are not relevant to the purpose of this study.

BDI is a self-report questionnaire of 21 items used to measure the severity of depress
with scores ranging from a possible 0 to 63. Subjects who scored less than 5 or more
than 10 on the BDI were classified as nondysphorics and dysphorics respectively, and
were individually contacted to participate in the experiment. At the time of the
experiment, 2-4 weeks after the initial contact, another administration of the BDI was
given. Subjects who met the same criterion on this retest were admitted to the
experiment, following the procedure recommended by Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen
& Ingram (1987). At retest, the mean BDI score for the nondysphoric group was 1.38
(SD = 1.26), and for the dysphorics the mean BDI was 18.2 (SD - 5.52),
Materials
The digit span task was presented using a President AT-compatible computer
driving a Philips colour monitor using VGA graphics. Each digit was displayed in white
on a black ground and measured 230 mm high by 130 mm wide. Each series of digits
used consisted of six numbers randomly drawn from the range 1 - 9 without replacement.
Responses were made using the computer keyboard. To measure negative and taskirrelevant thoughts occurring at the time of the experiment (cf, subjects were tested
the negative version of the Automatic Thought Questionnaire (ATQ) and the Cognitive
Interference Questionnaire (CIQ). The ATQ lists 30 negative self-statements and then
asks subjects to rate on a 5-point Likert scale how frequently each self-statement
occuned to them during the cunent experiment (e.g., I wish I were somewhere else).
The CIQ consists of 12 items inquiring about the frequency of any task-irrelevant
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thoughts which occuned during the experiment (e.g., "I thought about the purpose of
the experiment").
Procedure
Upon arriving at the experimental room, subjects were given the second
administration of the BDI. Subjects who responded differently from their first BDI test

were dismissed. In the digit span task, the subject initiated each trial by a key press. A

series of six digits was displayed sequentially at rate of 1.5 seconds per item. The seri
was followed by a blank retention interval of 1, 8, or 15 seconds in length, after which
three hash symbols (###) were displayed. Subjects then typed in the numbers on the

keypad on the right side of keyboard. There were 30 trials, ten trials at each of the thre
retention intervals, presented in a random order.
Upon the completion of the span task, the ATQ and CIQ were administered. A
measure of speech rate was then taken. To measure speech rate, subjects were asked to
read aloud a set of three digits repeatedly as fast as they could. Their speech was
recorded on a casssette recorder, from which measurements were made of the time taken

to articulate ten repetitions of the set. The procedure was repeated five times, each time
using a different set of digits, and the average of these five attempts was used as the
mean speech rate.

Results and Discussion
Digit span
The digit span data were scored in two ways: first as the percentage of digits
output in the conect serial position and secondly as the percentage of series which were
completely conect. Both measures yield similar results, so here only the first measure is
reported. The mean percentage of digits correct are provided in Table 6.1, and show that
overall performance was high and at about the same level for both nondysphoric and
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dysphoric groups. In both groups performance remained high across all retention
intervals.

Table 6.1 Percentages of items recalled conectly in three retention intervals
Retention interval (sec)
1
8_
15
Group
Nondysphoric
91.46
91.15
91.25
(11.70)
subjects (n=16)
(9,93)
(11.62)
Dysphoric 93.33 91.78
subjects (n=l5)

(6.30)

(9.73)

91.44
(8.99)

( ) indicates standard deviations.

The absence of any effect of mood or of retention interval was confirmed by analysis o

variance with mood as the between-subjects factor and retention interval as the withi
factor. Using percentage of items conect as the dependent measure, there was no

evidence of any effect of mood, F(l,29) < 1.0, or of retention interval, F(2,58) < 1.0
Nor was there any evidence of an interaction, FJ2.58) < i o.

Speech rate
The mean speech rate for the nondysphoric group was 4.35 digits/sec (SD =
0.82), and the mean speech rate for the dysphoric subjects was 4.38 digits/sec (SD =
0.74). There was no significant difference between groups, t(29)=.31, nonsig.
ATQ
The mean number of automatic negative thoughts reported by the dysphoric
group was 45.07 (SD = 15.28), and the corresponding values for the nondysphoric
group was 33.56 (SD = 5.69). The difference in frequency of reported thoughts was
significant, t(29) = 2.74; p < .01. Thus dysphoric subjects reported more negative

thoughts during the course of the experiment. This would be expected given the negati
memory bias associated with dyshoric mood (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). However, the
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increased frequency of negative thoughts did not seem to have a deleterious effect on
STM performance.

CIQ
Using the CIQ, dysphoric subjects reported more task-irrelevant thoughts during
the task performance (mean = 30.73; SD = 8.36), compared to nondysphoric subjects
(mean = 22.69; SD = 7.29). The difference in reported frequency of irrelevant thoughts
was again significant, t(29)=2.86,p<01.
The results of this experiment showed no difference between dysphoric and
nondysphoric subjects on immediate serial recall or on speech rate measures. Together
these findings suggest that the functioning of the articulatory loop is not affected by
dysphoric mood states. Moreover, there was no evidence of any decline in performance
across retention intervals for either group. Thus subjects in both groups were able to
maintain rehearsal throughout these unfilled retention intervals. However, there was a
significant difference in the frequency of negative automatic thoughts and task-irrelevant
thoughts reported by the two groups. If it is true that dysphoric subjects experience more
task-irrelevant thoughts, then these results suggest that such thoughts do not interfere
with the functioning of the articulatory loop, or act to disrupt extended periods of
maintenance rehearsal.
This experiment measured serial recall using six-digit sequences, which although
it is believed to engage most of the capacity of the articulatory loop, is regarded as a
relatively easy task. Performance in both subject groups was high, and it is possible that
any difference in performance is partly obscured by ceiling effects. Another experiment
with longer sequences of 7 digits was repeated. Colby and Gotlib (1988), using a
nonstandard STM task, reported a decline in performance over long retention intervals
(20-30 seconds). Since the retention intervals used here were shorter, this experiment
would not have detected either a very slow decay, or late-onset decay occurring after 15
seconds. Thus the second experiment increased the retention intervals.
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Experiment 3B
This experiment was similar to Experiment 3 A except that the digit load and the
duration of retention intervals were increased, According to Hasher and Zacks (1979),
Hartlage et al. (1993) and Ellis and Ashbrook (1988), memory deficits in depression will
only occur when processing is effortful If so, then increasing the demands of the task
should result in reduced performance in dysphoric subjects.

Method
Subjects
18 nondysphoric and 17 dysphoric subjects were drawn from the same pool of
students, using the same selection criteria as in Experiment 1. In this case, the second
B D I test was administered 4 - 5 months after initial screening. M e a n B D I was 15.83
(SD = 7.13) for the dysphoric group and 2.06 (SD = 1.70) for the non-dysphoric group.
N o n e of the subjects had participated in Experiment 3A.
Materials
Sequences of 7 digits were presented visually at a rate of 1.5 sec per digit, with
retention intervals of 1, 20 and 30 seconds. Otherwise the materials were as for
Experiment 3A.
Procedure
Subjects completed the serial recall task, speech rate measures, and the
questionnaires in the same order as in Experiment 3 A. In measuring speech rate, subjects
read sequences of 6 digits, rather than 3 digits. Otherwise the procedure was the same
as for Experiment 3 A.

Results and discussion
Serial recall
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Serial recall w a s measured using two indices of performance, as for Experiment
3A. Table 6.2 shows the percentage of items recalled in the conect serial position. The
results show that scores were lower with the increased memory load, and clearly avoided
ceiling levels. Performance was slightly higher in the nondysphoric group and decreased
in the longest retention interval

Table 6.2 Percentages of items recalled conectly in three retention intervals,
Retention intervals (sec)

1

20

30

84.05

84.84

81.43

(12.88)

(14.84)

(16,51)

83.70

80.42

76.22

(10.77)

(11.42)

(10.90)

Group
Nondysphoric
subjects (n=l 8)

Dysphoric
subjects (n= 17)

( ) indicates standard deviations.
A two-way A N O V A (2 groups x 3 retention intervals) was carried out using retention
interval as the within-subject factor and using the percentage of items recalled as the
dependent measure. In terms of the number of items conectly reported, there was no
difference between nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects, E(l,33) < 1.0, However, there
was an effect of retention interval, F(2,66) = 3.32; p < .05, but again no interaction of
group and retention interval, E(2,66) < 1.0. The results show that there was some loss of
information over time over the longer retention intervals of this experiment, but the rate
of loss did not differ between groups. W h e n the percentage of series conect was used as
the dependent measure, no significant effects were found,
Speech rate
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Speech rate measures were not obtained for one dysphoric and two nondysphoric
subjects due to recording failures. For the remaining subjects the mean speech rate was
4.23 digits/sec (SD = 0.65) for the dysphoric group and 4,24(SD = 1.39) for the
nondysphoric group. Again, there was no significant difference between groups, t(30)
=.04, nonsig.

ATQ and CIQ measures
For the ATQ the mean score for nondysphorics was 38.17 (SD = 8.78), and for
dysphorics the mean was 48.18 (SD =15.1). The corresponding values for the CIQ were
24.39 (SD = 7.86) for non-dysphorics and 30.47 (SD = 7.52) for the dysphorics. Both
measures showed a significant difference between groups: for the ATQ, t(33)=2.38, p
< 05 and for the CIQ, t(33)=2.34, p < 05.
Increasing the memory load in this experiment led to lower scores and removed

the possibility of any ceiling effects. Nevertheless, as for Experiment 3A, no differenc
between groups was observed. Thus no evidence was found here to suggest that mild

dysphoria has any effect on serial recall. However, in this experiment there was an effe

of retention interval, indicating that subjects in both groups found it difficult to mai
the items over the longer retention intervals used here. Let us assume that articulatory
rehearsal is responsible for mamtaining a series of items under these conditions. If
rehearsal was impaired in dysphorics, perhaps by the increased incidence of taskirrelevant thoughts, we would expect to find a faster loss of information over extended

retention intervals. No such evidence was found. Moreover, in terms of articulation rate,
dysphorics performed at a similar level to normal controls. A strong conelation was
found between serial recall and speech rate across subjects, r(32) = 0.53, p < .002,
supporting the view that the articulatory loop was functioning normally in this task,
These first two experiments indicate firstly that the articulatory loop seems to

operate normally in dysphoric subjects, and secondly, that despite the increased inciden
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of inelevant thoughts, maintenance rehearsal can operate over prolonged retention
intervals. Thus task-inelevant thoughts do not interfere at the level of the articulatory
loop, for example, by disrupting rehearsal Experiment 3C investigated this question
further by examining the word length effect of serial recall. Once again, naturallyoccurring dysphorics were included, and we also included a sample of mood-induced
dysphorics. Previous studies have shown that after dysphoric mood induction, subjects'
counting rates are slowed and show longer pause times between successive numbers
(e.g., Teasdale, & Taylor, 1981). Thus we might expect to find reduced memory span in
induced dysphorics which is attributable to reduced speech rate.

Experiment 3C
The previous experiments have shown no significant depressive memory deficits
in immediate serial recall with list lengths approximating the memory span limit. More
specifically, there was no evidence of any impairment in rehearsal, either in terms of
speech rate measures or in terms of the maintenance of information over prolonged
retention intervals. In terms of the working memory model, these results suggest that the

articulatory loop functions normally in naturally occurring dysphorics. A more direct test
was made in the cunent experiment, in which word span was measured for lists of short

and long words. In normal subjects, the span length is related to the articulation rates o
the words, so that span for long words is less than for short words. This word length
effect is believed to arise from articulatory rehearsal. Hence if normal rehearsal

processes operate in dysphorics, it is expected to find clear word length effects of simil
magnitude as for nondysphorics.
In previous studies of dysphoria using mood induction techniques, Teasdale and
colleagues (Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) used speech rate to
assess the extent to which mood induction had been successful. Their procedure for
assessing speech rate was to ask subjects to count from 1 to 10 in their own time. With
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this measure, they reported slower speech rates with induced dysphoria compared to
induced elation. However, these studies did not include neutral controls, so it is not clear
whether the differences in speech rate was due to either slowed speech rate in induced
dysphoria, or faster speech due to induced elation, as Goodwin and Williams (1982)
pointed out. In these studies, speech rate was not related to S T M performance. In
working memory studies (e.g., Baddeley et al., 1975), speech rate is usually measured by
asking subjects to repeat a series of stimuli as fast as possible. Experiments 3 A and 3 B
show that, using this measurement, there is no difference between naturally occuning
mild dysphorics and controls. In this experiment, m o o d induction of dysphoric and elated
moods was used to determine the effect, if any, of these induced m o o d states on speech
rates estimated by rapid repetition of words,
Method
Subjects
Fourteen naturally occurring dysphorics were selected from a different population
of psychology undergraduates, using a similar procedure to Experiment 3 A. The
naturally depressed subjects were those w h o scored 9 or more on the B D I during initial
screening (the criterion used by Greenberg & Alloy, 1989) and again at the time of the
experiment, which took place 2 - 3 months later. Subjects with B D I scores below 9
during the initial screening procedure were contacted and randomly assigned to the
neutral, induced depression or induced elation conditions. The number of subjects was
48; 18 neutral controls, 16 induced dysphorics, and 12 elated subjects. All subjects
received course credits or a small sum of money in return for their services.
Materials
T w o pools of ten words were adapted from those used in Experiment V I of
Baddeley, et al., (1975). O n e set consisted of monosyllabic words, the other of words of
five syllables. Each set consists of one word from each of the original 10 semantic
categories, except that here English place names were replaced by Australian place
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names. From each word pool, a set of 20 five-word lists was made by sampling at
random without replacement. Words were displayed in uppercase on an IBM-AT
compatible computer at a rate of one word every 1.5 seconds.
The VMIP (Velten, 1968) was administered using only the last 30 statements of

the original 60 statements. For the dysphoric and elated mood induction conditions, the

statements are self-referent in nature and gradually increase in intensity. Neutral mo
induction is accomplished using non self-referent statements. Music was also used to
supplement the VMIP. Pilot work from experiment 2A indicated that Sibelius' tone
poem, The Swan of Tuonela, was the most depressing piece of music, and the
contrasting pieces of neutral and elating music were those used by Pignatiello, Camp,
and Rasar (1986).
Procedure
Upon arrival at the experimental room, subjects completed the BDI and the version A of
the Depressive Adjective Check List (DACL; Lubin, 1965). The DACL has been often
used to assess a transient depression induced by mood induction procedures (e.g.,
Pignatiello et al, 1986; Chartier & Ranieri, 1989). Naturally dysphoric subjects were

given the neutral mood induction procedure. All other subjects were then given a neutr

dysphoric or elated mood induction procedure, consisting of administration of the Velt
sentences plus accompanying music of the appropriate mood. In each case, subjects read

the 30 Velten statements of the appropriate kind and were instructed to try to experie
the mood suggested by the statements. At the same time, music of the appropriate kind

(depressing, elating or neutral) was played through headphones. The music continued fo

the duration of the experiment, and subjects were instructed to feel the mood suggeste
by the music. After mood induction, all subjects answered the DACL version B to check
whether mood induction was successful.
The experiment began with four practice trials. On each trial a row of asterisks
was briefly displayed as a warning signal. Each word was then shown for 1 second, with
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0.5 seconds between each word. At the end of the list there was afive-seconddelay,
after which a question mark was displayed. This was the signal to begin oral recall,

which ten seconds were allowed. Subjects were instructed to say the words aloud in th

order presented, and to say "blank" if they could not remember a word in a particular
serial position.
Speech rate was measured at the end of the experiment. Subjects were asked to

read aloud as fast as possible a series of three words from the one of the pools. The
were timed by stop-watch for 10 repetitions of the series. This measurement was made

four times for each word pool, each time with a different series of words. To measure

negative and positive automatic thoughts, both the positive (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1988)
and negative forms of the ATQ were adminstered with all items mixed randomly.
Results and Discussion
Mood indices and Mood manipulation check
As shown in Table 6.3, the DACL-A and BDI administered prior to mood

induction showed that the naturally occurring dysphoric students had lower scores on
both tests than the other groups.

Table 6.3 Mean scores on mood measures.
Group
Neutral
Natural Dys. Induced Dys,
(n=16)
(n=18)
(n=14)
Measure
BDI
2.94
13.79
3,22
(2.82)
(2.76)
(4.34)

Elated
(n=12)
2.92
(2.81)

DACL-A

6.00
(3.93)

12.93
(3..63)

7.06
(3.75)

6.25
(2.22)

DACL-B

7.39
(5.66)

13.00
(4.84)

13.63
(4.50)

3.00
(2.00)

Note. ( ) indicate standard deviations. B D I = Beck Depression Inventory; D A C L =
Depression Adjective Ccheck List. D A C L - A and D A C L - B adminstered prior to and after
m o o d induction.

164

Analysis of variance showed that these pretest differences in m o o d between natural
dysphorics and the other groups were significant: for the BDI scores, F(3,56)=39.94, p
<.001 and for the DACL-A, F(3,56)=12.37, p <.001. Further analysis of the BDI and the
DACL-A scores using the Neuman-Keuls test showed that the naturally depressed
subjects were more dysphoric than the other three groups which did not differ.
For the mood manipulation effect, the DACL-B showed that the manipulation

was successful and that after induction there was a significant effect of group, F(3,56
16.09; p < .001. Comparison of groups using the Neuman-Keuls test showed that both
the natural dysphorics and experimentally depressed groups were significantly more
depressed than the other groups.
The elated group was also significantly different from the neutral group. Thus mood
induction, as measured by the DACL-B test was highly successful.
Serial recall

Table 6.4 The percentages of items recalled for short and long words.
Word Length
Short

Long

Neutral
group (n=18)

87.44(11.93)

49.17(15.18)

Natural
dys. (n=14)

84.29 (17.34)

52.57 (14.44)

Induced
dys. (n=16)

77.25 (17.75)

45.56 (19.14)

Elated
group (n=12)

84,67 (15.35)

45.25(19.75)

Group

( ) indicates standard deviations.

The data reported here are the percentage of words conectly recalled. The data
were analysed by a two-way ANOVA with one between subject factor (mood state) and
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one within-subject factor (word length). The scores are provided in Table 6.4 and show a
large word length effect, whereby recall of short words was superior to that for long
words, F(l,56)=331.19, p <,001. However, there was no difference between mood
states, F(3, 56) < 1.0, and neither was there any interaction between mood state and

word length, F(3,56) =1.0. These findings indicate clearly that there was no differenc
either in overall memory span or in the size of the word length effect across groups.
As shown in Table 6.5, there was no difference between groups in speech rate for
one-syllable words, F(3,56)=l,83, p > .05., nor for five-syllable words, F(3.56)=1.61,
>.05.
Table 6.5 Speech rate for short and long words
Group
Measure Neutral Natural Dys. InduccedDys. Elated
(n=18)
(n=14)
(n=16)

(n=12)

Short words 1.84 2.15 2.17 2.42
(1 syllable
(0.63)
(0.78)
words)

(0.59)

(0.73)

Long words 1.05 1,12 1.19 . 1.22
(5 syllable
(0.24)
(0.24)
words)

(0.24)

(0.26)

( ) indicates standard deviations

These findings indicate that natural or induced emotional mood states have little if a
effect on repetition measures of speech rate.

Negative automatic and task-inelevant thoughts
One subject in the neutral group failed to complete the ATQ, and one subject in
the induced depression group failed to complete both the ATQ and the CIQ. The mean
number of negative and positive automatic thoughts measured on the ATQ and task-

irrelevant thoughts measured on the CIQ are provided in Table 6.6, along with the rati
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depressives, there was an increase in the number of negative thoughts, relative to the
other groups, although this was not true of the induced depressives. The elated mood

induced group showed an increase in the frequency of positive thoughts. When analysed
in terms of the total number of positive and negative thoughts on the ATQ, there was
difference between groups, F(3, 54)=1.78, p > .05.

Table 6.6 The frequencies of inelevant thoughts as measured by the ATQ and the CIQ
Group
Measure

Neutral
(BF18)

Natural Dys. Induced Dys.
(n=16)
(n=14)

Elated
(n=12)

ATQ-P

47.82
(19.51)

42.57
(12.79)

44.73
(15.43)

63.75
(29.60)

ATQ-N

37.24
(8.33)

49.71
(21.56)

35.20
(7,61)

39.58
(12.85)

ATQ-P/ATQ-N

0.85
(0.24)

1.15
(0.22)

0.86
(0.29)

0.73
(0.30)

CIQ

28.56
(5.80)

31.43
(7.63)

29.13
(5.97)

28.17
(7.30)

Note. ( ) indicates standard deviations. A T Q - P = Positive Automatic Thoughts
Qustionnaire; A T Q - N = Negative Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; CIQ = Cognitive
Interference Questionnaire. N = 1 7 in A T Q - P and A T Q - N for Neutral controls, N = 1 5 in
ATQ-P, A T Q - N , and C I Q for Induced Dys,

These results suggest that approximately the same number of thought intrusions occur
in each group. However, the ratio of negative thoughts to positive thoughts did vary

across groups, F(3,54) = 6.41; p < .001, and post-hoc analysis using the Neuman Keuls

test showed that the naturally dysphoric group differed from all the other groups, b

there were no other significant differences. Thus the natural dysphorics experienced
higher proportion of negative thoughts compared to the other groups. The natural
dysphorics experienced more negative thoughts than positive ones as reported on the
ATQ: for negative thoughts, mean=49.71 (SD=21.56), and for positive thoughts

167

mean=42,57, (SD=12,79), This difference w a s marginally significant, t(13)=2.12, p
=,054. In contrast, the reverse is true of the neutral control group: for negative thoughts,
mean=37,24 (SD=8,33), and for positive, mean=47.82 (SD=19.51), which was
significant, t(16)=2.28, p <,05. O n the C I Q measure, groups did not differ in their
reportedfrequenciesof task-inelevant thoughts, F(3, 55)=.68, p > .05.
The present experiment clearly showed that depressive m o o d states do not affect
the size or nature of the word length effect in serial recall. The results also confirm those
of Experiments 3 A and 3 B that speech rate measures do not vary with either natural or
induced mood. If speech rate can be considered as an indirect measure of rehearsal rate,
then there is no evidence of any effect of m o o d state on rehearsal.
These results contrast with the rehearsal difficulty hypothesis argued by Hasher
and Zacks (1979) and Colby and Gotlib (1988). In their view, rehearsal is an effortful
process, of the type which is sensitive to depressed mood. Also in their recent review of
depressive m e m o r y deficits, Hartlage et al. (1993) argued that tasks requiring conscious
effort are likely to show depressive deficits. These results suggest that serial recall tasks
requiring rehearsal do not appear sensitive to depressed mood. Either rehearsal itself is
not effortful, in the sense used by these authors, or effortful processing alone is not
enough to reveal cognitive deficits in depression. The results cannot be explained simply
by saying that S T M deficits occur only in difficult tasks. Performance levels on the long
word lists w a s m u c h lower than those on the short words. Nevertheless, there was no
evidence that the depressed groups were particularly affected by the more difficult task
using long words. Together with Experiments 3 A and 3 B there is no evidence that
dysphoric subjects differ from normal subjects in terms of memory span performance or
rehearsal capabilities.
In terms of the working m e m o r y model, these findings suggest that the
articulatory loop system, responsible for rehearsal mechanism is not affected by
emotional m o o d

states. The articulatory loop is believed to hold speech-like
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representations and to be limited to the number of words subjects can speak within about
2 seconds (Baddeley et al., 1975; Schweickert & Boruff, 1986). The current data is
consistent with these estimates. The mean number of one-syllable words recalled was 4.2
and the mean number of five-syllable words recalled was 2.4. Mean speech rates for one
and five syllable words were 2.12 and 1.14 words/sec. Based on these averaged
measures, the function relating memory span to speech rate is given by:

memory span = 0.6 + 1.88 x speech rate

The total number of positive and negative automatic thoughts reported did not
vary across groups. However, the ratio of negative to positive thoughts did differ

significantly, in that naturally dysphoric students reported a higher proportion of nega
thoughts. Despite this preponderance of negative thoughts, the natural dysphorics did

not show any decrease in recall. Once again there is no evidence of a specific impairment
on STM brought about by negative automatic thoughts. However, since the total number
of task-inelevant thoughts remains constant across groups, it is possible that taskirrelevant thoughts in general use up STM capacity.
The results of these three experiments suggest that performance in traditional
serial recall STM tasks is preserved in dysphoric mood states, and that the articulatory
loop component of working memory appears to function normally. The final experiment
adapted the paradigm developed by Morris and Jones (1990) to determine if dysphoric
mood states have an effect on the operation of the central executive.

Experiment 3D
The capacity model of cognitive impairments in depression (Hasher & Zacks,
1988; Hartlage et al., 1993; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), proposes that depressed mood

states reduce the attentional resources available for the current task. The reason given
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this is that negative automatic thoughts and task-inelevant thoughts compete with taskrelevant thoughts for the limited central capacity. The previous experiments have shown
that if this reduced capacity occurs, it does not impair performance on standard serial
recall tasks. This would not be unexpected if the articulatory loop acts autonomously in
such tasks. The reduced capacity should however affect performance on tasks which
depend on the central executive. This was tested directly in the present experiment by
using the running memory span task developed by Morris and Jones (1990). This task
requires the subject to observe a series of items of unknown length and to report back

the six most recent items in serial order, It thus involves memory for serial order plus
updating component which operates when the list length exceeds six items. The task is
more complex than traditional memory span, since the strategies used must change
during the presentation of the list. As a supervisory attentional system, the central
executive should play a role in regulating these strategies (Morris & Jones 1990). The
task is considered as consisting of serial recall and updating components, tapping the
articulatory loop and central executive respectively. Hence, if dysphorics experience

reduced capacity in the central executive, the performance of dysphorics should decrease
relative to nondysphorics in conditions where updating is required.

Method
Subjects
Seventeen nondysphoric and seventeen dysphoric subjects were drawn from the
same subject pool used for Experiment 3C. Three subjects in each condition had also
participated in Experiment 3C. The criterion for inclusion in the dysphoric group was a
BDI score of 9 or above, and for the nondysphoric group a score of 5 or less. Otherwise,
the selection procedure was the same as for Experiment 1. The second administration of
the BDI was given 4 - 5 months after initial screening.
Materials
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A total of 40 lists of consonants were constructed, ten lists at each of four list
lengths, 6, 8, 10 and 12 items. No consonant appeared twice in the same list and any
obviously meaningful acronyms were deleted. Two lists of each length were used for
practice. Four sets of 8 lists were used in each condition. Lists were presented in a
randomized order with the constraint that no two lists with the same length should be
presented consecutively. Lists were presented on an IBM-compatible computer, as in
Experiment 3A
Procedure
Upon arrival, subjects filled out the BDI. If dysphoric subjects failed to reach the
criterion on this second administration of the BDI, they were dismissed. Subjects were
presented with the consonants displayed in the central location of the computer screen
a rate of one per second. At the end of the list three question marks were displayed,

which was the signal for recall of the consonants. Unlimited time was allowed for recall
Subjects wrote the last six consonants in six separate boxes on response sheets in the
conect (forwards) serial order.
Subjects were told that the length of a given list might be 6, 8, 10, or 12 items

long, and were instructed to recall the last six consonants. They were instructed to gue
if they could not remember one of these items. It was emphasized that some lists were
only six items long so they could not afford to ignore any items,

Results and discussion
Recall performance was scored by the percentage of correct items in each serial

position. The mean percentage of correct items are plotted for each group in Figure 6.1.
It can be seen that for a list length of six items (no updates) the dysphoric and
nondysphoric subjects performed at about the same level However, for longer series,
where updating was required, the dysphoric group had lower scores. A two way
ANOVA (2 groups vs. 4 updating condition) was carried out with updating conditions as
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a repeated measure. Main effects of group and updating factors were significant, F(l, 32)
= 5.28; p < .05, F(3, 96) = 23.46; p < ,0001, respectively, suggesting an overall
reduction in performance of depressed subjects. The expected interaction between
groups and updating conditions failed to reach significance, F(3, 96) = 1.97; j> = ,12,
This interaction may be weakened by the fact that the difference between dysphorics and
controls was constant across the three longest list lengths. A more powerful analysis
used contrasts between scores for a list length of six and the combined scores on all

other list lengths. When transformed in this way the main contrast effect was very highl
significant, F(l,32)=50.27, p < .0001, and there was a significant interaction between
group and list length contrast, F(l,32>=4.27, p < .051. These results suggest that the
updating process itself leads to memory impairment in depression.
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Morris & Jones' (1990) study 2 used three updating conditions (2,4,6) and three treatment conditions
(quite treatment, articulatory suppression, and irrelevant speech). Subjects had to reca
items. Three main effects including updating, treatment, and serial position were signi
F(3.33)=7.50, p < 001, F(2,22)=24.97, p < 001, and F(5,55)=44.19, p < .0001 respectively
the interation between updating and treatment was not significant, F(6,66) < 1
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Morris and Jones (1990) reported that this updating memory task relies on two
functions; one is rehearsal, mainly operated by the articulatory loop, and the other an
updating component involving the central executive. In this experiment a memory deficit
was revealed in dysphorics only with longer list lengths that require updating. It is not

clear whether this reflects a general impairment in the central executive in dysphorics, o
whether this task which makes demands on the central executive has properties (for
example effortfulness) which makes it sensitive to depression. However, the absence of
any such deficit when no updating is required confirms the results of Experiments 3 A 3C in showing that serial recall operates normally in dysphorics.

General Discussion
These experiments suggest that when a standard memory span task is used, there
appears to be no deficit in STM in dysphorics, either for immediate or delayed recall,
compared to controls. The dysphorics seem to show normal memory span performance

in terms of capacity, maintenance over unfilled retention intervals, the presence and size
of word-length effects and speech rates. These results contrast with the finding of Colby
and Gotlib (1988), who reported that dysphorics performed worse than controls at a task
involving delayed serial recall of simultaneously presented digits. However, dysphorics
showed no deficits on immediate recall, or any evidence of abnormal forgetting for short
lists. Both these results are consistent with normal articulatory loop functioning.
However, for longer lists, other components would be required to augment performance
and to preserve information throughout the extended retention intervals, and it is these
conditions which led to a deficit in performance in dysphorics. Colby and Gotlib (1988)
suggested that rehearsal processes might be impaired in dysphorics, but articulatory
rehearsal alone could not be used to maintain supraspan performance over extended
intervals, and hence could not explain the level of performance achieved by their control

subjects. One possibility is that the nondysphoric subjects adopted an elaborative strateg
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which increased L T M performance, whereas dysphoric subjects failed to do so. This
interpretation is related to the cognitive initiative deficit hypothesis proposing that
depression inhibits the spontaneous use of beneficial strategies for good performance in
memory tasks unless they are required to do so (Hertel & Hardin, 1991; Hasher &
Zacks, 1988; Abramson, et al, 1981).
A s this argument that dysphorics did not show memory deficits in the serial recall
of digits and words is based on the acceptance of nullfindings,power analyses on group
differences in the total recall performance were conducted with a a level as .05 to
support the argument. Unfortunately, except for experiment 3 D the level of power for
these experiments was relatively low, suggesting that the current experiments are
relatively insentive to the difference between dysphorics and nondysphorics. The results
showed that the power of experiments 3A-3C ranged from .20 to .40, but the power of
experiment 3 D w a s about .90. However, across the series of similar independent
experimental conditions across various dependent measures such as a speech rate,
consistent findings suggests that the lack of group differences can not be solely attributed
to the lowered power. In the case of the experiment 3 D with a high power of about 90,
there was still no depressive performance deficits in the serial component supposed to be
responsible for S T M when the running memory task was divided into the serial and
updating components. This conclusion was also consistent with one drawn by Channpn
et al. (1993b) study exploring the serial recall in terms of working memory model Finally
to avoid the lack of power and draw a strong conclusion, a further work is required with
the increased number of subjects in each group.

The role of negative automatic and task-irrelevant thoughts
In this study, two measures were used to assess the extent to which dysphorics
experienced intrusive thoughts during a serial recall task. In agreement with previous
investigations, the results of Experiments 3 A , 3B, and 3 C have shown that naturally
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occurring dysphorics report more negative automatic thoughts than controls. There was
no evidence of any increase in reported rates of negative thoughts in induced dysphoria,

The results for the CIQ, which measures task-irrelevant thoughts, were slightly different,
showing an increase in dysphorics in Experiments 3A and 3B, but not Experiment 3C.
The number of positive automatic thoughts was also measured using the ATQ in
Experiment 3C, and this showed that although naturally occurring dysphorics
experienced more negative thoughts during the experiment, they experienced fewer
positive thoughts. Thus the interpretation with respect to the number of disruptive
thoughts experienced in different mood states, depends to some extent on the measure
used.
The main finding here is that the increased frequency of reported irrelevant
thoughts in dysphorics does not produce any deficit in memory span. However, several
theories of cognitive deficits in depression (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook ,1988; Hasher &
Zacks, 1988) have proposed that depression-related thoughts (a general category which

probably includes both negative self-referent and task-irrelevant thoughts), interfere with
effortful processing, by competing for limited capacity resources. There are two possible
resolutions to this problem. One is that articulatory rehearsal, which is a commonly used
STM strategy, may not be an effortful process. This is consistent with a working
memory account whereby memory span is canied out by the quasi-autonomous
articulatory loop slave system, thus freeing the central executive. By this account,
negative thoughts may be severely disruptive to the central executive, but memory span
performance is sustained by an unimpaired articulatory loop. Part of the problem here is
that the nature of the thoughts themselves is unspecified. If they are auditory-verbal in

nature, for example internal speech, it would be expected that they utilise the articulato
loop and possibly interfere with rehearsal. On the other hand, if the thoughts take the
form of visual imagery, then no direct competition with the articulatory loop should
occur.
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The second possible resolution is that whereas negative automatic thoughts were
more common in dysphorics, the total frequency of intrusive thoughts, both positive and
negative, may not differ between normals and controls. If we assume that positive and
negative automatic thoughts are equally disruptive, then no difference in performance
between dysphorics and controls would be expected. Strictly, there is no evidence in

these experiments to support a particularly disruptive role for negative thoughts on seri
recall, since in Experiments 3 A and 3B the frequency of positive automatic thoughts was
not recorded. But the dysphorics also reported a higher incidence of task-irrelevant
thoughts, using the CIQ in Experiments 3A and 3B, but not Experiment 3C. Any
conclusion from these findings must be tentative, since the two self-report measures are
partially inconsistent. However, if we adopt the CIQ as a true measure of the frequency
of task-inelevant thoughts, then dysphorics (i) do seem to experience more frequent

intrusive thoughts than controls but (ii) the occurrence of these thoughts does not impai
serial recall.

The effect of dysphoria on articulation rate
Teasdale and Fogarty (1979) measured speech rate as an index of psychomotor
retardation in dysphoric mood states. They found that dysphoric mood slowed down
speech rate, as measured by an average pause time when subjects were asked to count 1
to 10 in their own time. If this were generally true, then we would expect dysphorics to
show impaired memory span, as there is a strong positive relationship between span and
speech rate (Baddeley et al, 1975). However our results provide no evidence
whatsoever for any speech rate retardation in either naturally occurring dysphorics
(Experiments 3A - 3C) or induced dysphorics (Experiment 3C). When subjects are asked
to repeat short lists of items as rapidly as possible, dysphorics perform as well as
controls. These results support the conclusion that the articulatory loop functions
normally in dysphorics. The same conclusion was drawn from the study exploring
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phonological similarity and word length effect among clinical depression, which are
assumed to tap the articulatory loop component in working memory model (Channon, et
al., 1993b).

Dysphoria and central executive functioning
In this study, dysphoria produced a memory deficit only in the running memory

span task (Experiment 3D). In this task subjects reported the last six digits of a series
which 6, 8, 10 or 12 digits were shown. There was no effect of mood state when only six

digits were presented. In this case the task is equivalent to simple serial recall of a s
item list, and the absence of any effect of mood confirms Experiments 3A - 3C.
However, a clear difference between dysphorics and controls emerged when rehearsal
updates were required. In this task, the component responsible for updating is

independent of the articulatory loop, since updating does not interact with the effects o
articulatory suppression or unattended speech. Monis and Jones (1990) argue that this
component is the central executive. Hence one interpretation of these results is that

dysphorics have a deficit in the central executive, an interpretation which is close in s
to the reduced attentional capacity theories outlined by Hasher & Zacks (1979) or Ellis
and Ashbrook (1988). Similarly, Channon et al. (1993b) suggest the possibility of an
impairment of central executive in depression because depressed patients showed
impairment on backward digit span task, and paced and unpaced auditory serial addition
test (PAS AT; Gronwell & Sampson, 1974), both of which are assumed to involve central
executive capacity.
There is one problem with this interpretation. If the central executive impairment
increased the probability of making an error on each update (perhaps by competition
from task-inelevant thoughts), then we should expect the two curves to diverge as the
number of updates increased. This does not happen and, as with Monis and Jones'(1990)

original data, performance does not decline after the first update. This pattern of resul
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suggests that the main source of difficulty lies in making thefirstupdate. Once this is
made, subsequent updates are added without further error. Thus one interpretation of
these results is that dysphorics have difficulty in making the appropriate change from a
simple rehearsal strategy to an updating strategy,

(4) Automatic and Effortful Processing
A number of studies have drawn the distinction between automatic and effortful
processing and have argued that only effortful processing is affected by dysphoria
(Hartlage, et al., 1993; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Colby & Gotlib, 1988). Within this
framework, rehearsal is considered by some (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979) to be an
effortful process. However the reduced capacity model by Hasher and Zacks (1979) did

not clearly distinguish between maintenance rehearsal and elaborative rehearsal (cf. Crai
& Lockhart, 1972, Craik & Watkins, 1973; for a review, see Greene, 1987). The
maintenance rehearsal is rote, repetitive and prolongs an items' accessibility without
leading to permanant memory trace, thus using a minimal cognitive capacity. In contrast,
elaborative rehearsal functions to enrich and elaborate the memory trace by adopting
process such as chunking, forming images, or recoding material in various way. With this

distinction, manintenance rehearsal can be seen as automatic, while elaborative rehearsal
as effortful So the current data suggests that depression do not interfere with
maintenacne rehearsal, since standard memory span tasks are assumed to rely upon rote
rehearsal, which is close to automatic processing. It could be argued that the updating
process in the running memory span task is effortful. To avoid circularity, we need to
have an independent criterion for establishing whether a task is effortful. The position
currently unsatisfactory, but the results suggest that effortfulness is not identical to
difficulty. When simple memory span was made more difficult by increasing the memory
load or word length, no differences were found between dysphorics and controls. It was
only when a need for making strategic deicions was added to the task that the effect of
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m o o d became apparent; that is when elaborative rehearsal is required by the task. So
with this distinction of types of rehearsal, a more accurate prediction can be made on
whether the rehearsal process would be interfered by depression.
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CHAPTER 7
Visual Recognition Memory in Naturally Occurring Depression

According to the continuum of automatic vs. effortful processing, the judgement
of frequency and the encoding of spatial information was categorised as an automatic
process (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In the judgement of frequency, depressed people could
perform as well as nondepressed people (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Hasher & Zacks, 1979,
study 3). However, whether the encoding of spatial location information is made
automatically even in the normal population is not clear (cf. Naveh-Benjamin, 1987,

1988, Ellis, 1990). In terms of criteria of automatic processing by defined by Hartlage e
al. (1993), and Hasher and Zacks (1979), automatic processing should not be affected by

the intentional vs. incidental learning, concurtent memory loads, and individual differe
such as depression. Nevertheless, these variables affected memory for spatial location
(Naveh-Benjamin, 1988), but not in the Ellis' (1990) study.
In relation to depression, Cooper and Marshall (1987) could not find any
difference between experimentally induced depression and normal controls in the recall

of the spatial location geometric figures. On the other hand, using the Block span task
based on Corsi's block sequence span, Richards and Ruff (1989) found that depressed
patients performed worse than normal controls in the delayed condition but not in the

immediate condition. Similarily, Channon et al. (1993b) did not find a disruptive effec
depression on the block span-immediate measure. Thus cunent evidence of automatic
processing of spatial information has been mixed in both normal and depressed
populations.
Little research has been done in the visual STM functioning under depressed
mood states, compared to verbal STM. The logic behind the verbal STM in the previous
experiments on verbal STM was extended to visual STM functioning in depressives in

the following experiments. It is assumed that visual STM is similarly based on rehearsa
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processes as in the verbal S T M and the question is asked whether depression interferes
with delayed recognition of visual matrix patterns, which relies on maintenance rehearsal.
If depressives have rehearsal difficulty with visual S T M , their recognition of visual
stimuli should deteriorate more rapidly over a delay period, relative to the
nondepressives.

Experiment 4A
Method
Subjects
The same subjects participated as in experiment 3 A with one nondysphoric
subject missing resulting in 15 subjects in each group.

Materials
A n I B M compatible 286 computer was used to present visual stimuli. 4 x 4 novel
abstract patterns were displayed, consisting of a rectangular matrix with cells which
could be either filled or unfilled. In each pattern, half of the cells were filled at random,
and the patterns were displayed for 2 seconds.

Procedure
Subject were screened out by administering the B D I twice, 2-4 weeks apart. O n
the initial test, subjects w h o scores more than 10 or less than 5 on the B D I were selected.
The second test was administered on the day of the experiment and subjects w h o met the
same category criteria were included. Half of subjects in each group received the verbal
testfirstand the other half received the reversed order. There was no order effect on
total visual recall, t(28) = 1.60, nonsig. The presentation of matrix patterns employed
three delayed recognition tests (1, 8, 15 seconds). Each retention interval was tested in
10 trials, totalling 30 trials for each subject. The order of retention intervals was
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randomly generated by the computer in each subject. After the retention interval, the
same matrix pattern was displayed with one illuminated cell missing. The location of the
missing cell was randomly generated by the computer. Subjects were instructed to point
to the missing cell. After pointing, the correct cell was displayed on the screen by the
experimenter. The number of conect trials, recognising the missing cell, were scored by
the experimenter.

Results and discussion
The number of conect trials were transformed into the percentage of total trials and
were subject to a two-way ANOVA (2 groups x 3 retention intervals: 1,8, 15 seconds)
with the repeated measure on delays. The percentage of correct trials is shown in the
table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1 The conect trials (%) in the recognition test of 4 x 4 matrix patterns among
dysphoric and nondysphoric groups over three retention intervals
1 second
delay

Retention intervals
8 seconds
delay

15 seconds
delay

Group
Nondysphorics
(n=15)

83.33
(14.48)

81.33
(16.85)

88.67
(10.60)

Dysphorics
(n=15)

76.00
(15.95)

77,33
(14.38)

82.20
(9.41)

( ) indicates the standard deviations.

In overall performance across retention intervals, nondysphorics appear to recognise
more than dysphorics, but it was not statistically confirmed, F(l,28)= 2.55 nonsig. No

significant effect of group was found, and only a marginally significant effect of reten
interval, F(2,56)=2.63, p=.08, was found.
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These results suggest that dysphorics are not different from nondysphorics in

their ability to rehearse visual stimuli once they encode it. This argument is based on t
finding that recognition performance of dysphorics did not deteriorate over retention
intervals more rapidly, relative to nondysphorics. Also a lack of group difference in
overall recognition performance implies no encoding difficulties with dysphorics.
However, these conclusions seem tentative because the figures in the table show that
dysphorics perform consistently worse than nondysphorics across retention intervals.
Another possible reason for this null finding in relation to group may be related to the
level of complexity of matrix patterns (4x4 matrix patterns; 16 cells), which is lower
than the average visual memory span (Wilson, Scott, & Power, 1987). The average
visual memory span in adults is about 14.3 cells illuminated (about 4x7 matrix; 28

cells), which means that the cunent matrix pattern is relatively easy. With these possible
problems considered, the following experiment was designed.

Experiment 4B
This experiment is similar to the experiment 4A except that task complexity of

the visual matrix patterns and the duration of the retention intervals are increased. A 5
5 matrix pattern was used and the increased retention intervals were 1, 15, 30 seconds.

Similarly, the purpose of this experiment is to test whether depression interferes with t
process of rehearsal of visual stimuli, which underlies visual STM. The number of
subjects in dysphoric and nondysphoric groups was 17. All subjects had participated in
experiment 3b on the same day. The order between verbal and visual tests was
counterbalanced across groups and subjects, and there was no significant effect of order
on total visual recall, t(32)=.80, nonsig. Other than these changes, all the other
procedural details are the same as in the previous experiment.

Results and discussion
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The proportion of correct trials is shown in the table 7.2 below. A two way
ANOVA (2 groups x 3 retention intervals) was carried out on subjects' percentage of
conect trials. As expected, a significant interaction between groups and retention
intervals was found, F(2,64)=3.16, p<.05. However, as shown in the table, performance
of dysphorics does not seem to deteriorate at longer retention intervals, relative to
nondysphorics. Similar to the previous experiment, the effect of retention interval was
significant, F(2,64)=6.42, p < 01, suggesting that overall recognition performance does
decrease at longer retention intervals.

Table 7.2 The conect trials (%) in the recognition test of 5 x 5 matrix patterns among
dysphoric and nondysphoric groups over three retention intervals

1 second
delay
Group
Nondysphorics
(n=17)

Retention intervals
15 seconds
30 seconds
delay
delay

60.59
(16.76)

Dysphorics 50.00 60.00 43.53
(n=17)
(22.91)

52.94
(22.57)

46.47
(24..73)

(20.92)

(19.02)

( ) indicates the standard deviations

The simple main effect analysis of the interaction, comparing averaged delayed retention
conditions vs. immediate condition, showed that the interaction was attributed to poor
performance of dysphorics in the immediate recognition test (1 second delay), suggesting
that their poor performance appears to be more associated with encoding difficulty than
with the maintenance rehearsal of stimuli, F(l,32)=4.08, p=.052. A similar result was
found in Sprock, Saccuzzo, and Alkinson's (1983) study. They found that depressed
people took longer to form a representation of the stimulus when backward masking was

used. These results are contradictory to the rehearsal difficulty hypothesis claiming tha
the rehearsal process, as an effortful cognitive process, will be impaired in depression
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(Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Colby & Gotlib, 1988). In contrast, Richards and Ruff (1989)
did find visual memory deficits as measured by a 20 second interference delayed block
span test in depressed outpatients but not in an immediate block span test. The block
span test requires subjects to serial recall the locations of blocks, which parallels the
memory span test. Similarly, Channon et al (1993b) did not find group difference on
immediate block span tests (forward and backward) among depressed patients. These
findings suggests that clinical depressives may suffer from impaired maintenance
rehearsal, not from encoding difficulty. The lack of group difference in the immediate
block span (Channon, et al., 1993b; Richards & Ruff, 1989) are contrast with the current

result, suggesting an encoding difficulty of visual matrix patterns. This discrepant findi
to the cunent study appears to he in procedural differences; the cunent study employed

mildly dysphoric students with a recognition test, while they used clinical depression wit

a recall test. In detail, the visual matrix pattern (12 cells illuminated) used in the cur
study was fixed in its task complexity, which is close to the average adult visual span
(14.3 cells, Wilson, et al., 1987). The block span test increases its complexity when
subjects are successful in the same level.
In addition, Richards and Ruff (1989) found depressive impairment in
visuospatial learning (Ruff-Light Trail Learning Test) but only minimal verbal learning
difficulties (Selective Reminding Test). Nor did they find memory span deficits in the

forward digit span test. On the basis of these results they claimed differential effects o
depression on visuospatial and verbal functioning. This differential effect of depression
on visual and verbal memory seems consistent with the current experiments provided that
the task difficulty across verbal and visual memory tasks used in the current experiments
is comparable. In effect, both 7 digit memory span and 5 x 5 matrix pattern tests appear
comparable in terms of task difficulty because both of them are close to the average
memory span of adults. Tentatively, it can be concluded that visuospatial memory
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functioning seems to be more impaired by depression than verbal memory span as long as
both visual and verbal memory span are underlied by maintenance rehearsal.
These results can be explained in terms of the working memory paradigm. In the
normal population, Monis (1987) explored the relationship among the central executive,
the visuo-scratch pad, and articulatory loop using visual patterns. He contends that the
maintenance rehearsal of visual patterns requires minimal resources of the central
executive, on the basis of the finding that once the encoding of visual pattern is
accomplished, delaying recall (20 seconds) did not cause a dramatic decline in
performance. In contrast, he claimed that encoding of visual patterns requires some
portion of the central executive resources. According to this argument, the current lack
of an effect of retention interval suggests that the visuo-spatial scratch pad remains
intact, accounting for the maintenance of rehearsal in dysphoric mood states. Rather,

these results suggests inefficient functioning of the central executive because difficul
of dysphorics appear to he in the encoding of visual stimuli. A possible reason for this
encoding difficulty is that dysphoric students do not pay full attention to the visual
stimuli due to their nanowing of attention due to depressive thoughts. This assumption
was supported from the results from the ATQ-N and the CIQ.
Dysphorics reported more frequent negative automatic and task-irrelevant
thoughts, relative to nondysphorics, t(32)=2.31, p < 05, t(31)=3.39, p <01 respectively.
However, conelation of these measures with performance was not significant, r=.07, r=.04 on the ATQ and CIQ respectively. The only significant correlation was found on a
separate question of "how much your mind wanders while you were doing the
experiment" on the CIQ, r=-,33 (one-tailed).
Finally, as a cautionary note, the power analysis was conducted on their total
recognition performance in experiment 4A and 4B because no difference between groups

could be found due to the lack of statistical power. Both analysis showed that the levels
of power at a=.05 was .55 and .31 in experiment 4A and 4B respectively. These
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relatively low power values suggest that the lack of difference in between groups m a y be

partly attributable to a insufficient statistical power. Therefore, whether rehearsal proce
is impaired by depression, requires a further work with a more powerful experimental
design.
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CHAPTER 8
Summary and Discussion
Several reviews showed that depression is characterized by memory deficits, but
did not discuss the distinction between short-term and long-term memory and any
differential predictions that might be made (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hartlage, et al.,
1993; Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). They put depressive

memory deficits on an automtic vs. effortful processing continuum (e.g., Hartlage, et al
1993) but such a cognitive effort approach was criticized by the lack of independent
measures of effort expended. Mitchell and Hunt (1989) claimed the concept of cognitive
effort as a cause-effect explanatory framework was inadequate for memory performance.
The cognitive effort account for depressive memory deficits was challenged by the

reduced initiative hypothesis, which restricted the cognitive effort account and can lea

to a more specific prediction of depressive memory deficits (e.g., Hertel & Hardin, 1991
Channon et al., 1993a).
There are several reasons why it is important to investigate depressive memory
deficits, particularly on neutral materials, without implication of emotional contents.
According to Williams et al (1988), some studies related to "mood and memory"

included only positive and negative materials without neutral materials, which provide a
baseline performance against which effects on emotional materials may be judged.
Another reason is that the neuropsychological tests for diagnosis rely on neutral
materials. As depression occurs concomitant with other mental disorders, it can be a
confounding factor affecting their performance (cf, Richards & Ruff, 19|°; Gibson,
1981). In this regard, it is important to determine whether depression interferes with
performance on neutral materials,
The thesis aimed to explore depressive memory deficits in terms of long-term
memory and short-term memory. The long-term memory process was investigated
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employing an elaboration precision manipulation in a subject-generated task condition,
and short-term memory was examined using memory span, including both verbal
visual tasks. In addition, due to some drawbacks with current mood induction

procedures (Clark, 1983), and some difficulties recruiting naturally occurrin
depressives, the combined method of VMTP and MMIP (Music Mood Induction

Procedure) was developed and its effectiveness in terms of duration and inte
induced depression was evaluated compared to the VMIP and MMIP over time.

Another focus of the thesis was to explore the role of negative/positive aut

thoughts, and task-inelevant thoughts in task performance. It is generally ac

such thoughts, particularly negative cognitions, have disruptive effects on t

performance for one reason or another, depending on the theoretical framework

Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Kuhl & Helle, 1986; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). However, mo

studies of memory performance did not measure the frequency of depressive th

even if they attribute memory deficits to depressive thoughts (e.g., Krarnes

1985). Moreover, it is not clear which attribute of depressive thoughts are r

for memory deficits; for example, frequency, controllability, individual mean

or content of the thoughts (positive vs. negative). Contrary to such impairin

depressive thoughts on memory performance predicted by the major theoretical

frameworks, Williams et al (1988, chap. 2) suggested that it is not clear whe
depressive thoughts are negatively conelated with performance.

8.1 Duration and Intensity of Induced Depression by the Combined VMTP and
MMIP
As an alternative approach to natural depression, the VMIP has been widely

employed to study depression-associated variables such as negative memory bia

psychomotor retardation in the context of experimentally induced depression.

convenience, several problems using the VMIP were raised (e.g., Polivy & Doyl
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Sutherland, et al., 1982); for example, demand characteristics, suggestibility of subjects,

and multiple affects induced. The problem of the VMIP, related to the current studies
that the duration of induced depression by the VMIP may not be long enough for some
investigators to complete the task (cf. Clark, 1983; Ellis & Seibert, & Herbert, 1990;

Polivy, 1981, study 2). Thus, inconsistent findings in cognitive and behavioural vari
may be attributed to a short-lived induced depression (Clark, 1983). The current study
investigated the relative effectiveness of the combined procedure of the VMIP and
MMTP in terms of duration and intensity over time. Four mood induction procedures
were compared, while subjects undertook a sentence completion task: (i) the reduced
VMIP, (ii) the MMTP (iii) the VMIP plus MMTP, and (iv) Neutral music procedure. As
predicted, the VMIP plus MMTP showed a more stable and strong mood change than
either the VMIP or MMTP as measured by the DACL and VAS-depression. Compared
to the VMIP plus MMIP, the VMTP alone elevated depressed mood to the same extent
in the beginning, but it dissipated rapidly over time. The effects of MMTP on mood were
weaker than either the VMTP plus MMIP or the VMIP, but lasted longer than the
VMIP. In sum, these results suggest that the transience of depression induced by the
VMIP could be overcome by playing music throughout an experimental session,

provided that the music does not interfere with the cognitive task studied. The level

anxiety was elevated by all depression mood induction procedures, but dissipated over

time. This coexistence of depressed and anxious mood states imitates naturally occuni

depression (cf. Watson & Kendall, 1989). Taken together, these results suggest that th
VMIP plus MMIP is a better method than either MMTP or VMIP alone,

8.2 Long-term Memory and Precise Elaboration.
Several studies suggest that depressive memory deficits will be found in tasks
requiring elaborative processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1988; Williams, et al, 1988;
Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hartlage, et al., 1993; Weingartner, et al., 1981). This
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prediction is based on the idea that shallow and w e a k elaborative processing occurs due
to the reduced capacity and/or inadequate allocation of processing resources to neutral
materials, relative to depressive thoughts. This prediction of poor/shallow elaboration in
depression was tested in terms of the precise elaboration hypothesis (experiment 1A, IB,
and IC). This precision of elaboration hypothesis maintains that in a relatively novel and

new situation, the extent of learning and recall is determined by the quality of elaboration
(precision) rather than the amount of elaboration (Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein, et al,
1982; Stein, et al., 1984). That is, information (elaboration) clarifying the seemingly
arbitrary relationship often encountered in a new situation can facilitate the acquisition

the knowledge. In a relatively arbitrary situation, the questions subjects ask to lessen the
arbitrary relationship play an important role.
This precise elaboration hypothesis was applied to depression to explore how
shallow elaborative processing is reflected in the subject-generated elaboration paradigm
used by the Stein and Bransford (1979), and whether the extent of precise elaboration is
differentially affected by the types of task instruction for sentence continuation.
In experiment 1A with an ambiguous task instruction, subjects were allowed to
continue a base sentence with either a precise or an imprecise elaboration at their will.
The results showed overall recall deficits in dysphoric subjects, but that the extent of
precise elaboration was comparable in both groups. Considering precision of elaboration,
contingent upon recall accuracy (recalled or not recalled), nondysphoric subjects recalled
more target adjectives from more precisely elaborated contexts, while dysphorics did not
show such a difference. However, such overall recall deficits were not supported by the
extent of precise elaboration because both groups did not differ in terms of the extent of
precise elaboration. Rather, these results suggested that dysphoric subjects may have

difficulties retrieving such precise elaborations as they could elaborate the base sentence
as precisely as nondysphoric students.
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F r o m the perspective of the reduced capacity and resource allocation models,
overall recall deficits support the reduced capacity model, but on the other hand, the
same extent of precise elaboration contradicts the suggestion of poor elaborative
processing in depression (e.g., Weingartner, et al, 1981; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). One
possible reason for the same precision of elaboration seems related to the

uncontrolled/ambiguous task instruction, possibly letting subjects speak the first though
which pops into their mind. In regard to the precision of elaboration contingent upon the
recall accuracy, the reduced initiative hypothesis and lowered self-initiative proposal
appear to be more adequate in explaining such a group difference. That is, lowered selfinitiative prevented depressed subjects from accessing the memory trace of their own

precise elaboration at the retrieval phase. Furthermore, in a situation like an incidenta

recall, self-initiated activities for accessing their own elaborations seem more necessar
for good performance. In the case of Hertel and Hardin's (1991) study depressive
memory deficits were found in a context requiring initiative from subjects.
Alternatively, such a group difference in the relationship between recall accuracy
and the extent of precision of elaboration could be explained in terms of a response bias
(e.g., Miller & Lewis, 1977; Larner, 1977; Dunbar & Lishman, 1984). Depressed
subjects are less willing to access the memory trace during later recall or produce the
recalled item as a response even though their elaborations are as precise as
nondysphorics. However, to exclude the possibility of response bias, subjects were
instructed to guess if they did not know the answer. These results led to two subsequent
experiments, examining the retrieval phase and task instruction (encoding phase)
respectively.
Some changes were made in experiment IB; subjects were administered the BDI
twice, and only subjects who did not change their group category on two occasions were
included for the experiment according to the suggestion from Kendall et al. (1987), and
they were given a more specific task instruction ("continue each sentence in a
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semantically congruous way"). Experiment IB aimed to test whether the availability of
their own elaboration differentially affected nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects. The
results showed that the elaborated retrieval condition enhanced recall, compared to the

nonelaborated retrieval condition, but the retrieval condition did not interact with group.
Thus, it does not seem that dysphoric subjects' access to their own elaborations at the
retrieval phase is impaired due to lowered self-initative.
In experiment IC, task instruction was manipulated; specific instruction vs.
nonspecific instruction conditions. In recall performance, dysphoria interacted with task
instruction. Nondysphoric subjects enhanced their recall in the specific instruction
condition, while dysphoric subjects did not. Nondysphoric subjects recalled more target
adjectives in the specific instruction condition than did dysphoric subjects, while in the
nonspecific instruction, there was no difference between the groups. This enhanced recall
of nondysphoric subjects in the specific instruction condition replicated the previous
studies in the normal population (e.g., Stein & Bransford, 1979; Stein, et al., 1982). In
relation to the precision of elaboration rating scores, nondysphoric subjects elaborated
base sentences in a more precise way than dysphoric subjects. However, the nonspecific
instruction condition received a more precise elaboration rating, than the specific
instruction condition. The extent of precision of elaboration was positively associated
with the recall of target adjectives, whereas the severity of depression measured on the
BDI was negatively conelated with the extent of precise elaboration. These results
suggest that the more precisely elaborated target adjectives have a higher chance of being
recalled and that depression interferes with precise elaboration. Regarding recall
accuracy contingent upon the extent of precise elaboration, both groups recall more
target adjectives from more precisely elaborated contexts. One unexpected finding in the

precise elaboration rating that the superiority of the nonspecific instruction condition to
the specific instruction condition seemed to be attributed to the process of the rating
procedure. Raters judged each short phrase generated by subjects in terms of its
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relevance to its target adjective, which could giveriseto more precise elaborating scores
to the nonspecific task instruction. To exclude this possibility, a new rating was
conducted with a different rating instruction in which raters attempted to evaluate
sentences in a manner close to the specific task instruction - how well does the
completion explain why the action described was performed by that particular person.
However, this new rating procedure yielded very low intercorrelations among three
raters; none of the conelations among the three raters was significant. The failure to

obtain a significant conelation among raters suggests that it is very difficult to evaluat
sentences consistently in the "why-question" context. Examination of the subjects
responses revealed that very few of the sentences were elaborated in the way the
instructions requested. It may be that the elaboration task was too difficult for the
subjects in this experiment. This argument was also evidenced by low average
elaboration scores by the three raters (2.25 (SD=,66), 2.46 (SD=72), and 2.99

(SD=.85), on the 5 point scale), suggesting that in general they elaborated less precisely
than the average (3 on the scale). So easier sentences are required for subjects to
elaborate in a more precise way, whose precision of elaboration can be evaluated in a
more systematically by raters.
In conclusion, from the perspective of the long-term memory functioning in the
area of subject-generated precise elaboration, the elaboration activity of dysphoric
subjects depends upon the task instruction about how to continue base sentences with
short phrases, showing elaboration deficits (experiment IC). In contrast, nondysphoric
subjects appear to elaborate base sentences in a precise way spontaneously regardless of
task instruction and then take advantge of them for later recall In terms of recall
performance, dysphorics show performance deficits in a more uncontrolled task
instruction (experiment 1A), probably allowing their attention to wander from the task.
When a more specific task instruction is given (experiment IC; Why-question) with its
aim to reduce the arbitrary relationship to the base sentence, they did not make good use
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of it, showing recall deficits, compared to nondysphoric subjects. In general, these results
lend more support to the reduced initiative hyothesis (Hertel & Hardin, 1991; Hertel,
1994) and to lowered self-initiated activity hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1988;
Abramson, et al, 1981) than to the capacity-reduced hypothesis. However, it is not clear

that the lack of cognitive initiative of elaboration activity in depression originated fr
motivational or cognitive deficits (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). As the reduced initiative was

later called reduced cognitive control (Hertel, 1994), it seems related to cognitive defic
due to reduced capacity. If so, the reduced initiative hypothesis become very similar to
lowered self-initiated activity attributed to the reduced processing resources (Hasher &
Zacks, 1988). However, from overall recall performance of three experiments, it is
difficult to claim that total available capacity is reduced in depression. Rather, their
allocation of resources is inadequately directed to self-relevant/other task-irrelevant
environments as measured by the ATQ-N/P and CIQ by narrowing attentional focus.

Despite this theoretical ambiguity with reduced initiative hypothesis, more researches on
the cognitive strategies can be conducted owing to the specific prediction the model can
offer, compard to the reduced capacity model. As Ellis (1990) claimed, contribution of
reduced initiative hypothesis might he in the locus of depressive effect. Further work is
required to examine whether total capacity is reduced in an absolute term.

8.3 Short-term Memory.
Many of the published studies on short-term memory in depression are sketchy
and did not use a standard method. Furthermore they have some methodological
problems such as statistical regression because depressed subjects serve as their own
controls (cf. Colby & Gotlib, 1988), Channon et al. (1993b) also pointed out that studies
of STM in depression have been conducted without a clearcut theoretical framework. As
with Channon et al.'s (1993b) study, the cunent studies were conducted in terms of the
working memory model One of the aims of the experiments was to test the rehearsal
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difficulty hypothesis proposed by Colby & Gotlib (1988). Hasher and Zacks (1979)
classifed rehearsal as an effortful process, suggesting depressive memory deficits will
found in tasks requiring a rehearsal process. Similarly, Krarnes and McDonald (1985)

also suggest that depression will interfere with the maintence of information in STM due

to depressive thoughts. Several other studies also suggest STM deficits (e.g., Friedman,
1964; Rappaport, 1968, Henry, et al, 1973). This rehearsal difficulty hypothesis was
tested using several different paradigms including both verbal and visual STM;
experiment 3 A and 3B employed standard verbal memory span for digits with varying
retention intervals, experiment 3C examined the word length effect, experiment 3D
running memory span, and experiment 4A and 4B visual matrix patterns with varying
retention intervals.

8.3.1 Digit Span Memory and Word Length Effect in Depression
Contrary to the prediction of short-term memory deficits, experiment 3 A
employing 6 digits, showed that dysphoric subjects did not show overall memory deficits
and also depression did not interact with retention interval According to the rehearsal
difficulty hypothesis, dysphoric subjects should have shown more loss of information

over longer retention intervals. This result was replicated in experiment 3B using 7 dig
with longer retention intervals, relative to experiment 3 A. These results suggest that
depressed people can encode as effectively as nondepressed people and maintain
information in STM as well as nondepressed people, in spite of the more frequent
depressive thoughts reported by dysphoric subjects during an experiment. In terms of

automatic vs. effortful processing, these results suggest that maintenance rehearsal ma
not be seen as an effortful process. According to the working memory model, these

results can be explained as that the articulatory loop responsible for rehearsal remain
intact in depression. To examine the articulatory loop in depression, the word length
effect was investigated in experiment 3C with short and long words. If dysphoric
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students have a problem with articulatory functioning, they should show a smaller word
length effect, compared to nondysphoric students. However, dysphoric subject showed

the same word length effect as nondysphoric subjects, confirming the earlier results that
articulatory rehearsal in depression remains intact. This argument was further supported
by the lack of difference in speech rate between nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects.

These results are consistent with the Channon et al. (1993b) study testing the articulato

loop using the phonological similarity effect, forward digit span, and word length effect
One problem with this interpretation is based on the fact that power in these
verbal short-term memory experiments was low, suggesting relative insensitivity of
experiments. However, considering these experiments (3 A, 3B, 3C), close to

independent replications, leading to consistent data, these null findings do not necessar
seem to be related to insentivity of experiments. In the following experiment 3D, where
power is high, serial component did not differ between groups. In addition, a series of
experiments by Channon et al (1993b) drew a same conclusion; articulatory loop
responsible for serial recall remain intact.

8.3.2 Running Memory Span in Depression
Considering these results, depression may interfere with the operation of the
central executive, which regulates and coordinates attentional resources among its
subcomponents and appears to be called in on tasks involving a high mental load such as
cognitive strategy selection and decision making. To test this assumption, the mnning
memory span task was employed in experiment 3D. The task is considered as consisting
of serial recall and updating components, tapping the articulatory loop and central
executive respectively (Morris & Jones, 1990). Thus, if depression reduced capacity in
the central executive, dysphoric subjects should show memory deficits in the updating
component rather than in the serial recall component. Consistent with this assumption,
the updating process leads to memory impairment in depression, while the serial
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component remains intact, confirming the results of experiment 3A-3C. These results
suggest that depressive STM deficits do not come from a deficit in simple maintenance
rehearsal, but from a deficit in elaborative rehearsal requiring cognitive strategy such
in the updating component, suggesting an impairment of central executive functioning.
The possibility of impairment in the central executive was also suggested by the Channon
and Robertson (1993b), and Channon and Baker (1994) studies employing different
tasks such as backward digit span, which are assumed to involve central executive
capacity.

8.3.3 Maintenance vs. Elaborative Rehearsal
Several studies mentioned earlier suggest rehearsal difficulty or STM deficits in
depression, but they did not clearly distinguish between maintenance and elaborative
rehearsal. Several studies with nondysphorics made a distinction between these two types
of rehearsal (cf. Craik & Lockhart, 1972, Craik & Watkins, 1973; for a review, see
Greene, 1987). Maintenance rehearsal is rote, repetitive and prolongs an items'
accessibility without leading to permanant memory storage, thus using minimal cognitive

capacity. In contrast, elaborative rehearsal functions to enrich and elaborate the memory
trace by adopting processes such as chunking, forming images, or recoding material in
various ways. With this distinction, maintenance rehearsal such as in experiment 3A-3C
appears to underly the articulatory loop, while elaborative rehearsal such as in the
updating processing involves central executive resources. So the current data
(experiment 3A-3C) suggests that depression does not interfere with the articulatory
loop functioning, and that depression impairs central executive functioning. A similar
interpretation is feasible when automatic vs. effortful processing is equated with
maintenance vs. elaborative rehearsal respectively. However, to avoid circularity, we
need to have an independent criterion for establishing whether a task is effortful The
position is cunently unsatisfactory, but the results suggest that effortfulness is not
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identical to task difficulty. W h e n simple memory span was made more difficult by
increasing the memory load or word length, no differences were found between
dysphorics and controls. It was only when a need for making strategic decisions was
added to the task that the effect of mood became apparent; that is when elaborative
rehearsal is required by the task. So with this distinction between types of rehearsal,
more accurate prediction can be made on whether the rehearsal process would be
interfered with by depression.

8.3.4 Visuo-spatial Memory of Matrix Patterns
Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed that spatial information is automatically
processed, hence is not impaired by depression. However, there is controversy as to
whether visuo-spatial memory is an automatic process even in the normal population (cf
Naveh-Benjamin, 1988, Ellis, 1990), In the case of the depressed population, when the
Corsi block span task was used, an immediate recall did not show any difference between
a depressed group and normal controls (Channon, et al, 1993b; Richards & Ruff, 1989),
but the delayed condition showed memory deficits (Richards & Ruff, 1989), suggesting a

rehearsal difficulty. The current thesis was interested in whether depression impairs th
rehearsal process underlying visual STM (visuo-spatial sketch pad) in the visual
recognition memory of matrix patterns with varying retention intervals. Assuming that
the rehearsal difficulty hypothesis is extended to the visual STM, it was expected that
dysphoric subjects would show a more dramatic decrement at longer retention intervals,
compared to nondysphoric subjects. Contrary to this prediction, experiment 4A (4 x 4
matrix patterns) showed no interaction between group and retention intervals. Once
dysphoric subjects encoded visual stimuli, they could maintain the stimuli as well as
nondysphoric subjects. However, when the complexity of the matrix patterns increased
to 5 x 5 patterns, an interaction between group and retention interval was found

(experiment 4B). The source of this interaction lies in immediate recognition rather tha
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delayed recognition, suggesting encoding difficulty rather than difficulty in rehearsal of
visual patterns. As with experiment 4A, once dyphoric subjects encode visual stimuli,
they could maintain the stimuli as well as nondysphoric subjects. In terms of the working
memory model, these results were interpreted as that the visuo-spatial sketch pad remain

intact, but central executive function is impaired. This interpretation is made on the ba
of Morris' (1987) study, which he argued showed that encoding of visual patterns
requires some portion of the central executive resources, while maintenance rehearsal of
visual patterns requires minimal resources of the central executive. Taken together with
verbal short-term memory, these results suggest that i) regardless of verbal and visual
stimuli, tasks requiring maintenance rehearsal are impervious to depression, ii) both the
articulatory loop and the visuo-spatial scratch pad remain intact in depression and iii)
central executive functioning appears to be impaired.

8.4 Depressive Thoughts and Memory Performance
Negative self-referent cognitions were considered as an etiological factor in the
maintenance and exacerbation of depression, and their impairing effects on performance
were also examined. In effect, throughout LTM and STM tasks, dysphoric students
reported having experienced negative self-referent thoughts as measured by the ATQ-N.
This result means that depression is characterized by a preponderance of negative
thoughts and supports the idea that this negative tendency plays an important role in the
maintenance of depressed mood. The opposite pattern is true of nondysphoric subjects;
they reported more positive automatic thoughts, relative to negative automatic thoughts.
These results suggest that depression regulates the accessibility of negative/positive
automatic thoughts; depression increases the accessibility of negative thoughts, while
reducing positive automatic thoughts. However this heightened accessibility of negative
automatic thoughts was not replicated in the depression induced by the VMIP,

suggesting that an enduring characteristic, such as a negative self-schema is responsible
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for negative thoughts rather than temporarily induced depression (experiment 3C). O n
the other hand, elated mood states increase the accessibility of positive automatic
thoughts. These asymmetric effects of depressed and elated mood induction seem to lend
more support to "cognitive priming" rather than mood effects itself (Riskind, et al
1985). In the case of nondysphoric subjects, positive information congruent to their
schema in the elation condition easily primed self-schema, leading to an increased
accessibility of positive automatic thoughts, while noncongruent information to their
schema such as in the depression induction did not.
However, when the frequency of negative thoughts is conelated with task
performance, the expected negative conelation is not obtained, which is contradictory to
the disruptive role of negative thoughts assumed by several theoretical frameworks
(Beck, 1967; Brown, 1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Several
reasons for this can be suggested. First, negative automatic thoughts generated
consciously or unconsciously require minimal attentional resources, thus do not impair
performance on the criterial task (Bargh & Tota, 1988). Second, when frequencies of

negative and positive automatic thoughts within each individual are combined, their total
frequency did not differ in nondysphoric and dysphoric groups. As with negative
thoughts, if positive thoughts are assumed to be disruptive to performance, there should
not be any between-group difference in performance (cf. Seibert & Ellis, 1991). Third,
what matters in relation to performance may not be the frequency dimension of negative
thoughts, but some other dimensions such as controllability, personal meaningfulness,

and intensity. Unless negative thoughts are directly manipulated or investigated, the rol
of negative thoughts regarding performance is tentative. Rather than negative automatic
thoughts, in general task-irrelevant thoughts/mind-wandering as measured by the CIQ,
seem to be a better predictor of performance. This is because the CIQ includes both
negative self-referent and task-inelevant thoughts. Particularly the indice of mindwandering was the best predictor of performance compared to other measures such as
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the B D I , ATQ-N/-P, and C I Q in experiment 3C. Dysphoric subjects let their mind
wander more frequently than nondysphoric subjects do, suggesting a concentration
difficulty.

8.5 Conclusion
Elaborative activity plays an important role in acquiring new information.
Sometimes, elaborative information is provided by the experimenter, but to learn
effectively, subjects themselves have to generate their elaborations by utilizing prior
knowledge to acquire new, seemingly arbitrary information. By doing so, more durable
and distinctive memory traces could be laid down and subsequently could be utilized to
facilitate recall However, just adding semantically congruous information to the current

context does not seem to be sufficient to facilitate learning and recall, rather, regardle
of the amount of information added, the quality (precision) of information added is more
important in a novel situation; that is, lessening the arbitrariness characterising new
information by being associated with prior knowledge and thus laying down a more
distinctive memory trace. This assumption was tested through the processing of arbitrary
sentences, an analogue to a novel situation, among nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects.
Dysphoric subjects appear to have some difficulty utilizing prior knowledge to generate
more precise elaborations, particularly when they are prompted to do so by the task
instruction. However, once they produce a precise elaboration, they can make use of
their own elaborations as effectively as nondysphoric people (experiment IC). These

results suggest some difficulties of dysphorics in learning in a new situation by initiat
precise elaboration, ie., utilizing prior knowledge or experiences to make the context
more meaningful. Furthermore, as depression gets severe, it seems that depressed people
find it more difficult to use prior knowledge for precise elaboration. In general these
results appear to be consistent with the reduced intiative hypothesis focusing on the
initiation of effortful processing. Other supporting evidence to the reduced initiative
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hypothesis is that nondysphoric subjects m a k e good use of their o w n elaborations

consistently regardless of task instruction (more or less controlled) for later performanc
while dysphoric students are sensitive to the task instruction in both elaboration and
recall. In a broad sense, these results put constraints on a general elaboration deficit
hypothesis. This is because elaboration activity can be affected by the task instruction.
The short-term memory functioning in dysphoric people can be accommodated
by the working memory model. Contrary to the rehearsal difficulty hypothesis, the
articulatory and visuo-scratch pad seem to be intact (experiment 3A-3C), Rather, they

have difficulty using cognitive strategies involving the central executive, as shown in th

running memory span task. Consistent with these results, in the recognition test of visual
matrix patterns, dysphoric subjects showed problems with encoding, involving the
central executive rather than maintenance rehearsal of visual patterns over the retention

interval. In sum, dysphoric people have difficulties using elaborative rehearsal rather th
maintenance rehearsal. The simple rehearsal difficulty hypothesis should be refined to
accomodate such differential effects of depression on maintenance vs. elaborative
rehearsal. As with the long-term memory findings, these results lend support to the
reduced initiative hypothesis because dysphoric subjects have difficulties in
employing/initiating cognitive strategies.
For an analogue study of depression, the combined method of the VMIP and
MMIP looks desirable particularly if researchers are interested in the measurement of
cognitive and behavioural variables. The combined method is more effective than either
the VMIP or MMIP alone in terms of duration and intensity of initially induced
depression.
Finally, performance correlates of negative self-referent thoughts as measured by
the ATQ-N are not apparent across long term and short-term memory tasks. These
results hold even though dysphoric subjects show dysfunctional thinking in terms of a
higher proportion of negative automatic thoughts. These findings suggest that negative
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automatic thoughts can be processed unconsciously or consciously without placing a
high mental load on attentional resources. Or assuming that positive automatic thoughts
play a similar role to negative automatic thoughts during the task as intrusive thoughts,
the equal number of automatic thoughts in both nondysphoric and dysphoric subjects can
suggest no difference in performance. A better predictor of performance in both longterm and short-term memory was mind-wandering, Suggesting that dysphoric students
lose their concentration more frequently than nondysphoric subjects. In future studies,
other than the number of automatic thougths, other dimensions such as personal
meaningfulness and intensity should be taken into account in explaining performance

deficits. These results hold for naturally occurring dysphorics, but not for experimentall
depressed people, suggesting that the heightened accessibility of negative self-referent
thoughts as measured by the ATQ-N appears to be associated with more enduring
attributes of naturally occurring depressed people rather than temporarily induced
depression.

8.6 Qualifications of the Present Thesis and Suggestions for Future Research
First of all, all experiments reported here were based on a mildly/moderately
depressed student population. Even if results from analogue studies using a student
population are claimed to be applicable to a clinical population, a direct investigation
the precise elaboration hypothesis and mrniing memory span task in clinical population
seems worthwhile.
In detail, in regard to the selection of dysphoric students, a simple two stage
selection method using the self-reported measure of depression does not appear to be

sufficient to guarantee a stable depressed group. In addition, using a diagnostic criteri

for depression is more desirable to obtain a clear-cut result. Particularly, this issue is
related to experiment 1A using a median split method upon completion of an
experimental task. In general, most studies on depression excluded subjects scoring from
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6 to 9 on the B D I . However, experiment 1 A included such subjects, causing some
problems in comparing its results to the other two experiments (experiment IB and IC).
In future studies exploring negative/positive automatic thoughts in memory
performance, rather than the conelational method used in the current experiments, more
direct investigation on negative self-referent thoughts is required. After selecting a
depressed population, a further screening procedure may be conducted to single out
people who experience certain types of negative automatic thoughts frequently and a
further experiment carried out to investigate the effects of such thoughts on memory
performance. One study (Sutherland, et al, 1982) employed a similar procedure but they
did not examine the effects of such thoughts on memory performance.
In relation to the visual recognition test of matrix patterns, the current two
experiments only employed a fixed level of complexity of matrix patterns with varying
retention intervals. The development of a corresponding visual running memory span

task to the verbal running memory is required to investigate whether differential effects
of depression on serial vs. updating components found in the verbal running memory
span task, can be replicated with visual stimul Also the cunent suggestion of the
impairment of central executive functioning should be further explored using different

types of task assumed to involving central executive capacity. If depressives suffer from
impaired use of cogntive strategy in the running memory span task, the provision of a
helpful cognitive strategy performing a running memory span should remove depressive
memory deficits. In regard to the rehearal difficulty hypothesis in both short-term and
long-term memory aspects, further study is required to investigate whether maintenance
vs. elaborative rehearsal is differentially affected by depression.
Finally, as discussed in the relevant sections, the insufficient power shown in both
verbal and visual experiments requires the replication and extention of previous
experiments with a sufficient power to confirm the argument that rehearsal process
remains intact in depressed mood states.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Base sentences used in Experiment 1A.
1. The funny man bought the cake.
2. The tall man purchased the crackers.
3. The rich man bought the paint
4. The grey-haired man carried the bottle.
5. The bold man used the telephone.
6. The angry man watched the TV.
7. The rude man climbed up the ladder.
8. The happy man used the charchol
9. The short man put up the tent.
10. The greedy man kicked the ball.
11. The slow man went to the library.
12. The handsome man listened to music.
13. The quite man got a hair-cut.
14. The brave man went into the house.
15. The lucky man cleaned the floor.

Appendix B
Base sentences used in Experiment IB.
1. The hungry man bought a tie.
2. The short man put up the tent.
3. The funny man bought the cake.
4. The rich man bought the paint.
5. The clumsy man cut the paper.
6. The tall man purchased the biscuits.
7. The thin man found the scissors.
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8. The polite man used the telephone.
9. The rude man climed up the ladder.
10. The slow man went to the library
11, The handsome man listened to music.
12. The grey-haired mm opened the fridge.
13. The brave man went into the house.
14. The lucky man cleaned the floor.
15. The strong man read the book.
16. The fat man went to the station.
17. The quite man got a hair-cut.
18. The young man drove the car.
19. The friendly man ate the dinner
20. The outgoing man looked at his picture.

Appendix C
Base sentences used in Experiment IC.
1. The angry man watched the TV.
2. The kind man ate dinner.
3. The fat man wore the shoes.
4. The strong man read the book.
5. The freightened mm walked up the steps.
6. The brave man gave money to the robber.
7. The old man bought the paint.
8. The funny man bought the ring.
9. The smart man went to work.
10. The short man put up the tent.
11. The lucky man walked home.
12. The greedy man kicked the ball.
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13. The tall m a n purchased the biscuits.
14, The slow m a n went to the library.
15. The thin m a n found the scissors

Appendix D
List of words used in Experiment 3C.
Zinc/Deer/Perth/Maths/Stove
AlunnniumAJniversity/Refrigerator/Louisiana/Periodical
Coonabarabran/Period4calAruberculosis/Alurninium/University
Scroll/Deer/Greece/Mumps/Perth
Greece/School/Deer/Maine/Mumps
Maine/Zinc/School/Perth/Maths
Aluminium/Coonabarabran/Physiology/Yugoslavia/Tuberculosis
Mumps/Stove/Greece/Zinc/Maine
School/Mumps/Maine/Greece/Scroll
Perth/Maths/Deer/Scroll/Stove
Zinc/Scroll/Maths/Deer/Perth
Louisiana/Yugoslavia/Tuberculosis/Physiology/Periodical
Deer/School/Maine/Perth/Zinc
Physiology/Tuberculosis/Aluminium/Coonabarabran/Louisiana
Deer/Perth/Maths/School/Zinc
Louisiana/Refrigerator/Periodical/University/Hippopotamus
Perth/Maine/Scroll/Deer/School
Mumps/Zinc/Scroll/Stove/Maths
Tuberculosis/Physiology/Yugoslavia/Hippopotamus/Coonabarabran
Refrigerator/Hippopotamus/YugoslaviaAJniversity/Tuberculosis
Greece/Stove/School/Maine/Scroll
Hippopotamus/Louisiana/Aluminium/Refrigerator/Coonabarabran
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Maths/Maine/Stove/Greece/Mumps
Yugoslavia/Coonabarabran/University/Tuberculosis/ Aluminium
Periodical/Refrigerator/Louisiana/ Aluminium/University
Scroll/Greece/Mumps/Stove/School
Coonabarabran/Periodical/Refrigerator/Louisiana/Aluminium
Yugoslavia/Louisiana/Physiology/Coonabarabran/Hippopotamus
Periomcal/Aluminium/Hippopotamus/Refrigerator/Physiology
Stove/Maths/Perth/Scroll/Greece
Urtiversity/Tuberculosis/Coonabarabran/Physiology/Yugoslavia
University/Aluminium/Coonabarabran/Tuberculosis/Physiology
School/Greece/Mumps/Zinc/Maine
Tuberculosis/University/Hippopotamus/Yugosla\da/Refrigerator
Maine/Perth/Zinc/Maths/Deer
Refrigerator/Physiology/Periodical/Hippopotamus/Louisiana
Stove/Mumps/Zinc/School/Greece
Physiology/Hippopotamus/University/Periodical/Yugoslavia
Maths/Scroll/Stove/Mumps/Deer
Hippopotamus/Yugoslavia/Loirisiana/Periodical/Refrigerator
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Appendix E

Table 4.2 Analysis of Variance on Mean Recall Scores in Experiment IB
Sources D.F M.S. F Pr
Group (G)

1

2.67

.24

.626

23.63

16.23

.000

Enor(G) 34 11.04
Retrieval
Condition (R)

1

G*R 1 .01 .01 .922
Enor(G*R) 34 1.46

Table 4.3 Analysis of Variance on Mean Recall Scores in Experiment IC
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 3.27 .446 .507
Task
Instruction (I)

1

G*I 1 35.267 4.815 .032
Enor 56 7,324

13.067

1.784

.187
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Table 4.4 Analysis of Variance on Mean Elaboration Rating Scores
in Experiment IC
Sources

D.F.

M.S.

F

Pr

Group (G)

1

5.44

13.03

.001

Task
Instruction (I)

1

3.97

9.49

.003

6.25
.25

20.71
.82

.000
.368

G*I 1 .00 .00 .980
Enor 56 .30
Recall Accuracy (R)l

G*R

1

I*R

1

.16

.53

.468

G*I*R

1

.04

.12

.731

56

.30

Enor

Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on Ratios of ATQ-P/-N in Experiment IC.
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 7.707 15.372 .000
Task
Instruction. (I)

1

G*T 1 .871 1.737 .193
Enor 55 .501

.727

1.450

.234
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Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on the CIQ in Experiment IC.
Sources

D. F.

Group (G)
Task
Inst. (I)

1

M . S.
448.267

1

21.600

F
11.617

.56

Pr
.001

.457

G*T 1 92.267 2.495 .120
Enor 56 38.586

Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on "Controlability" in Experiment IC.
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 7.677 3.964 .051
Task
Instruction. (I)

1

.523

.270

.605

G*I 1 2.302 1.189 .280
Enor 55 1.937

Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on "Wandering" in Experiment IC.
Sources D.F. M. S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 5.946 3,128 .082
Task
Instruction (I)

1

G*I 1 ,019 .010 .921
Error 55 1.901

.401

.211

.648
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Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on ATQ-P.
Sources

D. F.

M . S.

F

Pr

Group (G)

1

779.162

.955

.333

Task
Inst (I)

1

735.421

.902

.347

G*I 1 719.161 .882 .352
Enor 55 815.667

Table 4.5 Analysis of Variance on A T Q - N in Experiment IC.
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 5150.722 38.882 .000
Task
Inst (I)

1

4.861

.037

.849

G*I 1 .010 .000 .993
Enor 55 132.472

Figure 5.1 Analysis of Covariance on the D A C L in Experiment 2

F

Pr

3.07

.039

.02

3,07

.031

9

.02

3.18

.002

120

.01

M. S.

Sources

D.F.

Induction
Procedures (I)

3

.21

Enor (I)

39

.07

Time (T)

3

I *T
Enor (I * T.
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Figure 5.2 Analysis of Covariance on VAS-D in Experiment 2
Sources
Induction
Procedures (I)

D.F.

3

M.S.

F

5856.90

2,40

Pr

.082

Enos (I) 39 2435.82
Time(T) 3 799.04 3.20 .026
M*T 9 596.21 2.39 .016
Enor (I * T) 120 249.67

Figure 5.3 Analysis of Covariance on VAS-A (anxiety) in Experiment 2.
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr

Induction
Procedures (I)

3

1902.52

1.61

.204

Enor (I) 39 1184.77
Time(T) 3 459.56 3.48 .018
I*T 9 212.39 1.61 .121
Enor(I*T) 120 132.18

Table 6.1 Analysis of Variance on Percentages of Items Recalled Correctly
in Experiment 3A

M. S.

F

Pr

1

18.83

.08

.779

29

234.49

Retention
Interval (R)

2

10.25

.34

.712

G*R

2

5.88

.20

.823

Enor (G * R)

58

30.02

Sources
Group (G)
Enor (G)

D.F.
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Table 6.2 Analysis of Variance on Percentages of Items Recalled Correctly in
Experiment 3B.
Sources

D.F.

Group (G)

M. S.
290,34

Pr
.78

Enor (G)

33

370.40

Retention
Interval (R)

2

242.06

3.32

59.47

.81

G*R
Enor

66

.382

.0 42
.447

73

Table 6.4 Analysis of Variance on Proportions of Words Recalled
in Experiment 3C.

M. S.

Sources

D.F.

Group (G)

3

351.38

Enor (G)

56

426.57

Syllable (S)

1

G*S
Enor (G * S)

Pr
.82

.486

36486.20

331.19

.000

3

125.23

1.14

.342

56

110.17

Table 6.5 Analysis of Variance on Speech Rate (One Syllable words)
in Experiment 3 C
Sources

D.F.

.8417

Group (G)
Error

M.S.

56

.4605

F
1.8279

Pr
.1526
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Table 6.5 Analysis of Variance on Speech Rate (Five Syllable Words)
in Experiment 3C
Sources

D.F.

Group (G)

3

.0949

56

.0591

Enor

M.S.

F
1.6069

Pr
.1980

Table 6.6 Analysis of Variance on the ATQ-N in Experiment 3C

M. S.

F

3

1369.9075

1.7827

54

768.4333

Sources

D.F.

Group (G)
Enor

Pr
.1614

Table 6. 6 Analysis of Variance on Ratios (ATQ-N/ATQ-P) in Experiment 3C

M. S.

Sources

D.F.

Group (G)

3

.4313

54

.0673

Enor

F
6.4054

Pr
.0009

Table 6.6 Analysis of Variance on CIQ in Experiement 3C
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 3 29.7452 .6773 .5696
Enor 55 43.9141
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Figure 6.1 Analysis of Variance on Running Memory Span in Experiment 3D
Sources
Group (G)

D.F.

M. S.

1

4182.11

32

792.67

Updating (U)

3

G*U

Enor (G)

Enor (G * U )

F

Pr

5.28

,028

4371.47

23.46

.000

3

367.18

1.97

,124

96

186.37

Figure 6.2 Analysis of Variance on the Combined Scores (Serial vs. Updating) in
Experiment 3D
Sources
Group (G)

D. F.
1

M . S.

F

1056.67

2.31

Pr
.138

Enor(G) 32 457.64
Updating (U) 1 8241.45 50.27 .000
G*U 1 699.24 4.27 .047
Enor(G*U) 32 163.93

Table 7.1 Analysis of Variance on the correct trials in the recognition test
(4x4 matrix patterns) in Experiment 4A.
Sources D.F. M.S. F Pr
Group (G) 1 810.00 2.55 .122
Enor(G) 28 317.94
Retention
Interval (R)

2

G*R 2 23,33 .18 .836
Enor (G * R) 56 129.84

341.11

2.63

.081
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Table 7.2 Analysis of Variance on the correct trials in the recognition test
(5x5 matrix patterns) in Experiment 4B.
Group (G)

1

118.63

.13

.725

1353.92

6.42

.003

Enor(G) 32 941.51
Retention
Interval (R)

2

G*R 2 665.69 3.16 .049
Enor(G*R) 64 210.85

